TOWARDS A REFORM OF MODERN UNIVERSITY STUDIES

Ad reformandum universitatem

1

Anthropology, Sociology, Philology, Aesthetics

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C O N T E N T S

A List of Tables

AD REFORMANDUM UNIVERSITATEM

General Plan

1. A **systematic classification of sciences**: their evolutionary ordering, mutual hierarchy, structural interrelations and subordination, their integration into macro-sciences and new taxonomic nomenclature. Anchoring the system of academic studies and research institutes in General Science Theory.
2. The **systematic constitution of sciences**: adopting a unified standard for the constitution and construction of sciences in order that they may not describe only facts but link elementary units into complete (graph-theoretical) trees constituting an integrated taxonomy of valid categories. A transition from isolated branches of 'descriptive factography' to systematic sciences (systematic archaeology, systematic ethnology).
3. An **algebraic formalisation of sciences**: all sciences endowed with a calculus and assigned as simple **algebraic systems** generating output elements (systematic categories) from a set of input elements (units).
4. The **integration of sciences into macro-sciences**: isolated sciences enquiring into different affiliated aspects of one process (anthropology - archaeology – ethnology – mythology – comparative linguistics) integrated into one macro-science (macro-anthropology) taught as an introduction to all affiliated majors at one 'macro-faculty' (Faculty of anthropological studies).
5. **Professional stratification of sciences**: adopting a received standard for dividing **systematic sciences** (systematic botany) strictly from applied technology (agronomy), teacher training studies (botanical methodology), practical handicraft (animal husbandry) and occult sciences (fantastic cryptozoology). Adopting a received standard for the inner classification of **applied sciences** into constructive, remedial, reconstructive, maintaining, facultative and terminative technology. Anchoring applied studies in an integrated theory of applied sciences.
6. **Rooting academic studies in positive interdisciplinary methodology** conceived as 'an introduction to mathematical models', 'general system theory' or 'macrosemantics'. In the university curricula its course may include 'general science theory' and 'an integrated theory of applied sciences'.
7. **Underbuilding academic studies with historical methodology** conceived as 'scientific psychopathology', i.e. a 'negative antimethodology' of ideological diseases in science. The methodology of any field of study may be understood comprehensibly only on the background of its history of research demonstrating basic ideological deformations of scientific thought.
8. **Re-launching a project of Unified Science** (PUS) initiated by the *Wienerschule* and enacting a **Constitution of Academic studies** (CAS) to

protect their rights by delimiting institutional domains of systematic science, applied technology, school education, state ideology and church theology.



Table 1 *The model of Unified Science studies at the reformed university*

The Academic Reform: its Whys and Wherefores

Modern universities still preserve the general pattern of medieval university studies aspiring to give universal, encyclopaedic education implied in the very term *universitas* 'universal existence, general knowledge'. Apart from subordinating science to divine studies as *ancilla theologiae*, the **medieval model** did not distinguish general academic science from applied sciences taught at the faculties of law and medicine. As a consequence, both faculties are included into 'universal education', even if medicine may be defined as 'applied anthropology' and law as 'applied sociology'. A more consistent approach would separate them as 'botany' and 'agronomy' and promote them by founding their independent colleges. As there is no rational clue accepted for separating different application levels but medieval tradition, the modern

university is a melting pot of incompatible applications where academic research, teacher-training studies, applied technology and popular journalism all hustle together to survive and resume their position on one professorial chair.

The Renaissance Age liberated humanities from the reign of church scholasticism and opened **royal academies** for their studies at courts. These promoted learning concentrated on philology as a key providing access to reading ancient texts and literacy for the awakening nation. They provided a model of education detached from experimental research and standing aloof from commerce and crafts. Natural sciences started a reform of modern studies in the 19th century when the **polytechnic model** of higher education inspired secession from universities to new colleges of applied technology and arts. This schism divorced theoretical chemistry from metalworking and systematic zoology from veterinary medicine but never struck philologists as worth noticing and following. When Boutroux, Bourget, Dilthey and Rickert blasted a trumpet for a new mighty counter-attack against positivist experimental science they fortified their positions in the bastion of humanities and defended them as *Geisteswissenschaften*, the last refuge of intuition and spirituality. Their retreat into the irrational was backed up by the awoken rear-guards of church clattering with the armour of Neo-Thomist theology. After three centuries of secular rationalism European thought submerged into the misty cloud of new modern and post-modern scholasticism jetting in three geysers from priest seminaries in Louvain, Freiburg and Angelicum. In the end the laurel wreath of champions landed on the heads of their allies, secular thinkers Nietzsche, Heidegger and Derrida who invented religion without gods and reconstructed metaphysics by its 'deconstruction'. Soviet Marxists headed by Lifshitz did not lag much behind, and installed their own tradition of dogmatic scholasticism based on a cult of secular saints.

The crucial problem of sciences is their perpetual dying, ritual resurrection and repeated ascension that occur in every century in dependence upon waves of cultural rise and decay. As Milesian, Sophistic and Peripatetic encyclopaedism were followed by the dark ages of Pythagorean, Socratic and Stoic astrology, so Darwin, Spencer and Mendeleyev's century could be followed by a dark age of martial genocide and religious intolerance. Modern natural sciences have learnt to cope with irrationalism and fend off its attacks by establishing firm boundaries between systematic, applied, popular, ideological and occult knowledge. Social sciences have not carried such division and still persist in the medieval state when physics constituted one subject with alchemy, or remained part of 'black magic science' as is still common in the savage mind. If they ever ceased to serve as a maidservant to

theology, it was just to make a humble housewife to modern hermeneutics or to truckle in a toady-like manner as *ancilla ideologiae politicae*.

Humanities fall an easy prey to mental disorders of the decadent modern and post-modern moods because they do not stand on any systematics and cannot offer any consistent anthropogenesis, ethnogenesis, glottogenesis or culturogenesis of mankind. Instead of relying on natural sciences as their trustworthy husband, they take resort to hermeneutics that treats all phenomena as 'arbitrary psychological constructions' that can be given any 'arbitrary subjective interpretation'. Hermeneutics ignores millennia of lawful evolution of human nations, their mythology, folklore and languages and claims that any language or work of arts may be considered exhaustively as a momentary product of the author's or perceiver's mind. For modern hermeneutics stars, bodies, texts and poems are just signs, whose being and meaning is created *ex post* by the human soul. It does not admit any evolution, cultural development or theoretical categories, nor does it acknowledge any external or social reality, so it has nothing to scrutinise and study but the subjective self. It applies the same **interpretive semantics** as is peculiar to astrology, parapsychology and occult sciences when interpreting stars, palms, livers or handwriting. In its view physics must be replaced by metaphysics and historical sciences by their false makeshifts, by psycholinguistics, psychopoetics, phenomenological aesthetics and interpretive sociology. Its present epidemic has much to do with the explosion of post-modern irrationality and fundamentalism. Every century had its *Taliban* and harvested similar fruits in martial and cultural genocide.

Any academic reform is likely to fail unless all sciences join their efforts to adopt sound standards of natural sciences, finish their constitution and develop a systematic taxonomy in their fields of study. Our knowledge would remain just a poor heap of facts without Darwin's phylogenesis, Mendeleyev's periodic table of chemical elements, Chomsky's reform of linguistics or Hubble's cosmogenesis conceived as a lawful evolution of stars. Astronomy has become immune to astrology and chemistry immune to alchemy by developing their inner systematics that drained the latter two safely into the gutter of the popular tabloid press. All future academic reforms necessarily converge to Moritz Schlick's and *Wienerschule*'s program of '**Unified Science**' spreading the realm of standard exact methods to the universe of human knowledge.

Means, Steps and Measures

A. Comte and H. Spencer succeeded with their projects of classification of sciences because their times longed and craved for historical evolutionary

systematics. But our generation lives in a different world, we resemble Jansenists who worked on their concepts of *Grammaire générale et raisonnée* in the sombre seclusion of walls in the monastery at Port-Royal. Arnaud, Lancelot, Pascal, Descartes and Comenius dreamt about their own drafts of Unified Science (*pansophia*) but they had to bow humbly to the contemporary *Taliban* that looked down on their endeavours with hostile contempt. Also modern sciences can integrate only if they are secluded, if we 'pass a constitution of scientific rights' separating the institutional domain of systematic science from those of applied technology, school education, state ideology and church theology.

Such a Bill of Scientific Rights cannot be enacted only as a formal declaration but it must be sheltered by two new disciplines endowed with public approval and consensus in the academic community: general **science theory**, i.e. positive methodology providing a general plan of classifying and constructing all sciences, and **heuristic psychopathology** devised as 'negative methodology' describing ideological deformations in the history of science. The latter is usually taught in college courses of general philosophy but few textbooks can bridge this over with the methodology of general science or a particular field of study. Our plan is to build it as **general ideology** comprising both philosophy and methodology but systematise it as K. Jasper's *Psychopathologie der Weltanschauungen* or 'the social psychopathology of mental disorders in science'. While positive methodology teaches what science should be, negative methodology would teach why science was not what it should have been owing to the ideological pressures of the times. It will not consist in fiery moral harangues or simply condemning ideology and astrology but in the integrated theory of the occult, esoteric and irrational and in statistic surveys of their lawful periodic occurrence in history. Science does not need any further weapons to defend its frontiers against social ideology but the very grace of knowledge shedding light on obscurity, lie and fallacy.

The second set of measures concerns a transition from integrating science as a whole to integrating sciences and their facultative subtheories into well-ordered and well-defined standardised **macro-disciplines**. There is probably no urgent need to outline 'general macrophysics' and 'macrobiology' because natural sciences refuse to live in mutual isolation and manage to benefit fruitfully from their mutual links. Yet in anthropological, social, political and philological sciences such methodological seclusion is a general rule. Anthropology, archaeology, ethnology and comparative linguistics give different accounts of our human past and do not feel worried why its story is told in contradictory versions and incompatible evolutionary categories. Any further progress is conditioned by co-ordinating their fields into **macro-anthropology** that would project one unified taxonomy of evolutionary

categories. Similar projects have to be launched for co-ordinating humanities into ‘macro-sociology’, ‘macro-ideology’ and’ macro-philology’. Mathematics, geometry, logic and semantics are esteemed as well-founded exact sciences but the degree of the inner and mutual co-ordination is next to none. Obviously, our efforts to found an efficient positive methodology of science must aim at ‘an introduction to macro-mathematics’ that may temporarily be substituted by a theory of mathematical models. Neither of them can, however, make up for what they should be after integrating with logic semantics into one formal theory of the universe called **macro-semantics**.

The third set of steps concerns individual sciences themselves but not regarded in traditional vagueness but taught in clear-cut courses of systematic science. After anthropological sciences have agreed on one probable model of human evolution and co-ordinated their categories, they can concentrate on their special fields and reconstruct their apparatus into systematic anthropology archaeology and ethnology. Speaking in terms of academic institutions, the board of fellows at one *Faculty of Anthropological Sciences* can see to the syllabi of an introductory course on *Macro-Anthropology* and then depart to individual departments where they devise four-term curricula of *Systematic Ethnology*. At an independent *College of Applied Social Studies* students start with a course of *Macro-Anthropology* but continue with lectures on *Applied Ethnography* or *Applied Sociology*.

The most urgent goal is not enforce any formal administrative reforms but to fill in blank gaps in human knowledge by introducing ten or twenty new integrating disciplines that have been left out or neglected owing to the traditional one-sided division of university studies. The traditional disciplines focused on a narrow field of evidence and now it is up to the modern reformed university to build upper stories of knowledge and to shelter single groundwork pillars with one roof of integrating higher theories. The general plan is to call for dissertations and theoretical projects contributing to the Program of Unified Science (PUS) and offer foremost universities and outstanding research institutes participation in defending them. The idea is not to take or award any degrees but to finish into an accomplished form projects that might blossom only in the fertile soil of some chosen countries and academic campuses. Apparently, the project *English Literary History in Trends, Graphs and Statistic Tables* can be finished, edited and published successfully only in English-speaking countries. Academic centres are invited to proclaim their wish to be involved into these research activities and to be sent drafts of available dissertations, papers and working programs. As a next step they may set up research teams displaying interest in reviewing and elaborating individual projects into a publishable form. They are advised to apply them for admission at the European Union grant agency or at their

national grant offices. The authorities of the European Union Committee will attempt to monitor defending dissertations and stipulate their right to take further administrative steps for enhancing academic studies.

The project of the Reformed University (RU) aims at completing the edifice of human knowledge with united forces of collective teamwork. Its rebuilding is intended as *Abbau und Ausbau* of universal macrophysics opposed principally to Heidegger's and Derrida's plan for an *Abbau der europäischen Metaphysik*. The latter revives medieval exegesis, esoteric hermeneutics and religious hagiography, however secularised into the romantic cult of geniuses and modern text interpretation. The former presupposes anonymous collective teamwork, patient impersonal statistics and standard exact methods common in natural sciences. Projects of systematic archaeology and ethnology can be outlined by theorists with an interdisciplinary outfit but completed successfully only by scholars with a narrow specialisation. Interdisciplinary studies may recapitulate rough outlines of missing taxonomies but the main burden will again lie on the shoulders of traditional disciplinary research.

The Current State of Sciences

Any scientific research begins with collecting isolated facts and partial experimental evidence but few researchers are as naïve as to identify these accidental data with elementary structural units. The advanced stage of natural sciences as compared to humanities is determined by the fact that the former do possess valid elementary units while the latter only feign to possess them, and mistake them for amalgam entities of mixed nature and little or no taxonomic value. The Indo-European and the Nostratic unity in comparative linguistics may correspond to some mixed prehistoric groupings but as mixed amalgam phenomena they do not lead to any valid generalisations about the earlier origins of human prehistory. What awaits them is not launching out further and further false proto-languages derived from mixed nations of modern times but revisiting and analysing them carefully into the valid original tribal and racial types. There was no serious chemistry before chaotic mixed substances (air, clay, mud) were analysed into pure elements, and only then it was possible to trace how chemical reactions turn elements into compounds.

In this sense any science starts with analysing primary units (elements, atoms, axioms) and results in enumerating secondary elements (amalgams, compounds, theorems). Units are linked to one another by logical relations (inclusion, identity, similarity) and composed into higher entities by different operations. Operations between more general concepts of higher order are

called formulas or laws. All of these intuitive concepts can be given a more precise mathematical meaning:

units: simplest minimal unmixed elements
relations: logical relations between elements and their classes
categories: sets and classes of elements (e. g. phylogenetic species)
systems: models, algebras, lattices, graphs
laws: high regularity and occurrence of historical phenomena

An ideal state of advanced sciences set as an example to follow can be envisaged in 'macro-biology' and 'macro-physics'. Chemistry and zoology possess a valid taxonomy of elementary categories even if they lack explicit integrating 'macro-theories' and remain unclear as to many gaps in the phylogenesis of bacteria, fungi or plants. An equally advanced stage of knowledge has almost been reached in 'macrophysics' (Table 2)

SCIENCE	Macroscience	Units	Categories	Calculus	Systematics	Taxonomy
Cosmology	+	+	+	+	(+)	-
Geology	+	+	+	+	-	-
Chemistry	+	+	-	+	+	+
Atomistics	-	+	+	(+)	-	-

Table 2 *The state of disciplines in macrophysics*

The urgent need to integrate macro-disciplines strikes as most evident in human prehistory. Anthropology, archaeology, ethnology, mythology and comparative linguistics deal with one story of the prehistoric evolution of mankind but each presents its own different account as if human anthropogenesis, archaeogenesis, ethnogenesis and glottogenesis might have unrelated and independent solutions. Their chief sore are false units and categories misleading research to a deadlock. All disciplines should revise their categories and tailor them according to reliable archaeological evidence (Acheulian, Levalloisian, Mousterian, Gravettian etc.). As a next step phylogenetic taxonomy should co-ordinate with recent 'phylologic' taxonomy so that prehistoric archaeology might be bridged over with ethnology and palaeoanthropology linked with race theory.

SCIENCE	Macroscience	Units	Categories	Calculus	Systematic	Taxonomy
Anthropology	-	-	-	-	-	-
Archaeology	-	+	+	-	-	-
Ethnology	-	-	-	-	-	-
Glottology	-	-	-	-	-	-

Table 3 *The state of disciplines in macro-anthropology*

Even worse off are social sciences. None seems to be vexed by the fact that there are no meeting-points between diachronic historiography and contemporary sociology and no correspondence is visible between concepts of historical and logical taxonomy. Having only isolated historical events without any apparatus classifying them into periods and cultural trends, all social sciences should be regarded as facultative descriptive disciplines (the so-called '-graphies') similar to classical ethnography. Their pitiable state cannot be helped without a deeper statistical research of econometric, demographic and cultural development.

SCIENCE	Macroscience	Units	Categories	Calculus	Systematic	Taxonomy
History	-	-	-	-	-	-
Sociology	-	-	-	-	-	-
Philosophy	-	-	-	-	-	-
Kunsthistorie	-	-	-	-	-	-
Religionistics	-	-	-	-	-	-

Table 4 *The state of disciplines in social sciences*

Both natural and social sciences attempt to make the most of exact procedures introduced by theoretical mathematics and set its apparatus as an ideal model to follow. However, it is false to assume that mathematical theories have reached a high degree of integration. There is little clarity about bridging over universal algebra, topology, projective geometry and statistics, let alone their links to logic and semantics. The point is to make universal algebra universal enough to cover applications in geometry and extend its categories as far as semantics. **Unifying** sciences basically means **formalising** and **algebraising** them.

SCIENCE	Macroscience	Units	Categories	Calculus	Systematic	Taxonomy
Mathematics	-	+	+	+	-	-
Geometry	-	+	+	+	-	-
Logic	-	-	-	+?	-	-
Semantics	-	-	-	-	-	-

Table 5 *The state of disciplines in formal macro-semantics*

On the other hand, mathematical modelling cannot help other disciplines efficiently unless it is **naturalised**, i.e. it is tailored according to the real physical world. This presupposes to abandon abstract speculation about all possible worlds and concentrate on describing one real natural process of evolution. Algebraic structures must model physical and organic processes on the road from cosmogenesis to zoogenesis and further to the rise of man and human civilisation.

GENERAL SCIENCE THEORY

Systematic and Applied Sciences

The most urgent reform needed in humanities is to establish the division of labours common in natural sciences. In their realm there is no professional hierarchy between systematic science (comparative literary history), applied technology (applied linguistics), cultural ideology (jubilee journalism), school education (language teaching), handicrafts (practical criticism) and occult sciences (hermeneutics). This is an explosive social situation when professors of systematic zoology, veterinary doctors, horse-breeders and milkmaids have to compete at university for one professorial chair. Without a functional division of labours these specialities cannot fulfil their appropriate social roles.

When analysing different application levels inside a science we have to clearly distinguish two theoretical boundaries: (1) one between science and technology and (2) that between theoretical research and everyday practice (politology vs. politics, religionistics vs. religion, literary theory vs. practical criticism). The goals of academic science and applied technology are principally different, the former tries to develop trustworthy knowledge of existing reality whereas the latter aims to create some new reality for human needs. The former endeavours to trace the evolutionary laws of nature while the latter considers only their use for human society in order to apply them for devising new facilities. Their essential differences are summed up in Table 6.

SYSTEMATIC SCIENCE	**APPLIED TECHNOLOGY**
systematic classification	practical production
taxonomic bias	normative bias
general knowledge	practical results
reconstructing historical past	constructing new reality
reconstructing historical genera	analysing contemporary individuals
integrity of historical categories	mixed wholes of recent origin
studying essential genostructures	work with amalgam phenostructures
enquiry into historical origin	present-day function and use
studying systemic causes	designing according to function and need
understanding evolution	intentional transformation
diachronic studies	synchronic manufacturing
diachronic phylogeny	synchronic morphology
evolutionary laws	accidental contingence
historical determinism	indeterminism (arbitrarism)

Table 6 *The opposition between academic science and applied technology*

In social sciences advances of the 19th century brought a great predominance of comparative, evolutionary and typological methods while the 20th century shifted the focus on formal, structural or functionalist techniques. The clash between external and internal approaches shows a great misunderstanding as to disciplinary boundaries dividing academic and applied research. Humanities cannot develop their professional applications because their confusing makes them deny one another's specific rights and suppress their social functioning. To abolish external methods in natural sciences means to abolish science as such and to replace systematic biology by applied technology, by animal husbandry or agronomy. Confusing application levels distorts academic studies and disables humanities to such an extent as if the curricula of the Faculty of Natural Sciences were replaced by those of a College of Agriculture, Forestry and Veterinary Medicine.

SCIENCE	**TECHNOLOGY**	**CRAFT**	**RELIGION**
historical comparative sociological typological methods	formal functional structural descriptive methods	practical normative prescriptive didactic methods	hagiographical hermeneutical exegetical interpretative methods
academy ***university***	***institute*** ***applied research***	***vocational*** ***school***	***occult*** ***sciences***
glottology	applied linguistics	language teaching	hermeneutics

Table 7 *The division of labours and application levels in linguistics*

The rational layout of basic application levels with their respective methods, school institutions and varieties in linguistics is outlined on Table 7. Besides there is a number of other false substitutes that distort academic studies into cultural ideology, entertainment, creative essay writing and popular journalism. Religion, ideology, education, entertainment, technology and craft do not pursue any cognitive purpose, they provide spiritual or material technology for improving and prettifying man's world. Only **facultative sciences** may enjoy academic status because they deal with information processing, with collecting, archiving, storing, retrieving, diagnosing, measuring and examining data. They concern data processing where applied technology specialises in 'reality-processing' activities. Table 8

gives a brief survey of constructive and remedial applied sciences in comparison with two types of facultative sciences in the right two columns.

technology	***constructive***	***remedial***	***metrical***	***recognitive***
natural	engineering metallurgy	car repair	measuring technology	hydroscopy
botanical	agronomy gene splicing	herbicide agronomy	biometry	botanical keys
animal	zootechnology animal husbandry	veterinary medicine	zoometry	animal keys
human	pedagogy education	human medicine	anthropometry	phrenology
social	politics personalistics	criminalistics forensics	sociometry law jurisprudence	demoscopy
literary	poetics	textology	metrics	hermeneutics

Table 8 *Fields of applied technology in natural and social studies*

Facultative and applied fields of study need a systematic classification into formal, descriptive, constructive and remedial techniques. The first group (A) surveys facultative disciplines pursuing goals of description, recognition, reception, diagnostics, measurement and inspection. The second group (B) concerns 'reality-processing' fields enquiring into production, construction and development. Their techniques are in close relation to managemental care listed in the group (C). This includes branches dealing with management, maintenance, control and technical care. Repair services fall into the section D of remedial techniques, while preventive and terminative (extinctive) technologies (E-F) stand apart because they pursue human sake by means of removing harmful defects. The last set of techniques (G) includes occult sciences that pretend false fictive work in assistance with supernatural forces.

A. Recognitive disciplines:

1. recognitive '***-gnomies***' (physiognomy, botanical keys, OCR, algorithms of sentence analysis, recognitive and categorial grammars)
2. facultative inspecting '***-scopies***' (endoscopy, microscopy, demoscopy),
3. descriptive '***-graphies***' (cartography, demography, dialectography),
4. measuring '***-metrics***', devised for an exact quantification of size and occurrence (econometrics, sociometrics, demometry, phonometry),
5. instructive and introductory '***-agogics***' (isagoge, isagogics, *pedagogy*).

B. Constructive technology:

1. productive manufacturing '***-urgies***' (metallurgy, chirurgy),

2. constructive and building '***-tectonics***' (architectonics),
3. growth genetics (psychogenetics, ontogeny of children's speech),
4. educational '***-pedies***' (pedagogy, orthopedy, logopedics).

C. Managemental technology:

1. cultivating '***-cultures***' (agriculture, horticulture, pisciculture),
2. cattle-breeding '***-trophies***' (hippotrophy 'keeping horses'),
3. managemental '***-nomies***' (economy 'house-keeping', agronomy),

D. Remedial technology:

1. curative '***–therapeutics***', (psychotherapeutics, *error correction*),
2. curative '***-iatries***' (psychiatry, pediatry, pediatrics, phoniatry).
3. repair services (motor-car repair, electricity fixing).

E. Preventive technology:

1. preventive protective „prophylactics" (psychoprophylactics).

F. Terminative technology:

1. extinctive '***–machies***' (myomachy 'mouse extinction', deratisation)

G. Manipulative pseudo-sciences:

1. cultic '***-agogies***' manipulating with masses (mystagogy, demagogy, commercial advertisements, electoral propaganda, political ideology),
2. occult interpretative '***-mancies***' (chiromancy, astrology, hermeneutics),
3. worshipping cults and '***-latries***' (idolatry, physiolatry),
4. belief-prescribing doctrines and '***-doxies***' (orthodoxy, *katechesis*).

Each science should have a simple calculus relating elements into a network of categories with equations such as $H_2 + O \rightarrow H_2O$. Biological and anthropological sciences may arrange their categories with a different calculus:

engender = make begin to exist = make cease not to exist $mbe^{-1} = m\underline{b}^{-1}e^{-1}$
breed = make continue to exist = not to make cease to exist $m\underline{b}e = m^{-1}\underline{b}^{-1}e$
extinguish = make cease to exist = make begin not to exist $m\underline{b}^{-1}e = mbe^{-1}$
prevent = make continue not to exist = make not begin to exist $m\underline{b}e^{-1} = mb^{-1}e$

Such equations apply a simple 'phase algebra' where a phase verb *b* (*to begin*) has a linear negation b^{-1} (*not to begin*) and a dual negation $\underline{b}$ (*to continue*). Engineering as a field of applied technology can make use of similar defining relations with similar verbal symbols:

construct = make begin to function = make cease not to function
maintain = make continue to function = not to make cease to function
destroy = make cease to function = make begin not to function
hinder = make continue not to function = make not begin to function

Macro-Sciences and Micro-Sciences

Confusing application levels may be avoided by introducing convenient

terms. It is not sufficient to separate science as a field of **academic studies** and **basic research** but we have to distinguish it as **systematic science** and insist on referring to applied research as **applied technology**. Wherever it is possible to coin new terms, systematic sciences should be termed '–logies' (ethnology, sociology) while applied technologies labelled as '-nomies' (agronomy, economy). In linguistics this would imply to accept pairs as 'linguology' and 'linguonomy', with little chance against traditional coinage. Therefore it seems more convenient to insist on distinguishing pairs as 'external' and 'internal linguistics' or 'macro-linguistics' and 'micro-linguistics' even if the latter are intersecting areas common to both academic and applied studies.



Table 9 *The three basic sub-disciplines of versology*

Most applied disciplines are based on **micro-sciences** that deal with a formal study of phenomena in their temporal consequence (*Nacheinander*), spatial coexistence (*Nebeneinainder*) and inner hierarchy (*Übereinander*). When enquiring into prosody, we must add tone (pitch, frequency) and accent (intensity). The formal theory of verse, rhyme and meters is traditionally called **versology** and its apparatus may serve as a convenient illustration of the inner constitution of **micro-poetics**. On Table 9 it is represented an abstract co-ordinate space with three axes arranging the poetic utterance according to time, tone and accent. Versology is traditionally said to consist of 'prosody', 'intonation' or 'metrics' but on Table 9 its axes compose three respective sub-disciplines, metrics (time), melodics (tone) and rhythmics (accent).

Micro-sciences serve for a formal study of individual phenomena but their systematic typology can be established only by **macrosciences** enquiring into different systems of versification, different families of nations and languages. Also macro-sciences study phenomena in time, space and intensity but these are usually understood in a broader sense as world history, world geography and social hierarchy. Table 10 plots the area of **macro-linguistics** as a Cartesian 3-dimensional co-ordinate space with three axes. The first is defined by historical grammar (linguistic diachrony) as a study of sound change on principles of 'pure chronology' and hence is called **chronolinguistics**. The second concerns linguistic geography and the distribution of linguistic isoglosses and as such it is referred to as **geolinguistics**. The two must be completed by **sociolinguistics** enquiring into social dialects and different ethnic layers in populations.



Table 10 *The theoretical space of 'macro-linguistics' and its methods*

Table 10 demonstrates an inner correspondence between applications and methods displayed in Table 7. Scientific methods are not a question of individual taste but one of the very nature of the object studied. Micro-sciences tend to apply formal, functional, structural and descriptive methods and when involved in applied research they focus on practical, prescriptive and normative aspects. Systematic research concentrates on macro-sciences and uses the micro-scientific apparatus for typological purposes. It cannot disclose deeper laws in outer reality without historical, comparative, typological and sociological procedures. Any poem, language or domestic animal forms an organic functional whole but their inner type cannot be understood from one specimen only. Their constitution resembles that of a mongrel dog whose morphology exhibits a mixture of several canine races. A vet will resign from scrutinising its descent but a systematic scientist cannot avoid it. Individual reality is a mixture of mixtures and only a long-time comparative research may disclose what is essential and what is accidental about an individual representative of a categorical species. His knowledge does not content itself with **phenostructures** as accidental apparent wholes but has to go into

genostructures disclosing pure genetic types, i.e. essential wholes that paved the road of phylogenetic evolution.

An Algebraic Formalisation of Sciences

In mathematics an arbitrary algebra A represents a simple system $A = [V, \oplus]$ composed of a basic set V of elements and an operation $\oplus$ on V. Lexicology **W** may be defined as an algebra **W** = [W, +] which concatenates morphemes, roots and affixes and turns them into the set W of all words. The operation + defines the operation of lexical **derivation** represented by affixing a suffix to the root and an inverse operation consisting in dropping the suffix:

waiter = *wait* + *-er* $\qquad c = a + b$ (lexicological addition)
waiter − *-er* = *wait* $\qquad c - b = a$ (lexicological subtraction)

Joining morphemes, words or sentences, whether we mean derivation (affixing), composition (compounding) or forming sentences and syntactic chains is conceived as an analogy of arithmetic addition, whereas their dropping from complex chains is expressed as an analogy of arithmetic subtraction. The analogy with arithmetic fails when we try to commute morphemes, since their concatenation is non-commutative:

$$wait + \text{-}er \neq \text{-}er + wait$$

Classical mathematics concentrated on static algebras while recent advances focus on dynamic systems. Their formalism was anticipated by the concept of „generating subsets“ or „sets of generators“ said to generate the universal set of elements. For instance, an algebra **R** = [R, $\times$] is defined as a pair of the set R of rational numbers and the operation of multiplication $\times$. An important step forward consisted in introducing the set P of prime numbers as a generating subset allowing us to enumerate all rational numbers as products of a finite number of primes. Modern system theory prefers to speak of **input**, input elements or an input subset and applies these terms in a similar sense.

Instead of classic algebras it is convenient to introduce a system-theoretical apparatus and write their mutual relation in a different notation. A symbolic formula [P, $\times$] $\rightarrow R$ says that multiplying elements of the set P of prime numbers $P \times P \times ... \times P \rightarrow R$ generates the whole set R of rational numbers. When we apply terms common in the theory of automata, we may say that the input P generates the output R. We may also proceed the other way round and suggest a system [R , ÷] $\rightarrow P$, where ÷ is the operation of division. Then we may say that applying infinite division to the set R of rational numbers ‘degenerates’ this to the set P of prime numbers. Division ÷ is an **inverse operation** to multiplication $\times$ and [R, ÷] $\rightarrow P$ stands in inverse

relation to $[\ P, \times\ ] \rightarrow R$. Generating and degenerating the set of all elements are inverse procedures with different properties. Multiplication $\times$ maps the set P of prime numbers into the set R of all rational numbers, whereas division $\div$ maps the set R of rational numbers onto the set P of prime numbers. Obviously, instead of classic notation $\mathbf{R} = [\ R, \times\ ]$ or $R = [\ P, \times\ ]$, it is more convenient to introduce writing $[\ P, \times\ ] \rightarrow R$ or $[\ R\ , \div\ ] \rightarrow P$. Informally, we say that the input set P **generates** R and the output set R **degenerates** into P.

Such conventions are easy to apply to chemistry where atoms seem to generate molecules and chemical elements appear to generate chemical compounds. When we admit that elementary particles generate atoms and molecules generate crystals we may arrange physical sciences into one linear chain and establish their mutual ordering. Every science is conceived as a set of tools that make possible enumerating sets of output elements from sets of some input elements. Then let us say that a science $[\ X_k, \times\ ] \rightarrow X_l$ is an **extension** of a science $[\ X_i, \times\ ] \rightarrow X_{j,,}$ if it holds that $X_j = X_k$, i.e. if the output of the more elementary science is identical to the input of a higher science. Arranging sciences into generating chains of their extensions offers an efficient tool for a systematic classification of sciences. Its advantages may be seen on Table 11 displaying a generating chain of physical sciences.

discipline	***input***	***system***		***output***
atomistics	particles	[E, +, -]	→ A	atoms
chemistry	atoms	[A, +, -]	→ M	molecules
mineralogy	molecules	[M, +, -]	→ H	crystals, rocks
geology	rocks	[H, +, -]	→ P	planets
astronomy	planets	[P, +, -]	→ G	galaxies

E	→	A	→	M	→	H	→	P	→	G
[E, +, -]	→	A								
		[A, +, -]	→	M						
				[M, +, -]	→	H				
						[H, +, -]	→	P		
								[P, +, -]	→	G

atomistics	chemistry	mineralogy	geology	astronomy

Table 11 *A systematic classification of physical sciences*

Let E be the set of elementary particles, A the set of atoms of elementary chemical elements, M a set of molecules of chemical compounds, H a set of crystals of different rocks, P a set of planets and G a set of galaxies. Then we

may maintain that the set of elementary particles generates the set of atoms, the set of atoms generates the set of molecules and the set of molecules generates a set of crystals. Similarly we may establish generating relations between crystals, rocks, geologic formations, planets, heavenly bodies, solar systems and galaxies.

A similar system may be suggested for classifying linguistic disciplines, and for literary sciences (stylistics and poetics), which act as their extensions. For the needs of their formalisation we may define simple definitions of linguistic disciplines such that every field of linguistic study will be reduced to the procedure of generating output elements from the elements of the input set.

Phonetics	F = [E, +, -]	composes sounds from acoustic features.
Syllabics	V = [F, +, -]	composes syllables from sounds.
Morphematics	K = [V, +, -]	composes morphemes from syllables and sounds.
Lexicology	W = [K, +, -]	composes words from morphemes.
Morphology	M = [W, +, -]	composes syntactic constituents from words.
Syntax	C = [M, +, -]	composes clauses from syntactic constituents.
Syntactics	S = [C, +, -]	composes complex sentences from clauses.
Stylistics	U = [S, +, -]	composes utterances from complex sentences.
Poetics	P = [U, +, -]	composes works of art from utterances.

E → F → V → K → W → M → C → S → U → P
[E, +]→ F
[F, +]→V
[V, +]→K
[K, +]→W
[W, +] → M
[M, +]→ C
[C, +] → S
[S, +] →U
[U, +]→ P

phonetics syllabics morphematics lexicology morphology syntax syntactics stylistics poetics

Table 12 *The system of classification and ordering of linguistic disciplines*

Table 11 illustrates an easy way to formalise physical sciences, Table 12 shows how to shape and build formal **micro-linguistics**. The notation proposed solves the inner partitioning of linguistic disciplines and demonstrates how to assign grammatical rules. What it does not solve is the origin and descent of languages and their prehistoric evolution. The same objection applies to physical sciences. Composing elementary particles into chemical elements or molecules into crystals have never been seen as a natural

process, they remain just dreams of applied sciences. The real evolution proceeded just the other way round, from galaxies and solar systems to planets where hyperon and neutron plasma grew tough into crystals, rare rocks and heavy metals.

The Evolutionary Systematics of Sciences

The real evolution marched forth from upside down by decomposing hyperon stars into solar systems and these into cold planets. The same process of decomposition must have occurred in their centre where high-energy hyperon plasma 'cooled down' into neutron plasma and stable atoms. Such **decomposition** or degeneration from upside down links macro-sciences into a chain arranged by the ordering relation >. It direction is opposite to the reverse process of **composition** that marches forth from downside upward and links micro-sciences by the ordering relation → of artificial production.

MACROSCIENCES: cosmology > planetology > geology > microbiology > > biology > anthropology > ethnology > sociology > culturology

(1) **natural evolution**: cosmogenesis > planetogenesis > geogenesis > microbiogenesis > biogenesis

(2) **social evolution**: biogenesis > anthropogenesis > ethnogenesis > sociogenesis > culturogenesis

MACROSCIENCES:

cosmology > planetology > geology > biology > anthropology > ethnology

↓ ↓ ↓ ↓

MICROSCIENCES:

atomistics → chemistry → mineralogy → organic chemistry

APPLIED PRODUCTS:

chemicals ← produce ← harvest ← breed ← man (< god)

Table 13 *Higher evolution in building systematic and applied sciences*

Table 13 suggests that inorganic evolution of stars and planets continued by organic evolution that gave birth to plants, animal species and man. The curricula of the faculties of natural sciences cover very large periods of inorganic and organic development. Mineralogy, crystallography, limnology, hydrology and cartography are fields wide enough to separate as one faculty of **macro-geology**. Biology is one of few integral united fields that actually function as macro-biology and so do not need special coinage to indicate

integration. Anthropology is also enrolled as an option at faculties of medicine and natural sciences while most of its twin disciplines, archaeology, ethnology, mythology and comparative linguistics are left over as humanities to faculties of arts. Human anthropogenesis lasted from 6 to 0.7 million years ago, human races separated from 500 to 50 thousand years ago and ethnic tribes formed from 50 to 10 thousand years ago. Their natural integrity and mutual relationships may be preserved only when taught in integrated curricula at united faculties of **macro-anthropology**. The further development continued with the rise of cultures (10-5 thousands years ago), civilisations and nations (5,000 to 1,500 *AD*) and landed in recent social history. Social sciences may be grasped in one integrated whole of **macro-sociology** if and only if their curricula bridge over civilised history, political sciences, sociology and culturology. Integrating their unsystematic fragmented evidence will, however, remain pointless until we possess a consistent model of **sociogenesis** giving a tenable typology of all societies and explaining general laws of social development. Also literary history, *Kunsthistorie*, philosophy and religionistics will remain crippled unless they are integrated into one introductory course of systematic **macro-ideology**. But their unity cannot stand on a few general statements, it must be supported by one integrating theory and systematic historical taxonomy.

discipline	***input***	***system***		***output***
microbiology	organic matter	[O, +, -] →	M	lower organisms
zoology	lower organisms	[M, +, -] →	Z	higher organisms
anthropology	higher organisms	[Z, +, -] →	H	populations
ethnology	population	[H, +, -] →	E	tribal cultures
culturology	tribal cultures	[E, +, -] →	S	societies



Table 14 *A classification of zoological and anthropological sciences*

Most stages of evolution can be arranged by the → relation where higher forms are appended as extensions to lower forms but there are numerous examples of parallel evolution such as that between zoology and botany. The

latter two may be referred to as parallel ‘co-sciences’, one stemming from DNA viruses and the other from RNA microorganisms. As far as there exists one common predecessor to bacteria, invertebrata, fungi and plants we are fully justified to join them into one large field of macrobiology. But more meaningful a use of this term is indicated in macro-anthropology where mythology, comparative linguistics, religionistics, ethnology and archaeology rest on one bearer called anthropology. In this narrower sense **co-sciences** are ‘one-bearer’ disciplines with a common base dealing with different offshoots of one and the same underlying bearer. Myths, religion, oral tradition, folklore and languages are independent manifestations of prehistoric tribes’ collective social life, but their valid classification should coincide with pathways of ethnic anthropogenesis. The same may be said of philosophy, fine arts, literary history and ideology: when we isolate them from social history we loose the thread that unites them into one integral story and one cultural whole.

The Methodology of Science and ‘Occult Pseudo-Sciences’

Setting an ideal example of what the ideal science theoretically should look like is as vain as defining an ideal healthy patient in medicine. Like medicine, science theory needs systematic surveys of ‘bad examples’, a symptomatic **diagnostics** of ‘scientific diseases’ conceived as the ‘psychopathology of mental disorders in science’. Science is not simply any knowledge whatsoever but a definite form of rational cognition distinct from magic, witchcraft, philosophy and religion. Its nature may be understood only from its antipode and adversary, from ‘occult pseudo-sciences’ that plague the savage mind as well as the modern psyche. All mental defects in science may be summed under the term of **creationism**. The savage eats, drinks and loves without understanding natural causes of his behaviour but with a bent to attribute their invisible work to hidden spirits. *Spiritus venit, vidit et vincit* might read the proverb of the savage mind, the spirit can create anything and work miraculous wonders just by magic words, incantations and spells. The spirit created the world in seven days *ex nihilo*, just from its own will, rational decision and deliberate plan.

Modern man has refused much of the old-time supernatural rubbish, he has refused fairies, ghosts, gods, deities and demiurges but he has preserved the very gist of every creationist faith, the belief in omnipotent powers of his spiritual self. His self ceased to hide behind divine deputies and is content to act only as a hermeneutic interpreter of the natural creation who re-creates its wonders spiritually in his own mind. Stars, animals, societies, languages and works of art are not objective phenomena that have evolved a huge diversity of their species for thousands and millions of years but ’signs’ and arbitrary

psychological constructions of its own mind. Astrology, divination, numerology, chiromancy and all esoteric sciences share a well-developed sign theory or semiotics explaining individual fates from material signs. Their younger sophisticated sister is **hermeneutics**, the art of interpretation that treats societies, poems and tongues as spiritual creations that may be given an arbitrary interpretation and any plausible meaning without respect to real time, place and history. Its way of thinking appeals very much to the superstitious man-in-the-streets because it points its finger at visible trespassers, proves them guilty of rational deliberate intentions and supports their deeds by evidence of visible material signs. Ph. Sollers called his creed **'semiotic materialism'** as an assumption that the whole spiritual world exists through material signs, through emblems, national flags, religious symbols, heraldic coats-of-arms, icons of saints and relics of martyrs. Where science speaks of abstract processes, general laws, statistic tendencies and hidden natural causes, religious myths and fairy-tales can offer visible saints and wrongdoers.

STAGE	**DISCIPLINE**	**SIGN**	**MEANING**
formalism	linguistics mathematics geometry	sign number figure	meaning quantity patterns
exegetics	theology exegesis spiritism heraldics interpretative critique grammatology graphology allegoresis	biblical canon sacred script ancestors' word coats-of-arms metaphysical texts enigma written character symbolic ideas	divination interpretation message clans and dynasties explanation solution human character allegoric sense
hermetics	astrology chiromancy oneiromancy telepathy hermeneutics *Traumdeutung* symptomatology phrenology numerology geomancy	stars hand dream ideas text sign vision dream symptoms skull number grooves in sand	fate human nature fate their distant reading higher hidden sense meaning disease race fate future
classical philology	biblical criticism mythology biography	legends myth classics	historical persons real history examples

Table 15 *Semiotic formalism and sign theories in real and occult sciences*

Esoteric sciences, metaphysics, parapsychology and irrationalism do not flourish at any time, their huge explosions coincide with the ‘dark ages’ of conquests and religious wars. Plundering troops do not need any science but indulge in simple religious fundamentalism preaching that the infidels’ and heathens’ property must be Aryanised by pious orthodox believers of our race. All they need is reassuring that their idols, icons, flags, statues and ossuaries are false, whereas ours are sacred. This is why the ‘golden ages’ of flourishing Milesian, Sophistic and Peripatetic science alternate with ‘dark ages’ of Pythagorean, Platonic and Stoicist astrology. Every ‘dark age’ of astrology buried evolutionary science and replaced it by hermeneutic semiotics. What F. de Saussure did for linguistics by introducing the sign-meaning relation *significant – signifié*, was matter-of-factness for Stoics who distinguished *logos* and *ennoia* ‘concept, idea’. Medieval theology would not be able to cultivate exegesis without distinguishing *dictum* ‘the said’ and *significatio* ‘meaning’ either. English Caroline ‘theomagic’, ‘hermetic physics’ and ‘hermetic astrology’ developed by Th. Vaughan and A. Ross would be impossible without N. Culpeper’s semiotics outlined in his medical treatise *Semeiotica Uranica or an Astrological Judgement of Diseases* (1651).

Table 15 shows characteristic transformations of sign theory during a transition from formal science to classical philology and their decay into ‘occult pseudo-sciences’ in times of war crises. In close dependence upon ‘grey’, ‘black’ and ‘brown economics’ there appears also ‘grey’, ‘black’ and ‘brown science’ that does not contribute to knowledge but serves well financial acquisition. Its present revival chimes in with J. Derrida’s ‘deconstructing the edifice of European metaphysics’ (M. Heidegger’s *Abbau*) and Neo-Thomism vanquishing in priests’ seminaries but it has much more dangerous expression in secular hermeneutic science. The plague of modern occult sciences rests in diverse forms of ‘secular psycho-science’, in psycholinguistics, psycho-poetics, poetic interpretation, interpretative sociology, *Rezeptionsästhetik* etc. These disciplines have replaced systematic and applied science by users’ guide psychology explaining the world from the consumer’s feelings. They revive medieval hagiography and exegesis by adoring and interpreting Hölderlin and other metaphysical poets as holy fathers of new intellectual sects. The triple of prophets, Nietzsche, Heidegger and Derrida, invented new religion without gods, new metaphysics without the supernatural and new exegetic theology without the Holy Fathers. Their philosophical artistry, however sophisticated and secular, satisfies the postmodern psyche in the same way as sci-fi films disguising ancient ghosts and vampires as modern extra-terrestrial ufonauts.

The inner layout of postmodern pseudo-sciences continues to work with the classical outfit: prophets, spiritual originators, their false and orthodox

interpreters, their priests and hagiographic cults adoring their personality, their deliberate intentions against the infidels' misinterpretations, their holy bible and canon, their sacred words hovering in eternal spiritual tradition. The principal ideas is that there is no external universe, no gradual evolution and laws, no class and categories and no outer reality to study and learn, only the prophet's texts and their interpretation. The only reality worth studying are isolated poems and sacred texts worshipped as prophets' founding tradition.

SCIENCE	**METAPHYSICS**
materialism: matter generates spirit **organic causalism**: inner organic causality peculiar to all matter **evolutionism**: ascending development **organicism**: organic self-evolution **progressivism**: ascending progress **monism**: natural and cultural facts conceived in integral unity **determinism**: spiritual dispositions are ruled by needs, genes, hormones **rupturism**: knowledge as organic growth through breaks and ruptures **collectivism**: the power of masses **naturalism**: a materialist account from real natural conditions	**idealism**: spirit generates matter **teleologism**: purposeful development according to a higher plan **traditionalism**: eternal tradition **creationism**: spirit creates *ex nihilo* **regressivism**: descending decay **immanentism**: autonomous evolution in independent immanent series **indeterminism**, arbitrarism: everything is determined by free will **cumulationism**: knowledge as linear collecting pieces of evidence **personalism**: a cult of great persons **psychologism**: psychological reasoning, the loss of natural and social space

Table 16 *The principles of science as opposed to those of metaphysics*

Table 16 lists basic principles of scientific methodology in contrast to their deformations in metaphysics. They say that all natural entities have to be studied in the systematic order of their natural evolution in unity with their underlying 'material' carrier. Scientific **monism** means that all scientific disciplines concerning human society and prehistory should be integrated and kept in one whole. We cannot afford having different accounts of human prehistory as given by comparative linguistics, anthropology and ethnography because the latter study only different manifestations of one and the same process. Linguistics cannot launch into forging speculative genealogies of language families without constant regard to the ethnography of their speakers. Customs, myths, religions and languages cannot be studied detached from their 'material carrier', i.e. their *ethnos*. Similarly, modern medicine cannot enquire into human emotions, feelings, visions, pains and disorders without analysing their material carrier in the living human body.

Types of materialism	**Priorities**
general materialism:	there is no conscience without a material carrier
cosmological materialism:	matter generates energy, waves and motion heavenly bodies
atomic materialism:	there is no energy without a particle
physical materialism:	matter generates its energetic and spiritual reflections
noetical materialism:	notional categories of the human mind reflect the categories of the real nature
biological materialism:	organic life generates neural excitation organisms govern themselves by neural sensations spiritual life is part of body behaviour
anthropological materialism:	*ethnos* generates folklore rites simulate economic activities as a *camera obscura* in inverse spiritual procedures
linguistic materialism:	the fates of ethnic cultures govern the fates of linguistic cultures linguistic changes reflect ethnic changes
sociologic materialism:	society generates its culture social being generates its own social conscience
aesthetic materialism:	aesthetic norms and artistic standards are set by ruling elites

Table 17 *Specifications of materialism for different sciences*

Golden ages of rational science always emerged with prosperous economies and flourishing philosophical materialism. Its principal statement that matter generates spirit sounds too abstract and trivial unless we specify its constitutive meaning for scientific methodology in every particular discipline. Table 14 attempts to order sciences and their scope of study by two ordering relations. The relation $x > y$ reads 'x historically evolves into y' and defines the evolutionary sequence of sciences from the physical to the organic and the human world. The relation $x \rightarrow y$ reads 'x generates y' or 'x is the generating material carrier of y'. In biology it means that during geological evolution the living forms of the organic body generate their corresponding forms of neural

excitation and conscience. Speaking in terms of interdisciplinary research, it means that physiology and anatomy predetermine psychiatry. In this point **scientific materialism** coincides with the requirements of scientific monism: it says that linguistic, religious and cultural phenomena cannot be understood without regard to the fates of human collectives and societies existing in real historical time and space. Enquiring into isolated myths, poems, dialects, sound shifts and personalities as deliberate spiritual creations and sacred celestial omens leads to a deadlock of **philological astrology**. The natural, human and social universe may be understood appropriately only in the network of evolutionary relations. Things have to be studied in the **process of making** and there are no spiritual processes without a material process.

cosmology > biology > anthropology > ethnology > sociology



Table 18 *Applications of scientific materialism to different disciplines*

Table 17 outlines priority relationships between sciences and their scope of study but their practical implications for particular disciplines have been elucidated by verbal formulations in Table 18. The general formula is always accompanied by practical implications enclosed in the brackets. Most cultural phenomena trivially have to do with all applicative levels of materialism but their nature becomes transparent only as long as they classified in a systematic

taxonomy of their closest neighbourhood and closest priority relations. Folklore, myths, races and prehistoric languages cannot be considered exhaustively as a field of human psychology and neither can they be treated only as a scope of social studies. Most cultural phenomena are concerned with all stages of evolution but their essence becomes apparent only on the background map depicting their closest structural correlations, their area, space and distribution, their time, occurrence and historical period. Each macro-science deals with a definite segment of evolution, macro-anthropology with prehistory and macro-sociology with civilised history. Metaphysics proceeds in an opposite way, it cancels the real world with its space, time and history and looks at phenomena *sub species aeternitatis*. It treats them as isolated deliberate creations in the timeless sphere of eternal spiritual psychology.

ANTHROPOLOGICAL SCIENCES

One Story of Anthropogenesis

The worst error in prehistoric sciences consists in explaining the human past backwards from modern mixed nations. This naïve approach cancels the world of prehistory and enthrones misleading criteria of modern chaotic ethnographic conditions. It claims that most living European peoples, Slavs, Romans, Celts and Germans, arose a few years before *Völkerwandrung* and had no relation to the Neolithic and Palaeolithic tribes. This view implies that the European ethnogenesis lasted a few centuries and one million years of prehistory can be omitted as irrelevant. Since modern nations are secondary amalgams and derived mixtures of mixtures, linguists can trace their descent only to the stage of Indo-European unity (2,000 *BC*) and then get stuck in the Nostratic trap. They have to resort to the same **extinction theory** as anthropologists who assume that all prehistoric cultures are extinct except for one *Homo sapiens* survivor of European stamp who gave rise to all modern varieties of races, nations, religions and cultures. This fatal error kills prehistory because it sweeps all pure primary Palaeolithic cultures into oblivion and replaces them by secondary amalgams of Neolithic date. Its effect is as disastrous as if we started the evolution of mammals from domestic varieties of dachshunds and fox-terriers.

Progress in modern anthropological sciences is hindered by a set of false misleading preconceptions and the following principal errors:

(1) Prehistoric evidence is left unrelated to modern ethnic typology.

(2) Most racial and ethnic categories are derived from modern mixed nations and so remain incompatible with prehistory and the original prehistoric tribes.

(3) Obvious incompatibility between prehistoric and modern tribes is solved by ‘extinction theory’ reporting all tribes before *Völkerwanderung* as extinct.

(4) Evidence available in archaeology, anthropology and comparative linguistics is not co-ordinated and unified into one anthropogenesis.

(5) One story of human evolution is broken into many unrelated accounts as if races, customs, industries and languages developed in independence on tribes.

(6) Prehistoric phenomena are not studied in one firm typological framework.

(7) Instead of projecting a relatively complete taxonomy of archaeology into other disciplines and filling in its network of reliable categories, its abundant evidence is replaced by confused generalisations of comparative linguistics.

(8) Most studies are focused on a chaotic chronology of incessant changes and neglect typological genetic continuity exhibited for many thousands of years.

(9) Instead of tracing human evolution from prehistory up to now, its reconstruction proceeds backwards from modern mixed nations to mixed civilisations of antiquity.
(10) Palaeolithic tribes as the real bearers of prehistoric cultures, myths, industries and languages are omitted and left out of consideration.

What all prehistoric and ethnographic disciplines primarily need is one unified model of human anthropogenesis and co-ordinating diachronic and synchronic evidence. They cannot advance forth without Ernst Haeckel's laws maintaining that **phylology** (the synchronic taxonomy of species) recapitulates **phylogenesis** (their diachronic genesis and prehistoric taxonomy). Humanities do not feel embarrassed that synchronic studies (ethnology) are not related to diachronic disciplines (archaeology) and there are no links between the ethnic classification of modern nations and the typology of prehistoric cultures:
(a) Human palaeontology (anthropogeny) has no clear and meaningful intersection and bridges with synchronic anthropology (the theory of racial classification of recent aborigines and surviving tribes).
(b) Archaeology (ethnogeny) has no meaningful intersection and bridges with the synchronic ethnology of recent types.
(c) The historical grammar of Indo-European and Nostratic languages (glottogeny) is built on the evidence of recent surviving languages without recognising their secondary, derived and highly mixed character.
(d) Sociology is built as a modern synchronic discipline without any relation to historiography and the historical typology of societies.
(e) Most categories in prehistoric sciences are misleading because they are build on modern mixed nations, represent secondary amalgams and obscure the real prehistoric tribes that composed into modern mixed peoples.

A systematic classification of sciences should indispensably insist on a pair-like correlation between **-genies** (anthropogeny, ethnogeny) enquiring into the diachronic genesis of species and **-logies** studying their synchronic taxonomy. Table 19 attempts to envisage a network of three rows of terms: words in the upper row are considered as the scope of study of disciplines in the middle row and those in the lower row are entered in bold types because *–logies* should primarily cover synchronic taxonomy but secondarily also diachronic taxonomy so that when entrusted to shelter also their respective *–geny* they may be said to yield general taxonomy. Because it is difficult to regulate live usage and replace traditional terms 'human palaeontology' and 'archaeology' by new coinage 'anthropogeny' and 'ethnogeny' we may aim at theoretical consistence by coining terms of **diachronic anthropology** and **diachronic ethnology**. Then anthropology and ethnology would be understood to function as synchronic disciplines while the terms of **systematic anthropology** and

systematic ethnology would meet requirements of general (both diachronic and synchronic) taxonomy.

MACROANTHROPOLOGY					
anthropogenesis	< ethnogenesis	< sociogenesis	> glottogenesis	- mythogenesis	
↑	↑	↑	↑	↑	
anthropogeny	< ethnogeny	< sociogeny	> glottogeny	- mythogeny	
↓	↓	↓	↓	↓	
anthropology	< **ethnology**	< **sociology**	> **glottology**	- **mythology**	

Table 19 *An inner partitioning of macro-anthropology*

The central column in Table 19 mentions sociology and sociogeny where we would actually prefer to speak of ‘demogeny’ and ‘demology’ as sub-disciplines of prehistoric demography. The ordering relations < and > indicate structural subordination or mutual determination since in our view it was **prehistoric demography** (nutrition, sources, density, overpopulation, colonisations, migrations) that governed human evolution to a greater extent than Darwinist ‘natural selection’ or ‘survival of the fittest’. The gravest sin of prehistoric considerations is treating all typological units as ‘ghost categories’ as if the *Acheuleén* or *Solutreén* were just fleeting spiritual fashions without any links to the real ethnic stocks of Acheulians and Solutreans. The archaeological evidence on prehistoric cultures is so rich and consistent that it should be taken over by other prehistoric disciplines and used as masonry for building an integrated evolutionary classification in other prehistoric fields. If archaeology set up a valid taxonomy for other fields, prehistoric sciences would share common terms and their language would be simplified to the following tautologies: The Mousterians (an ethnic tribe) were of Mousterian race (*Homo mousteriensis*), lived in Mousteria (geographic area occupied by Mousterians), produced the Mousterian (archaeological industrial culture) and spoke Mousterian (Mousterian proto-language).

The most urgent goal is to develop one model of human **anthropogenesis** compatible with the pathways of human evolution in other fields. It must be fully coincide with a mirror-like model of ethnogenesis (archeogenesis) and glottogenesis (origin of human languages) and should unify all anthropological sciences into one integrated theory based on one typological network of taxonomic terms. This requirement presupposes that there is a stable genetic and typological continuity in all prehistoric cultures so that their bearers

(prehistoric tribes) did not become extinct (extinction theory) but survived in most occupied and colonised areas and may be seen as mixed remains in recent tribes (residualist theory). **Residualism** claims that there is one firm typological ground allowing us to classify and reconstruct the origin of most races, ethnic tribes, myths, ethnographic cultures and languages on earth. The simple typological clue deciphering the fates of most human races, cultures and languages from the very beginning to surviving aborigines is sketched on Table 20.

Family	Type	Race	Culture	Economy
Eteo-Bantu	^{m}b-dialect	Negroids	Acheulian hand-axe	peasants
Eteo-European	*b*-dialect	Nordics	Corded Ware	peasants
Eteo-Uralic	*t*-dialect	Uraloids	Combed Ware	hunters, breeders
Eteo-Basque	*k*-dialect	Dinarics	Megaliths	cattle-breeders
Eteo-Turkic	*r*-dialect	Turcoids	Microliths	fishermen, pirates
Eteo-Pelasgic	*l*-dialect	Pelasgoids	Levalloisian	fishermen, pirates
Eteo-Lappic	*i*-dialect	Lapponoids	Urnfielders	artisans
Eteo-Annamitic	isolative	Aëtoids	Incinerators	artisans
Eteo-Pygmic	click dialect	Pygmoids	semidugout, lean-to	honey-collectors

Table 20 *The typology of human cultures, languages and races*

Systematic Archaeology

Archaeology occupies a privileged position in prehistoric sciences because it exhibits evidence complete enough for drawing generalising deductions. Its abundance in comparison to other prehistoric sciences, however, did not stop Ceram from saying that ‘generalisation is not a decent word in archaeology’. Such scepticism and modesty becomes well only prehistoric anthropology that displays so scanty numbers of finds that it has profiled as a study of individual digs. Moreover, these digs are not preserved in whole skeletons but often only in jawbones and small fragments (*Homo heidelbergensis*, *H. bilzinglebensis*). Anthropology may stand as prior to archaeology in theoretical considerations but in practical conclusions it must tailor its taxonomy according to archaeology and obey disciplines richer in evidence.

The chief triumphs of modern archaeology are O. Montelius’s and H. Müller-Karpe’s stratification scales that established a tenable relative chronology of excavation layers. The ’stratification archaeology’ developed C. J. Thomsen’s view of prehistoric evolution as a progress of technical knowledge in metallurgy (Stone Age, Bronze Age, Iron Age). This approach

neglected that transitions to higher technology (wheel carts, copper daggers) had usually been introduced by invasions of special warrior castes so that their dating in a given area was not a question of knowledge but one of tribal migrations. It could not escape the traditional illusions assuming that that the Neolithic Europe had been inhabited by one undifferentiated people speaking one Nostratic or Indo-European proto-language, who had not lived in isolated tribes as modern aborigines but had waited in that day's media for technical news in order to pass from microlith techniques (12,000 *BC*) to megalith technology (3,000 *BC*) and further to the iron gadgets (1,200 *BC*). Such views regard prehistoric cultures as fleeting vogues and fashions of industrial design haunting at intervals the mind of one awakening mankind. They fail to see that such techniques were associated with different prehistoric tribes and their **geographic migrations** so that every area had its own local dating. Changes in stone-working and metalworking techniques did not indicate milestones in human knowledge but only changes in the social and geographical dominance of their real users. It is vain to dream about one universal worldwide chronology of cultural stratification, because every area had its own local time-schedule dated by the invasions of its inhabitants.

The **Diffusionist School** (W. H. R. Rivers, W. J. Perry, L. Frobenius, F. Graebner, O. Menghin) was the first to realise that prehistory was not a competition of ghosts in industrial knowledge but a theatre of highly specialised tribal civilisations and their worldwide migrations (diffusions). Diffusionists replaced historical chronology by cultural typology and geography oriented to migrations. By **typology** they meant focusing on stable genetic traditions, frequent cultural patterns and well-defined types of customs. Their high occurrence defined a *Kulturtypus* and their distribution a *Kulturkreis* considered as a cultural whole, as a unique complex of a tribe, race, culture, area and language.

Diffusionist methodology turned attention from chaotic changes to **genetic stability**, to cultural traditions lasting long periods of time. If *Homo erectus* came to Java 1.8 million years ago and his descendants continued to produce **pebble-stone choppers** in Southeast Asia up to the Neolithic times, his progeny cannot have become extinct. He must have survived in remains of living Negro-Australoid tribes such as Veddahs, Ainus, Australians and Melanesians in New Caledonia. All descendants of *Homo erectus* showed very consistent social patterns and cultural morphology. All were robust vegetarians and practised a plant-gathering economy requiring pebble-stone choppers for crushing grains. In the Neolithic they experienced a revival and, without considerable changes in life style, they became pioneers of Melanesian and Chinese agriculture. Their cultural characteristic preserved the Palaeo-Negroid heritage imported from Africa: large matriarchal families, dual endogamy,

large quadrangular wooden huts, ancestral cults, prenasalised stops m^{b}-, n^{d}-, n^{g}-, prefixing classifiers etc.

Homo erectus came from Africa to Asia with the first wave of colonisation producing Olduwan choppers. The second wave was heading for central Europe and brought Abbevillian choppers of higher quality (900,000 *BP*). About 500,000 *BP* a new centre of advanced **Acheulian** technology emerged in Morocco and spread through Gibraltar north to western Europe. Its characteristic product was the Acheulian hand-axe with bifacial stoneworking and flints chipped off the whole surface. Another branch of Acheulian colonists moved eastward to Palestine and Mesopotamia and wandered as far as Punjab. Their seats occupied the long belt of fertile land (countries of the Green Crescent) from Egypt to the Near East that yielded abundant crops of corn. When their Neolithic descendants exhausted natural sources, famine made them discover agriculture. The Near East became a meltingpot of civilisations where black peasants from Africa mixed with hunters from Asia and give birth to the hybrid **Caucasoid** race. African languages with prefixing classifiers mixed with Altaic tongues with agglutination and their result was a hybrid Nostratic dialect of inflecting type. The Asiatic element with convex aquiline noses was represented by Semitic pastoralists while the robust dark element by peasants with fringed aprons. The ancients called them fellahs, *Koptoi*, *Aegyptoi* or *Guttii*.

The original Abbevillian settlement of Europe grew denser thanks to two ethnic infusions from the south, Acheulian settlers in western Europe and their Micoquian kinsmen (100,000 *BP*) in eastern Europe. These hand-axe civilisations had a younger brother in **Campignian** colonists (10,000 *BC*) with large macrolithic hand-axes. Campignians used hand-axes for crushing sea shells and left their heaps in *kjökknemöddinger* (kitchin middens) on the seaside sand-dunes. Their hut resembled the *wurth* of the medieval Goths in Danemark and the architecture of the Corded Ware (2,000 *BC*). Its warriors fought with boat-shaped battle-axes (*Bootäxte*) and were of tall, robust **Nordic** race similar to modern Scandinavians. In the lowlands of central and southeast Europe they met Danubian peasants who dwelt in ‘long houses’ and produced pottery known as the Linear Ware. These represented the main core of tall, robust European peasantry classified as **Europoid** race.

Linking Palaeolithic tribes with Neolithic or modern peoples sounds too audacious, but however entangled its intricacies with correct dating might be, they cannot disturb the inner consistence of the basic typological framework of one tall, robust dolichocephalous population of vegetarian and plant-gathering dispositions. This population makes up the typological unity of 60 per cent of mankind with 0 blood group and dolichocephalous skulls. It descends from the **Negroid plant-gatherers** in Africa who had their remote forefather in *Homo*

erectus but survived in his original seats as the black Bantu people. Their genetic continuity in this area is evidenced by the **Sango** hand-axe culture (40,000 *BC*) and the Negroid physiognomy of Asselar man. Negroid plant-gatherers gradually colonised the equatorial zone on all continents and but during warm interglacials migrated northward and formed hybrid races of lighter skin. Their albinisation in northern areas changed the colours of eyes, hair and skin but had little effect on the original genetic heritage, dolichocephalous skull, tall skeleton and robust constitution. R. Biasutti classified the Veddahs and Ainus as '*Europidi*' and this label is often applied also to Australians.

High genetic stability is evidenced also in the fates of the second large stock of mankind stemming from the Palaeolithic hunters of Mongoloid type. Their first subgroup were **Levalloisian fishermen** and lake-dwellers of Palaeo-Tungid stock who produced Levalloisian and Aurignacian prismatic flakes. The second were **Magdalenian marsh-dwellers** in northern Europe and **Tardenoisian cliff-dwellers** in southern Europe who lived as fishermen, pirates and small-game hunters using weapons with microlith implements. Both stocks of fishermen originated in the waterside areas of the Euxine and the Caspian Sea. The former were remembered as Hyperboreans of Pelasgian lineage who lived in tepee tents and post-dwellings on the lakeside and wandered far to the north. The latter were bloodthirsty pirates and seafarers of Palaeo-Turcoid origin who flooded the southern seas of Europe as Kimmerians, *Cimbri*, *Iberi*, *Ambrones* and *Hiberni*. Their eastern clansmen were the Khmers and Dravidian tribes that imported microlith to India about 11,000 *BC*. Their earlier prehistory is hidden in obscurity but they may have had predecessors in Asiatic cultures of microblade tools (80,000 *BP*).

In some areas the Turcoid fishermen took to small-game hunting and turned to Neolithic goat-keepers or shepherds but in principle they never fused with **big-game hunters** (horse-breeders, cattle-breeders) of Mousterian descent. **Mousterians** were Neanderthals who dwelt in beehive huts from hides and mammoth bones (Molodovo) and hunted big animals with long lances inset by leaf-shaped points. About 60,000 *BP* they ravaged Africa to settle down as Hottentots and other beehive-dwelling tribes of South Africa. The typical warrior's outfit consisted of a leaf-shaped lance, an oval shield and a cowhide mantle held on a clasp over one shoulder. About 11,500 they invaded as North America and spread over its prairies as buffalo-hunters. Theirs was the Folsom and Clovis culture with fluted leaf-shaped points and large mound graves. They buried their dead sitting, bedaubed with anointment and wound in cloth to mummify the corpse. In contrast to slim Turcoids they were tall and robust and had a brachycephalic head with an aquiline, convex nose. They enslaved other peoples and made them build megalith mounds similar to their beehive

huts, castles and churches. Their descendants can be sought in all Cyclopean megalith-builders and beehive-dwellers with *t*-plurals and *k*-duals (Hottentot, Basques, Abxaz, Scythians, Chukchee, Algonquin, Quechua).

The third stock of mankind must be attributed to Pygmies, Negritos, Negrillos, Annamites, Samoyeds and Lapps who exhibit remarkable brachycephaly, short figure with extremely short legs and high rates of A blood group. Their women exhibit long hanging cylindrical breasts, fat hips, inclination to steatopygia and secondary matronism in adult age. About 25,000 *BP* they became visible in Europe as **Gravettians** carving ivory statuettes of 'graceful Venuses'. Their physiognomy betrays descent from African terracotta figurines and reminds us of the Bushwomen, their curly haircut, long breasts and typical steatopygia. The African **Pygmids** seem to have originated from Bushmen and **Boskop man** (50,000 *BP*) but they may also have to do with the **Negrito** colonisation that started in northern Vietnam. This made Negritos of short dwarfish figure, probably in fear of some foreign conquerors, sail on small bark rafts as far as Australia (Keilor man, 60,000 *BP*) and Tasmania. Their social customs converged everywhere to incineration burials (burning their dead and hanging their ashes in sacks on tent-poles), weaving special shoulderbags from straw, collecting bee honey and building lean-to huts. Besides they collected mushrooms, used them for poisoning arrows and shot these with bamboo blowing-pipes. They boiled food with hot stones thrown into water and applied this technique also for heating their subterranean huts and saunas. They spoke languages of Chinese type with isolating syntax, reduplicative morphology, rich tonal systems, numerous affricates and implosive stops similar to the Bushman clicks.

This much is to put forth the argument that archaeology is not a science about thousands and thousands of unrelated cultures but a discipline dealing with cultural manifestations attributable to several few races, Negrids, Pygmids, Tungids, Turcoids and Mongoloids. As there is a limited number of races, there should be also a limited number of cultures and languages. The deceptive illusion that there are infinitely many of them is due to their amalgamation. Their huge secondary diversity conceals only primary typological clarity peculiar to a few 'pure genuine types' (eteo-tribes, eteo-cultures and eteo-languages) at the Palaeolithic stage. Palaeolithic cultures belonged to the original pure ethnic families (races) while Neolithic cultures (Linear Ware, Stroked Ware) represented only their **local subgroups**, their locally assimilated tribal confederacies. The Neolithic stage started amalgamation and assimilation into modern nations and false macrofamilies but these are secondary derived units of little value for taxonomy and ethnogenesis. Dating attached to different colonisations here may be disputed but the general principle of genetic stability holds good. Prehistoric

civilisations did not perish but survived, mixed and disappeared in populations of later newcomers. The present cast of mankind has not shaped in a few centuries but has deposited slowly in layers for hundred thousand years. Prehistoric archaeology and modern ethnology can meet. Prehistoric migrations agree with modern ethnic distribution and modern ethnography is a safe guide to prehistory.

Digging up a find is not the last and ultimate aim of archaeology and does not absolve it of the duty to render a well-arranged classification of all possible classes and types of finds. Archaeology may join the family of systematic sciences only by meeting several strict requirements: (1) every phenomenon must be classified by a network of valid categorial classes, (2) every culture must be defined as a complex unit of a tribe, race, area and language, (3) cultural typology is given preference instead of uncertain chronology, (4) every culture should be linked with its direct ancestor and descendant, (5) all secondary amalgam entities (white race, Indo-European, Common Romance) must be dropped out of consideration as phenomena of local importance, (6) taxonomic terms in all fields should be co-ordinated to avoid futile verbosity.

Basic elements in archaeology are excavation **sites** (e.g. Szeleta and Istállóskö), a local geographic cluster of such sites forms a **local group** (Szeletian) and their complete network represents a **culture** (Mousterian, Epi-Mousterian). As demonstrated on Table 21, any culture should be endowed with specifications concerning chronological **dating** and **duration** (32,000-25,000 *BP*), geographic **location** and **extension** (Hungary) and occasionally also social **status** (in Africa big-game hunters and pastoralists formed upper warrior castes). Then a site Szeleta may be defined as a member of a taxon ***Szeletian Epi-Mousterian*** [Hungary 32,000-25,000 *BP*].



Table 21 *The key terms of systematic archaeology*

The most important convention is to arrange all valid information into a taxonomic network pointing from the earliest origin to the living survivors. Then the Clactonian and Tayacian as the earliest groups betraying the arrival of mammoth hunters in western Europe might be referred to as ***Clactonian Proto-Mousterian*** and the Folsom culture in North America would be labelled as ***Folsom Algonkinoid Meso-Mousterian*** [North America, -11,500-present]. The adjective attribute 'Algonkinoid' determines the ethnic **destination** specifying that the culture has survived in Algonquian mound-builders while the prefix 'Meso-' gives an approximate Mesolithic dating. Then a general taxon would look as follows:

site $x \in$ '***Group Culture Destination Dating-Prefix-Macroculture***
[Location+Extension, Dating +Duration, Caste status]'

Such taxonomy brings more precision but looks too tedious to enter into wide usage. Its copies botanic terms such as *Pulsatilla patens, subsp. Latifolia* (RUPR.) ZAMELS but seems inconvenient for practical reference. It would be easy to adjust terms as *Homo sapiens erectus* for other prehistoric disciplines if they did not need taxonomy similar to the periodic table in chemistry. Such taxonomy should classify cultures by a network of parentage relations locating their position clearly on the ethnic, geographic and temporal axis. **Geographical taxonomy** does not pose any serious problem but presupposes several conventions. First we have to generalise the distribution of some cultural traits (microlithic implements) to the whole complex of their occurrence and compose their clusters into a complete migration graphs. Microlithic cultures penetrated upon all continents but archaeology has no common name for them. There is only one general denomination **Magdalenian** that may be extended to cover all the local groups (Tardenoisian, Azilian, Maglemosian, Hamburgian) in western Europe but theoretically also their heartland in the Middle East. When we localise the heartland we find it natural to attribute microlith cultures to the Palaeo-Turcoid family and trace their colonisations also to other continents. Then the ethnogenesis of one large Palaeo-Turcoid stock of mankind looks like an octopus with several tentacles jutting out in different directions. These tentacles may be distinguished as 'Afro-Magdalenian' (Wilton Microlithic, 7,000 *BC*), 'Indo-Magdalenian' (Dravidian Microlithic 11,000 *BC*) and 'Sino-Magdalenian' (Khmers) while the original sites in Europe might be called 'Euro-Magdalenian' and 'Ibero-Magdalenian'. When describing such migration graphs, we may apply different types of geographical taxonomy:

Continental taxonomy: Euro-Mousterian, Afro-Mousterian, Amero-Mousterian
Peninsular taxonomy: Ibero-Mousterian, Sibero-Levalloisian
Directional taxonomy: Hespero-Magdalenian, Arcto-Magdalenian
Riverine taxonomy: Rhino-Abbevillians (Mauer jawbone on the Rhine)

Linguistic taxonomy: Sino-Negrids, Sino-Pygmids, Indo-Magdalenian
Organic taxonomy: Eteo-Negrids, Allo-Negrids, Auto-Mousterian

Such terms do not require special explanation except for ‘organic taxonomy’ that concerns genetic hierarchy and parentage relations between primary and secondary seats. It attempts to reconstruct the whole ethnic **migration graph** defined as an acyclic graph from whose root (heartland) there are different branches splitting that never meet and return back. If the black people have their natural heartland in the Bantu area of central Africa coinciding with the settlements of the Sango culture (40, 000 *BP*), the Bantu family may be called ‘Eteo-Negrids’, i.e. ‘trueborn, genuine blacks’ or ‘Auto-Negrids’, i.e. ‘black people themselves’. On the other hand, Chinese peasants (highly assimilated Sino-Negrids) exhibiting high chamaeorrhinia (broad noses) may be called ‘Allo-Negrids’ because their original Palaeo-Negroid blood has been blended with many other racial admixtures.

Most atlases of archaeology are guided by an erroneous view that imagines prehistoric tribes as modern nations occupying closed compact countries with impenetrable frontiers. In fact every tribe looked for an appropriate **ecotype** yielding abundant sources of food and spread forth in narrow **migration corridors** along very long routes. Northern Magdalenians colonised long strips of marshlands, their Mediterranean clansmen occupied long belts of seaside cliffs and the Bronze Age mound-builders colonised high mountains and hillsides with rich pastures for their cattle. In the Neolithic such long chains of related clans began to crumble into smaller neighbourhoods living in **tribal confederacies** with other local tribes. Their local groupings manifested in different styles of the Neolithic pottery (Linear Ware, Bossed Ware, Painted Ware) superimpose several layers of heterogeneous overlapping populations. Their appropriate ethnic interpretation requires something like **transparency theory** decoding surface phenomena and demonstrating how earlier autochthons shine through the culture of later newcomers. So under the outer surface of Danubian peasants and their Linear Ware there were deeper layers of the Stroked Ware (4,500 *BC*) showing through due to remains of the Epi-Gravettians of the Furfooz race. The Painted Ware betrayed pastoralists of Sarmatian origin and the Bossed Ware indicated remnants of lake-dwellers of Pelasgoid stock. Such relations require more complex types of taxonomy:

Evolutionary taxonomy: Mousterians > Epi-Mousterians
Retrogressive taxonomy: Palaeo-Turcoids, Palaeo-Tungids
Periodic taxonomy: Proto-Mousterians, Mio-Levalloisians (Aurignicians)
Relative taxonomy: Proto Mousterian (Charentian), Epi-Mousterian (Aterian)
Technological taxonomy: chopper-makers, flake-tool makers
Architectural taxonomy: beehive-dwellers, tree-dwellers, cliff-dwellers
Funeral taxonomy: mound-builders, incinerators, urnfielders

Morphological taxonomy: Microlithic, Megalithic, Macrolithic, Leptolithic

Evolutionary (or progressive) taxonomy proceeds from the earliest ancestors and applies their terms to later descendants. Retrogressive typology, on the other hand, starts *ex post*, from modern ethnical taxonomy and denotes the forebears of the Tungus as Palaeo-Tungids. Dating cultures may pursue advantages of either relative or absolute chronology. 'Proto-Mousterian' (Charentian) and Epi-Gravettian' illustrate relative parentage as well as relative dating without referring to a fixed time. Periodic taxonomy, on the other hand, provides absolute chronology specified in long stable eras and periods. It may apply prefixes used in some less frequent terms as *Protolithikum* (Lower Palaeolithic), *Miolithikum* (Upper Palaeolithic), *Chalkolithikum* (Bronze Age) and suggest 'Mio-Levalloisians' as a suitable catchword for Miolithic Aurignacians.

Such taxonomies must be completed by cultural typology classifying different types of housing architecture, funeral constructions (mounds, pit-graves), weapons (lances, bows, throwing knives) and working tools (choppers, hand-axes, scrapers). Their division is fully compatible with typologies based on funeral obsequies (incineration, sitting interment, mummification), clothing (cowhide mantles, Turcoid turbans, Pelasgian head-bands, fringed aprons among Mesopotamian peasants) and nutrition (Pelasgian, Tungus and Uto-Aztecan acorn-eating customs). It also can make use of different types of ceramic design if we refuse to emphasise Neolithic innovations and focus on earlier Mesolithic patterns of pre-ceramic vessels. Their deeper classification may distinguish the Turcoid sack-type pottery with pointed bottoms, the Uraloid eggshell ware with combed round bottoms, the Campignian corded ware (corded tubs?) and the lake-dwellers' bossed ware.

The classification according to ethnographic patterns and cultural typology makes up what is referred to as **morphological taxonomy**. Table 22 gives its illustration by plotting periodic taxonomy on the vertical axis against morphological taxonomy on the horizontal axis. The **Megalithic** is an established term for Cyclopean stone buildings, the **Microlithic** is traditionally associated with small triangular, crescent and rhomboid flakes inset in Magdalenian sabres and throwing knives and the **Macrolithic** has recently been coined for big Campignians axes. Its usage may, however, be extended figuratively also for pebble-stone choppers and Acheulian hand-axes. Flake-tool cultures do have a convenient classification of technologies but lack appropriate short names. In want of better terms, the **Leptolithic** is entered above as a new coinage for prismatic flakes of Levalloisian and Aurignacian stamp. 'Foliolithic' was contemplated as a possible designation for Mousterian and Solutrean leaf-shaped lance-heads but its need was avoided thanks to their affiliation to 'Megalithic'. Table 22 omits Pygmoid cultures that had no

specific stone industry, practised incineration, i.e. burning the dead corpse on the funeral pyre, and stayed in temporary nomadic camps hidden in forest clearings. All these customs completely erased their archaeological records and made them prehistorically invisible. A tentative term of **Pyrolithic** hints at their special technique of throwing hot stones into water to produce steam in subterranean huts and saunas.

	Leptolithic	**Microlithic**	**Megalithic**	**Macrolithic**
Protolithic	Soan	Buda?	Clactonian	Olduwan
M-Palaeolithic	Levalloisian	Taubachian	Mousterian	Acheulian
Miolithic	Aurignacian	Microblades	Aterian	Micoquian
Mesolithic	Scottsbluff	Tardenoisian	Solutrean,Clovis	Campignian
Neolithic	Ochre burials	Cardium Ware	mound cultures	Linear Ware
Chalcolithic	Hyperboreans	cliff-dwellers	Megalithic	Corded Ware
Ancient Age	Pelasgians	Etruscans	*Hügelgräber*	Indoeuropeans
Races	Tungids	Turcoids	Scythoids	Nordics

Table 22 *A transversal taxonomy of prehistoric cultures*

The morphological classification introduces easy reference and makes it possible to denote the Abbevillian as 'Proto-Macrolithic' or the Aurignacian as 'Mio-Leptolithic'. Its nomenclature is primarily based on stone implements but it might be used in a broader sense to cover other fields. Prehistoric studies may attain their integrated synthesis only in a systematic cross-cultural or **transversal taxonomy**, *ie* both ethnical, linguistic, cultural, geographical and chronological typology that co-ordinates archaeology with linguistics as well as religionistics and compares their evidence in systematic tables. All valid typologies converge to one and may be based on an arbitrary archaic trait. Table 20 demonstrates a flexible transversal taxonomy based on plural affixes and linguistic traits but co-ordinated with the morphological classification proposed in the upper row of Table 22. Peasants and plant-gatherers on all continents may be classed as *b*-tribes or *b*-cultures, fishermen as *l*-tribes (Pelasgoids and Tungids) or *r*-tribes (Palaeo-Turcoids), cattle-breeding pastoralists and big-game hunters as *k*-tribes (Basco-Scythoids) or *t*-cultures (Uraloids) and Pygmids as *i*-cultures. Indo-Europeans seem to form a special race with *s*-plurals but a deeper analysis will reveal them as *b*-cultures with plural endings derived from *s*-ergatives.

Systematic Anthropology

Prehistoric anthropology exhibits too rare numbers of finds to draw any valid generalisations, so its only chance is to adopt the taxonomy looming

thanks to more abundant evidence in the neighbouring field of archaeology. It may scrutinise sufficient samples of finds only in case of integration with other prehistoric disciplines and considering isolated skeletons as one whole with the adjacent stone implements, dwelling constructions and burials. Its disrespect for the well-founded classification of cultures in archaeology harms all prehistoric studies. As the highest authority in questions of ethnic interpretation and attribution to ancient tribes they prefer to trust comparative linguistics

This undue authority ascribed to Indo-European linguistic studies paralyses all prehistoric research and leads it to a deadlock. The chief sore of modern anthropology is a weaker form of the popular linguistic prejudice assuming that all modern European peoples and languages arose in the hard times of the *Völkerwanderung* If linguistics starts the history of most living Europeans in Christ's era and archaeology indulges in the Neolithic horizon, anthropology sets this threshold at the end of Palaeolithic soon after the extinction of Neanderthals. Though its dating is much more reliable and realistic, the underlying philosophy of evolution suffers from the same theory of extinction as comparative linguistics. It takes to strict monogenism and proclaims that all bands of Palaeolithic mankind perished except for one gracile cultural hero *Homo sapiens* that threw all rude apes down the abyss of oblivion and gave birth to all modern gracile sapient nations.

Modern palaeoanthropology has worked on this false concept of evolution for two centuries and its advances consisted only in shifting the sapient predecessor to earlier and earlier times. Whatever dating it might finally adopt, its principal postulate continues to declare all palaeolithic races (Early Neanderthals - Levalloisians, Late Neanderthals – Mousterians, *Homo erectus* – Oldowans, Acheulians) to be extinct primitive apes. As a consequence, all Palaeolithic records and migrations are worthless because modern racial diversity originated in Mesolithic times without leaving any perceptible proofs of hypothetical colonisations. Such views may be attributed to a wide scale of **monogenism**, the theory of one single origin of mankind maintaining that man descended from one genus (monophyletism) and one common ancestor (single-origin theory) in a single region and place (uni-regional theory). Their adversaries defend **polygenism** claiming that modern mankind had several Palaeolithic predecessors (*H. erectus*, *H. Neanderthalensis*), these may have belonged to different species (polyphyletism) and human evolution made parallel progress in several independent centres (multi-regional theory).

The cultural waves of monogenism and polygenism historically alternate with times according as the focus is shifted either on chronology-oriented or typology-oriented studies. Polygenism came into vogue in ethnography and anthropology with diffusionism and its emphasis laid on typology, inheritance and genetic diversity. Its most radical form was preached by the pre-war

polyphyletism (M. Sera, G. Sergi, A. Mendes-Correa, H. Klaatsch), a diffusionist stream in anthropology that derived races from several genera of advanced hominids. The post-war anthropology refused these views and returned back to the **single-origin theory** (Jorde 1985; Stringer, Andrews 1988) that counts with a single predecessor of man. It claims that all modern races of man descend from one *Homo sapiens* (90,000 *BP*) who first appeared in the Near East and in due course spread to all continents. Only few researchers adhere to the **multi-regional theory** (Wolpoff 1989, Brauer, Frayer, Henke) that admits parallel sapientisation in different areas and independent cultural centres.

The case of monogenism vs. polygenism has to be revisited in the light of a related issue of **divergence theory** as opposed to **convergence theory**. Ch. Darwin and his close linguistic follower A. Schleicher believed in evolution as a rapid process of perfection and binary bifurcation splitting ancestors into two branches of descendant families. Ethnographic and linguistic diffusionism (N. Trubetzkoy, R. Jakobson, B. de Courtenay) protested by adducing examples of convergence, assimilation, amalgamation and hybridisation between overlapping tribes and languages. Instead of branching genealogies it proposed models common in modern **statistic genetics**. In its view development was not an endless growth of new and new innovations but a statistic process where several **genetic strains** coexist in close interbreeding neighbourhood and mix a limited set of genes by recombining them in different ratios. Whereas early evolutionists imagined human prehistory as a branching pedigree modelled like ancient aristocratic genealogies, diffusionists advocated polygenism allowing for inheritance and genetic stability that preserve continuation among several cohabiting genetic populations of Palaeolithic man.

Modern anthropology discarded old genealogical evolutionism by ideas of statistic genetics but its advances have left palaeontology practically intact owing to the evident scarcity of prehistoric finds. Lack of reliable evidence makes monogenists imagine human evolution as a rapid process of **linear hominisation** (sapientisation, gracilisation) without respect to surviving genetic diversity. Their theory of linear gracilisation is refuted by polygenists who argue that the *Australopithecus africanus* and *Homo habilis* displayed higher degrees of gracility than *Homo erectus*. They maintain that rude erect robust herbivores and gracile arboreal omnivores coexisted in several generations of hominoid apes so that the gracile face and erect walk in modern man found support in recombined genes of two different genetic strains.

Fictive constructions of palaeoanthropology make sense when scrutinising scanty finds of a few isolated skeletons but look unrealistic when projected upon the screen of abundant archaeological evidence. They are based on false prejudices of classical anthropology and attempts to apply the cumbersome

apparatus of Linnean classification to human evolution whose nature actually requires a genetic model used in the hybridising differentiation of races of domestic animals. The most erroneous preconceptions imply that (a) every isolated find (*Homo paleohungaricus, Pithecanthropus, Paranthropus, Atlanthropus*) represents an independent hominoid species or genus, (b) every human ancestor belonged to a different extinct genus, (c) *Homo erectus* and *Homo neanderthalensis* were not sapient species, (d) they became extinct, (e) they were remote species so that they could not interbreed and mix with *Homo sapiens*. Such prejudices indirectly imply that our predecessors could not mutually interbreed and give birth to vital offspring, Australian aborigines are not sapient beings and the white, black and yellow people are not races but distant species of one genus. They overestimate all genetic distances in prehistoric finds and treat racial varieties as different species and genera.

The chief erroneous preconception of classic anthropology is its tendency to promote any isolated skeleton immediately to an independent genus or species (*Telanthropus, Atlanthropus, Pithecanthropus, Homo palaeo-hungaricus*). This false view makes us believe that one genus *Homo* originated from the *Proconsul africanus* by leaping through fifteen remote extinct hominoid genera. It hinders research from studying genetic parentage because ancestors in a direct lineage are not considered as transient evolutionary forms of one species but as members of different genera. A genus cannot produce a new genus with new genes all by itself because most related genera differ only by different re-combinations of the same outfit of genes. Dynamic evolution affected all unspecialised species in large cultural centres so that so that its progress, consisting in **convergent progressive hybridisation**, was fastest in close cohabitation between several interbreeding racial varieties. The assumed extinct genera were only transitional forms of racial varieties that could subsequently turn into new species and genera through **divergent regressive specialisation** and a long-term isolation in distant isolated areas.

Prehistoric anthropology will not have an adequate model of evolutionary growth if it concentrates only on chronology and does not take into account parentage, genetic stability, continuance and racial diversity. It will not get any further without answering the following crucial questions of ethnic inheritance: Who were the people and tribes that continued to produce Olduwan pebble-stone choppers, Acheulian hand-axes, Mousterian leaf-shaped points and Levalloisian prismatic tools for almost half a million years? How were they related to *Australopithecinae* that produced flake-stone tools and pebble-stone choppers two million years ago? Why did these cultures remain stable for two million years while their producers changed rapidly and leapt from one genus of primitive apes into another? What happened with the progeny of *Australopithecus africanus*, *Homo habilis* and *H. ergaster* who

produced the first flake tools and bone tools? Did they survive in Boskop man, *Homo pygmaeus* and other representatives of the Pygmoid race? Most records come from Olduvai Gorge and a few large centres in east and south Africa. But Levalloisian flake-tool implements were excavated also at Riwat on Potwar Plateau in arid areas of central Asia (2 mill. *BP*), where palaeoanthropology has not managed to evidence any earlier human fossils. Did *Homo habilis* and his 'osteodontoceratic culture' stay also in central Asia and did he have a hand in the rise of the Palaeo-Mongoloid stock in northern areas?

Most crucial questions of palaeoanthropology remain unanswered and undocumented but their approximate solution may be deduced from the realistic account of evolution looming in archaeology: About 400,000 *BP* there existed at least four distinct races of man, four different types of tribal culture, society, customs and technology, and also four types of completely different languages. The Kafuans, Olduwans and Abbevillians corresponded to several generations of one equatorial racial variety called improperly *Homo erectus*. In Asia there appeared two new racial varieties of Mongoloid hunters classed as *Homo neanderthalensis* and divided into two subvarieties: the Early Neanderthals were Levalloisians who lived in tree-dwellings on the waterside and hunted fish with prismatic flake tools; the Late Neanderthals were Mousterians who lived in beehive huts and hunted big game with leaf-shaped flake tools. The traditional doctrine that Neanderthals became extinct is not acceptable because it would imply a total extinction of all northern hunters and their peculiar flake-tool cultures. Moreover, human palaeontology remained completely blind to a racial variety called *Homo pygmaeus*, whether represented by Boskop man in Africa or by Tzyian man in China (Tscheboksarov 1965: 43). Its worst crime was that instead of tracing these four racial varieties in their natural seats on different continents, it killed them all and replaced them by a ghost-like monster *Homo sapiens* displaying all the mixed hybrid properties of the white Caucasoid man. This man living in the Near East on Mount Carmel may have had a hand in the Aurignacian colonisation along the Mediterranean coastline but his prehistoric role was next to none, he poured just a small drop into populations of the Upper Palaeolithic ethnic sea.

A realistic reform of palaeoanthropological nomenclature should not speak of different genera and species but limit genetic distances to racial varieties and subvarieties and acknowledge the important role of their convergent hybridisation as is common among domestic varieties of canines and felines. Because it is difficult to estimate real genetic distances, it is wiser to speak of Kafuans, Olduwans, Abbevillians and Acheulians instead of *Homo erectus*, and introduce terms Levalloisians and Mousterians instead of the Early and

Late Neanderthals (*Homo neanderthalensis*). A meaningful usage of the Linnean taxonomy might be restored only by classifying Olduwans as *Homo sapiens erectus*. Alternative types nomenclature might be adopted by distinguishing Chopping-Tool Makers and Flake-Tool People or using *ex post* racial labels such as Palaeo-Negrids, Palaeo-Tungids and Meso-Turcoids.

Because the Linnean classification is difficult to acquiesce with both Darwinian and Mendelian genetics, it plagues prehistoric anthropology with inadequate terms of high descriptive but low explicative and classificatory value. A species cannot evolve by changing generic affiliation like dirty shirts but must necessarily fall into the genus of its predecessor. The kinship relation between ancestors and descendants may consist only in a generic inclusion into the genus of the ancestor. Human and animal evolution may be described efficiently only by a new **periodic** or **transversal taxonomy** tracing genetic strains, hereditary lines as well as geographic migrations and regional mutations. Its keyword is a **genetic strain**, a hereditary line of several generations of indirect descendants residing in one area. **Indirect parentage** is a partial statistic coincidence of gene repertory between two subsequent local populations. By **genetic interval** we mean racial diversity of genetic strains allowing for partial interbreeding in a given local neighbourhood. As one **generation** we may denote a genetic interval of contemporary transitional forms surviving at one prehistoric period. A **translation** is defined as geographic isolation of one generation migrated to an isolated area. An **elevation** is a projection of a genetic interval into a higher generation. Every elevation is a chronological projection and every translation a geographical projection of a given genetic interval into a new space.

One possible look at human ancestors from the viewpoint of modern genetics is shown on Table 23. Human predecessors are arranged into two vertical columns representing a genetic interval between two genetic strains, robust erect terrestrial herbivores on the left and gracile arboreal omnivores on the right. Their genetic interval is repeated in several generations of advanced hominoids starting from *Dryopithecus* and *Proconsul*. Our estimate is that populations in one generation of a genetic interval could interbreed but after two generations they split into different species and genera. In spite of inbreeding in their main genetic lines there was a middle area reserved for vital crosses acting as *Kulturtrager* of civilisation. About two million years ago this role was given to *Homo habilis* (Flake-Tool Maker) and *Homo erectus* (Chopper-Tool Maker) who moved northeast and founded new colonies in to Asia. Besides this outer translation, their generic interval was mapped also into an inner translation in the heartland of Africa: in rainforests there survived regressive populations of gorillas and chimpanzees and a mixed intermediary

stock of *Australopithecus boisei* and *A. africanus* on the fringes of woodland that could probably mix with human civilisators as well as with forest isolates.



Table 23 *The anthropogenesis of the human stock*

Table 23 demonstrates how the genetic interval between robust herbivores and gracile omnivores was repeated in several generations of human ancestors. Its right column may be split into two distinct minor genetic lines, slim arboreal carnivores (with flake-tools) living in tree-dwellings on the waterside and short gracile omnivores with nocturnal habits. These three strains can be observed in interbreeding cohabitation in several generations of higher primates: among *Dryopithecinae*, *Australopithecinae* as well as several Palaeolithic generations of the genus *Homo*. Moreover, they seem to cut across the whole kingdom of primates, depicted schematically on Table 24. Genetic strains are represented as vertical bars while generations and translations are drawn as horizontal bars. Some lines (*Lemuriformes*, *Lorisiformes*) with diploid chromosome numbers approaching 80 got specialised in isolated refuges (Madagascar) but their precursors from the late Terciaries were

included into further evolution and elevated to higher classes. Some moved to America and were absorbed into the *Platyrrhini* that represent a geographic translation of the Eocene Old World monkeys. The model presupposes that there were no single predecessors, only dynamic racial hybridisation between overlapping populations that later specialised into stable genera.



Table 24 *Genetic strains and generations in primates*

Carpolestidae (Palaeocene) → *Microchoerinae* (Eocene) → *Tarsiiformes*
→ *Microsyopidae* (Eocene) →*Dryopithecinae?*

Omomyoidea (Palaeocene) → *Paromomyidae* (Eocene) → *Tuparoidea*
→*Phenacolemurinae*(Eocene)→*Lemuriformes*

Plesiadapidae (Palaeocene) → *Adapidae* (Eocene) → *Propliothecinae?*

Anaptomorphidae (Palaeocene)→ *Anaptomorphinae?* → *Lorisiformes*

Table 24 gives a 2-dimensional projection of a 3-dimensional periodic table of primates where geographic translations would be represented on a special axis. It assumes that there were no clearcut evolutionary classes, only dynamic **genetic tendencies** repeated in different quantitative ratios at higher and higher levels. The traditional doctrine presupposes that the *Platyrrhini* had one single predecessor with a broad nuzzle but genetics will explain this as a secondary trait due to convergent development and a low percentage of *Lemuriformes* among immigrants. A rational reform of taxonomy should map covariant projections of genetic strains into different geographic and temporal translations. Pairs *Pliopithecus* and *Propliopithecus* or *Dryopithecus robustus* and *Australopithecus robustus* show two different ways of arranging species into genetic strains. The evolution of narrow-nuzzled arboreal lake-dwellers from *Propliopithecus* to *Limnopithecus* and *Hylobates* may be kept easily in meaningful associations if the Miocene and Oligocene transitional forms are reclassified as *Mio-Limnopithecinae* or *Oligo-Hylobatinae*. Such taxonomy would save thousands of futile terms and replace a tedious descriptive apparatus by a simple transparent nomenclature of high explanatory value.

The classic philosophy of evolution believed in direct parentage, single predecessors and endless diversification without any recurrent tendencies and stable genetic lines. Many of its large classes (*Platirrhini*, *Cercopithecoidea*, *Pongidae*) are artificial groupings, generations united by secondary assimilated traits. A new taxonomy should build on primary genetic strains that do not imply direct parentage but display recurrent tendencies and arrange successive populations with higher percentages of one original genotype. Every taxon should bear a convenient term specifying its genetic strain, prehistoric age and geographic distribution, while all complementary specifications would be appended at the end. Palaeontology cannot crumble into a factographic description of individual fates but should map integral processes of **global transformations** affecting all species (glaciation, overpopulation, migration).

PHILOLOGICAL SCIENCES

Systematic Ethnology

Classifying phenomena according to secondary derived features is the gravest child disease vexing all prehistoric studies. In ethnology no serious researcher would agree with deriving the descent of Jews, Moors and Gypsies from the nations of Europe where they came as immigrants in medieval times. None would mistake immigrants mixing with autochthons for their lawful kinsmen, but if he enquires into the dark ethnic conditions of earlier ages, he finds such erroneous ethnic attribution natural. The saddest piece of news about modern ethnology is that all ethnic taxonomies we have are based on secondary, derived, assimilated and neighbourhood-oriented relations. Such taxonomies are worthless because instead of disclosing real ancestors traced back to prehistoric tribes they reveal only outer superficial resemblance between assimilated populations of medieval kingdoms and modern nations. Instead of analysing modern nations as amalgams of heterogeneous tribes cohabiting in one area, they explain them as one homogeneous stock stemming from one ancestral line. Instead of enquiring into the huge ethnic diversity of archaeological cultures in prehistoric Europe, they preach myths that all Neolithic hunters and farmers were one undifferentiated nation speaking one Indo-European or Nostratic proto-language. Instead of dividing Amerindians into several stocks of heterogeneous origin, they emphasise their secondary similarity acquired through mutual assimilation.

Erroneous methods of classic ethnography and comparative linguistics look reasonable because they deal with deep hidden ethnic relations concealed to the eye of a naive observer. Most laymen find it natural to use all common ethnic terms (Celts, Slavs, Germans, Russians) in the false meaning of modern nations without realising that they originally referred only to small ruling tribes. The original Russians were not Slavs but the ancient *Roxolanoi* and *Aorsoi* of Sarmatian stock. Romance nations and languages did not originate in a Common Romance family but from Roman legionaries spreading Latin as the administrative literary standard of the Roman Empire. Unfortunately, modern ethnology and comparative linguistics have not overcome such naive observers' optics. Instead of analysing modern ethnic amalgams into original elements they knead their mixed dough into larger and large compounds, into large Indo-European ethnic families, into amalgams of amalgams and mixtures of mixtures. They venture a far-reaching generalising prehistoric synthesis without having done any preliminary analysis and stage imaginary fairy-tales played by ghost nations. Their artistry consists in searching for superficial similarities without analysing structural differences as if any quantity of

German loanwords in Yiddish and Hungarian could prove their Germanic origin. Such methodology undermines science and threatens to turn ethnology into a sort of 'applied bastardology' deriving mammals from dachshunds. It is as naive as if chemistry started its elementary considerations from mixed substances, from lemonade, soup and risotto.

The semantic misinterpretations of ethnic conditions hinder understanding prehistoric tribes as well as modern nations. Modern nations are local groupings of many heterogeneous tribes seated in one area and composed from many previous archaeological cultures settled in overlapping neighbourhoods. They are not real primary ethnic elements but secondary **political units** arisen from medieval kingdoms uniting many different tribes under the rule of one medieval conqueror. In its original sense ***ethnos*** is a geographic network of tribal settlements colonised by large Palaeolithic cultures. The original pure races, tribes, cultures, faiths and languages had existed only by the dawn of Neolithic period when they began to melt into large local groupings.

Modern ethnology does not need a new special ethnic classification because prehistoric tribes had one meeting all modern requirements. Ancient historiographers (Berossos, Herodot, Strabo, Pausanias, Ptolemy, Nestor, Geoffrey of Monmouth) had heard a lot about its surviving fragments but it is difficult to convince modern authors that they were not utter liars who on purpose embezzled the historical truth. In order to revive it we have to realise that the real Turks are not mixed populations inhabiting countries speaking Turkic languages but Mesolithic fishermen, pirates and goat-keepers who produced microlith cultures (12.000 to 9.000 *BP*). Their prehistoric migration routes are preserved in many place names appending the ethnonym Hun with a plural in *-r*. The Turkish plural form *Hunnir* can be read in *Cimbri*, *Cymri*, Kimmerians, Hebrew, *Iberi*, *Hiberni*, *Ambrones*, *Umbrii*, Khmers and Chamorro. These place names are usually associated into a quadruplet of four elementary phratries Hun-ir - Ta(r)t-ar - Herm - Tur. Such ethnonymic parallels must be verified carefully by resemblances in cultural typology: deposing the dead in the water, giving them coins as *viaticum*, water offerings, purification by water, subterranean caves and cliff-dwellings, phallomorphic statuettes of their god Hermes etc. Reconstructions of the original ethnic classification are demonstrated in quadruplets of tribal phratries.

I. Mongoloid (Mousterian) race:

A. **Basco-Scythoids**: tall robust brachycephalic race with an aquiline nose, leaf-shaped lance heads, shields, beehive huts and mounds with anointing and mummification, cowhide mantles tied by a clasp over the shoulder, stone wall hill forts, stone mound graves:

k-tribes (Megalith tribes, beehives, cairns, *tholoi*, mausoleums, agoras, kraals):

a. **Mysians**: (*Mysioi*, *Bessoi*, Nessites, *Moisxoi*, Basque, Abxaz-*Abazgoi*, Abazins, Mongols, Mansi, Massongo-Bassongo, Masai, Quechua-Muisca-Mochica, Mushkogee, Mixtec)
b. **Scythians** (*Saki*, Scots, *Sudini*, Sokoto, Scandinavians, Tchuď)
c. **Ugrians** (Hungarians, *Vagri*, *Varyagi*)
d. **Medes** (*Mitanni*, Magyars)

ŋg-tribes: Pashto, Baxtrians, Sokoto, Mitanni, Medes:
k/t-tribes: Khoisanids, Hottentot, Eskimos, Chukchee
(1) *k/t*-tribes: Mousterian (-60,000) → Balkanian → Szeletian (-45,000) → Solutrean (-22,000) → Ibero-Mauretanian → Aterian (-30,000)
(2) *k*-tribes Ordos (-15,000) → Ugro-Xanty → Folsom (-11,500) + Clovis (Algonquin) → Quechua (Peru)

B. **Uraloids** (horse-pastoralists, jurtas, the exposition of the dead on the scaffolding, myths about the World Tree, World Egg and Word Duck):

t-tribes (tree burials, cart-burials, exposition on sledges, Combed Ware):
a. **Asians** (*Osi*, Ossetes-*Asioi*-*Yazygi*, Oscans, Estonians-*Aestii*, Assyrians)
b. **Russians** (*Roxolanoi*, *Rosomoni*)
c. **Sarmatians** (Zyrjans, Cheremiss)
d. **Wallachians** (*Volsci*, *Volcae*, Welsh, *Vlachi*, *Walsungen*)
e. **Marians** (Mordvins, *Neuri*, Nards, *Amorites*, Nuers, *Norici*, *Marsi*, *Marrucini*, *Morini*, Moors)

t(>*r*)-tribes: Assyrians, Nordic *Aesir*, Aryans, Vedic *Aśurah*
(0) Cradle land: Altaic, Fergana Valley?
(1) Combed Ware: Narva - Dyakovo - Volosovo → Uralic (Combed Ware)
(2) Sarmatian horse-breeders → Assyrians → Amorites → Hyksots (Egypt, 1,950 *BC*) → Mauretania
(3) Sarmatians (Globular *Amphorae*, cart-graves, hillforts) → Norici → Roman *Marsi* → Morini

II. Levalloisian race:

A. **Turcoids** (cliff-dwellings, *tepees* - conic post-dwellings, prismatic and triangular arrowheads, boat burials, sea burials, piracy):
a. **Kimmerians** (*Cimbri*, Gomer, *Kumár*-Khmers, Umbria, Cambria, *Iberi*, *Hiberni*, Huns, Chamoro, Komoro)
b. **Teutons** (Ta(r)tars, Tat, *Toutones*)
c. **Germans** (*Hernici*, *Hermunduri*, Herero)
d. **Silesians** (*Silingi*, *Sikuli*, Sicilians, *Segovesi*)
e. **Turks** (*Tyrhenes*-*Tursci*-Etrucans, Thuringen, *Hermunduri*)

B. **Tungids** (lake-dwellers, acorn-eaters, head-bands, pole-tents, wolves, swans and dolphins as totem forefathers, descent from twin brothers):

a. **Pelasgians** (*Pelishti*, Palestinians-Philistines, Apulians, *Belgae*, *Belovesi*, *Polane*, *Polochane*, Bulgars, *Polovtsi*, Pele-Pede)
b. **Danaïdes** (*Daunii*, *Daanu*, Danes?)
c. **Sardians** (*Śardana*, Sardinians, Stradonice)
d. **Karians?** (*Carentani*, Cornish, Karelians)
e. **Picenians** (*Piceni*, *Peucetii*, *Pechenezi*)
f. **Tungus** (Tagalog, Telugu)

III. Lapponoid race (incineration burials, lean-to *zemlyankas*, blood group A):
A. **Celtoids** (hut-urns, face-urns)
a. **Albanians** (elves, Alpines, Lapps, *populi Albanenses*)
b. **Drevans** (dwarfs)
c. **Gauls** (Gaels, Letgala, *Galinda*)
d. **Celts** (*kolduns*, Galatians)

B. **Wendoids** (pot-urns, shoe-urns):
a. **Wends** (*Veneti*, Gwynt, Goidel, Anti, Finns)
b. **Croatians** (*Chorvati*)
c. **Czechs** (*Tsakones*?)
d. **Lakhs** (*Lakones?*)

C. **Palaeo-Slavs** (pot-urns, sack-urns):
a. **Slavs** (Slavonians, Slovaks, Slovenes, from **Galv*-?)
b. **Serbians** (Sorbians, from **Kerb*-, Chorvat, Croat?)
c. **Lusatians** (*Lugii*, *Lužici*)
d. **Lubians** (*Lubushane*, from **Alp*-, *Alb*-?)
e. **Milingians** (*Milingi*, *Miletici*)

IV. Olduwan race (dolichocephaly, pebble-stone choppers, plant-gathering, large, quadrangular huts, ancestral cults, matrilinear parentage):
(1) Melanesian faction:
Burongo (Mbareke, Birao) + **Langalanga** (Longgu, Lengo)
(2) **Australoids**, Australian faction: Aranda + Waljbiri + Pittapitta

V. Acheulian race (dolichocephaly, hand-axes, agriculture, quadrangular huts with thatched roof and wicker walls fixed with mud):
A. **Negroids** (*pithoi* burials):
(1) Sudanic faction: **Bari** (Bura, Berti, Borana) + **Lango** (Loko)
(2) Bantu faction:
Konde (Ma-Konde, Kete, Kota, Hutu, Nkundu) - **Bira** (Bara) +
Loango (Loko, Ku-Lango)
B. **Caucasoids**: (*pithoi* burials, cist graves):
(1) Anatolian faction: Hittites, Hattites, *Gutii* + *Lullubei* + Elamites

VI. Europoid race (cist graves, long houses, agriculture, Mother Earth cults)
(1) Campignian faction (cist graves, kitchen middens, dune-dwellings, wurths):

a. **Goths** (Jutes, *Jotun*, *Italici*)
b. **Frisians** (Britons, Bretons, Prussians, *Borussi*, *Bruttii*)
c. **Saxons** (*Senones*?)
d. **Angles** (Langobards, *Uglichi*?)
(2) Aunjetitz faction (*pithoi* burials):
Swabians (*Suevi*) + Franks (*Francones*) + Senons (*Senoni*)
(3) *Reihengräber*: Burgundians (*Buri*, *Burones*) + Langobards (*Langiones*) + Rugians (*Rugii*)

Comparative Linguistics

In linguistics the principle of monogenism is usually referred to as the **hypothesis of congenerism** and implies a common origin of all languages of the world. A. Schleicher reconstructed Indo-European as a common proto-language (*Ursprache*) whose binary splitting into daughter languages led to the present diversity of European national tongues and dialects. His bifurcative model (*Stammbaumtheorie*) copied traditional royal pedigrees and was intended as a direct parallel to Darwin's evolution of species. M. Swadesh attempted to give this model a mathematical form based on the hypothesis of a constant decay of languages at a regular speed. He supposed that languages required 0-5 centuries, families 5-25 centuries, and stocks 25-50 centuries to come into existence. His 'lexico-statistical method' won a wide repute as **glottochronology** and was applied with great success also to Austroasiatic languages (I. Dyen 1963).

Alternative approaches of linguistic polygenism appeared before the First World War with the diffusionist movement. Sapir, Jakobson and Trubetzkoy refused the idea of an exclusively divergent development without convergent mixing, overlapping and assimilation. They turned their focus from ancient literary languages to spoken dialects surviving in the aboriginal areas of the world. The diffusionist reconstructions of **Austroasiatic** (W. Schmidt 1919), **Common Indonesian** (R. Brandstetter 1916), **Malayo-Polynesian** (O. Dempwolff 1934-8) and **Hamitic** (C. Meinhof 1917) demonstrated that large ethnic families can be classified by a means of synchronic description without deep diachronic research and ancient literary records. The post-war linguistics added important reconstructions of **Sino-Tibetan** (R. Shafer 1955) and **Afro-Asiatic** (J. H. Greenberg 1963).

Diffusionism influenced also American **descriptivism** attempting to give a synchronic description of Amerindian languages. The first preliminary step consisted in generalising the 'first-order macro-languages` such as **Macro-Algonquian** (L. Bloomfield 1946) or Athapascan **Na-Dene** (E. Sapir 1915). As early as in 1925 E. Sapir attempted to relate Na-Dene to Chinese on

account of tonal systems in Tlingit and other Athapascan languages. Further comparisons of Amerindian languages to Sino-Tibetan, Uralic and Basque were made by Morris Swadesh (1960) who extended Sapir's theory to the hypothesis of **Vasco-NaDene** (Gluhak 1978, Wikander 1970, Viitso 1971, Sadovszky 1977). The seventies made a further step, a transition to the 'second-order macro-languages` such as **Proto-Algic** (Proulx 1984).

The second-order reconstructions implied 'long-range comparisons` that crossed oceans and continents. Preparatory activities were started by two-sided comparisons between Indo-European and Semitic (Müller 1906, Cuny 1924, 1946; Brunner 1969) as well as Indo-European and Uralic (Collinder 1957; Joki 1973; Dybo 1978). H. Pedersen (1925) came with the first draft of a Eurasian synthesis, with the idea of **Nostratic** as a common *Ursprache* of the white **Caucasoid race**. But it was only V. M. Illich-Svitych (1971) who breathed life into his hypothesis and collected its wordstock. His Nostratic vocabulary compared words from Indo-European, Semito-Hamitic, Ural-Altaic, Dravidian and Kartvelian families. The Brno school of Nostratic studies proposed to distinguish between **East-Nostratic** (Uralic, Altaic, Dravidian) and **West-Nostratic** (Indo-European, Semito-Hamitic, Kartvelian) families (Erhart 1979; Čejka 1979) because there was a wide difference between the Ural-Altaic agglutinating type and western inflecting languages.

Most ‘first-order macro-families’ correspond to one dominant prehistoric stock but contain also several admixtures of heterogeneous ethnic components that turn them into impure amalgams. Large amounts of lexical parallels do not necessarily imply genetic kinship unless there are deeper correspondences in syntactic structures, ethnic customs and racial types. The Italian **Neo-Linguistic School** (V. Pisani 1956) proved the fallacies of Schleicher’s *Stammbaumtheorie* by shattering the myth of Common Romance. Romance languages arose from Italic, Gallic, Dalmatian and Dacian tribal dialects that merged their lexical heritage into one administrative literary standard of the Roman Empire. The Romans were not their original forefathers but only a minor tribe of conquerors who subdued them to their military rule. The older divergent model (Part A in Table 25) proved to be erroneous because what came last and *ex post* was celebrated pompously as first. The Italian Neo-Linguists proposed an alternative convergent model (Part B in Table 25) that merged primary tribal diversity into secondary national unity. It proved that most modern national languages had originated from many regional tribal dialects and served as administrative standards of medieval kingdoms. Hence they cannot be considered as primary ethnic and linguistic units but have to be classed as secondary **political units** that are worthless for linguistic prehistory and comparative studies. They construe a fallacious chain of mixed tongues

Italian < Latin < Common Romance < Indo-European < Nostratic ,

where they should have traced the development of pure ethnic categories

Paleo-Turkic (microlith people) > Sea Peoples (*Tursci*) > Etruscans > Toscans.





Table 25 *The divergent and the convergent account of Ursprachen*

ROMANCE → *s*-Italians + *r*-Umbrians + *t*-Oscans + *l*-Apulians + *i*-Gauls
s-Italians → *Italici* + *Bruttii*
l-Apulians → *Apuli, Paeligni* + *Daunii* + *Sardi* + *Latini* + *Piceni*
r-Umbrians → *Umbri, Cimbri* + *Taurini, Tyrhenes*, Etruscans + *Siculi, Sicani*
t-Oscans → *Osci* + *Volsci* + *Boii* + *Marsi, Marsigni* + *Sabini, Samnites*
i-Gauls → *Veneti* + *Albanenses*

The real linguistic analysis of Romance and Italic languages should not search for common words but for structural differences between dialects. It should result in the decomposition of the secondary national unity into the original primary tribal languages peculiar to prehistoric Europe. In prehistoric Italy they were represented by Indo-European peasants with *s*-plurals (*s*-Italians), Sea Peoples with *r*-plurals (*r*-Umbrians), lake-dwelling fishermen with *l*-plurals (*l*-Apulians), warlike horse-breeders with *t*-plurals (*t*-Oscans) and short-sized Celts with *i*-plurals (*i*-Gauls). Such decomposition analyses national languages into tribal dialects and reveals how prehistoric tribes composed into regional groupings and social castes of modern nations. First civilised societies in Europe had **caste stratification** similar to aboriginal societies in Africa, Melanesia and Oceania. The royal *k*-tribes (Megalith builders), assisted by aristocratic *t*-tribes of pastoralists and warriors, ruled together over peasant serfs (*s*-tribes, *b*-tribes or ^{m}b-tribes) and enslaved artisans (*i*-tribes). The middle class of *equites* was usually formed by merchants recruited from seafarers and fishermen (*r*-tribes, *l*-tribes).

The same story of misinterpretation occurred to Classic Greek, Common Celtic, Common Slavonic and Baltic. Comparative linguistics stands on rotten foundations because its edifice is built from muddy bricks. Any of its n^{th} order macro-families must be misleading because it is built on false low-level units.

GREEKS → *k*-Cyclopes + *i-Hellenes* + *r*-Dorians + *l*-Pelasgians
k-Cyclopes → Thracians + *Bessoi, Mysioi, Mosxoi*
l-Pelasgians → *Paeones, Pelasgiotes* + *Danaides* + *Karoi* + *Leleges*
r-Dorians → *Doroi, Tauroi* + *Kimmerioi* + Greeks, *Geryones*
i-Hellenes → Galatians, *Hellenes* + *Ionoi* (< *Jav/Alban) + Aetolians (< *Ant)

CELTS → *i*-Gauls + *r*-Cimbri + *s*-Britons + *l-Belgae* + *t-Volcae*
i-Gauls → Celts, Gaels + Albania + Veneti, Gwynt, Goidel, Gwynned
l-Belgae → *Belgae*, Firbolg + *Daanu* + *Picti*? + Cornish, *Cornubii*?
t-Volcae → Welsh, *Volcae Tectosages* + Morini + Ossi

r-Cimbri → *Cymri*, *Iberi*, *Hiberni*, *Ombrones*, Cambria-Cumber,

SLAVS → Slavs + Wends + Celts + *t*-Sarmatians
t-Sarmatians → *Yazygi* + Russians + Moravians, *Norici*, *Muroma* + *Veleti*, *Volcae*, Wallachians + *Boii*, Bohemians
Wends → Veneds + Croatians + Lekhs, Lakhs + Czechs
Celts → *Golasici*, *Havolane*, *Golyad'* + *Polabingi* + *Drevane*
Slavs → Serbians + Lugians + Lucians
Sorbians → *Serbs* + *Batinoi*, *Budinoi*, *Budici* + *Cotini*, *Chodové*
Lugians → *Lugii*, *Lužici* + *Raeti*, *Radici*, *Ratari* + Lubushani, *Libici*
Lucians → *Lučané* + *Dobřané* + *Dražici*

BALTS → *s*-Prussians + *i*-Lapps + *t*-Uralians + *k*-Scythians
s-Prussians → *Borussi*, *Prutenes* + Jaćwings, *Jotija*
t-Uralians → Estonians, *Aesti*, *Eeste* + *Veltai* + Lithuanians, Latvians, *Letgala*, *Lettia* + Mera, Muromi
i-Lapps → Laplanders (< elves) + Finns (< Wends) + *Galinda*, *Semigala*
k-Scythians → Scandinavians, *Sudavi*, *Sudini*, Chud' + Vesi, *Vepsa* + Varyags

Our decompositions of main Indo-European families apply a simple classification according to plural endings but use a wide scale of cultural structural typology. They assume that the Welsh *cathod* 'cats', Latin forms *mors – mortes* 'deaths', Old English *ealuÞ* 'ales' and Slavonic *t*-stems used for animal offspring (*kuręta* 'chickens') bring residual evidence of ancient Sarmatian *t*-plurals. A similar consideration is attached to German pairs *Mann - Männer* 'men', *Bach – Bächer* 'brooks' arousing suspicion that their umlaut and *r*-endings are residues of the Palaeo-Turcoid vowel harmony and *r*-plurals. Anomalous plurals tend to be preserved chiefly in different professional argots, *t*-plurals are common in animal husbandry and *r*-plural in fishing activities. Mapping such dialectal phenomena as evidence for prehistoric tribes became very popular thanks to N. Trubetzkoy's *Kettentheorie* and modern **infra-dialectology** (H. Werner, M. Izzo). Izzo's treatise *Toscan & Etruscan* (1972) demonstrated that a geographic study of living languages and dialects may safely reconstruct the distribution of prehistoric nationalities.

The underlying philosophy of linguistic analysis may be called **residualism** because it uses differential analysis for reconstructing residual structures instead of traditional additive analysis of integral structures. Its basic principle claims that residual grammatical differences are more important that numerous lexical parallels. When applied to other language families, say, Common Uralian, it means that searching for residual differences in Lappish grammar is more important than collecting lexical parallels with other Uralian languages. Saying that Lappish is a Uralian language is pointless because the Lapponoid race disagrees with the Uralic and Mongoloid race and agrees with other

pygmoid populations all over the world. Listing infinite amounts of Uralian words in Lappish is trivial because it proves only a long period of residing in the Uralian local neighbourhood. The ethnonyms *Lapp – Alb - Elf* and *Finnland – Vinland - Wends* suggest genetic affiliation to the short-sized Lausitz Urnfielders of Slavonic descent and their characteristic features (palatalisation and palatal correlation in consonants, *e*<*i*-plurals, *k*'>*s*-satemisation). Comparative linguistics should abandon collecting lexical parallels (secondary loan-words) inside large families and concentrate on cross-continental parallels between dialects in phonetics, word-formation, morphology and syntax.

URALIAN → *t*-Uralian + *k*-Uralian + *l*-Uralian + *s*-Permian + *i*-Lappish
k-Uralian → Vepsa (*Vesi*), Varyags, Magyars, Xanty, Mansi
t-Uralian → Finnish, Estonian, Mordavian
l-Uralian → Upper Mari, Lower Mari, Karelian
i-Lappish → Saam, Samoyedic, Selkup, Nenets, Enets
s-Permian → Komi, Permian (< *Barmia*), Udmurt

CAUCASIANS → *b*-Caucasians + *l*-Caucasians + *r*-Caucasians
r-Caucasian → Agul, Rutul, Tsaxur, Archi, Budux, Xinalug, Kryz
l-Caucasian → Urartian, Svan, Avar, Andi, Botlix, Axvax, Bezhita, Bagvali, Tindi, Chamalal
b-Caucasian → Georgian, Mingrelian, Lazi, Svan, Ginux, Godoberi, Tindi, Bagvali, Lezghian, Dargi, Kapucha, Tsaxur, Karat, Dido, Gunzib, Xvarshi, Cez, Bezhita, Rutul, Kryz
s-Caucasians → Bats, Ingush, Chechen

IRANIAN → *n*-Scythian + *t*-Sarmatian + *i*-Kafir
n-Scythian → Persian, Talysh, Tat, Gilaki, Semnani, Sogida, Pashto, Kurmanji, Mazanderani, Mukri, Khowar
t-Sarmatian → Ossetic, Yaghnobi, Ishkashmi, Yazghulami
i-Kafir → Kashmiri, Waigali, Kati, Ashkun

INDIAN → *s*-Indian + *i*-Indian + *r*-Indian + *l*/ *r*-Dravidian + *r*-Munda
r-Indian → Nepal, Assam, Oriya, Benghali
r-Dravidian → Tamil, Tulu, Malayam, Kurukh, Gadaba, Purji, Kolami, Naiki, Kannada, Konda, Kodagu
l-Dravidian → Tamil, Telugu, Kannada, Kolami, Purji, Gadaba
i-Indian → Kashmiri, Malayam, Telugu
b-Dravidian → Kodagu, Kolami, Gadaba, Purji
k-Dravidian → Kui, Naiki, Tamil, Gondi, Braui, Kuvi

AUSTRONESIAN → *k*-Indonesian + *k*-Polynesian + *r*-Dayak + *l*-Malay
k-Indonesian → Malagasy, Tagalog, Bisayan, Sundanese, Bontoc,

Talautese, Nias, Toba, Tontemboan, Igorot
k-Polynesian → Maori, Samoan, Tongan, Niue, Futana, Mae, Nukuoro, Sikaiana, Rarotongan, Tahitian, Hawaian
r-Dayak → Malay, Dayak, Toba, Batak, Minangkabau, Gaio, Bugi, Nias, Achin, Malagasy, Komoro
l-Malay → Gorontalo, Tagalog, Bisayan, Paulokhi, Malay, Buru
r-Australian → Aranda, Warlpiri, Nyanguwanda, Pitjantjatjara

BANTU → Bantu + Pele + Herero + Pygmy
^{m}b-Bantu → Yaunde, Fernando Po, Duala, Isubu, Fan, Diga, Benga, Congo, Bangui, Kamba, Bondei, Luyi, Nkundu, Dzalamo, Luba, Lunda
Pygmy *i*-Bantu → (Masaba, Kikuyu, Komoro, Kavirongo, Ababua, Nyanyembe, Konyagi, Mpongwe, Galoa, Po, Kibira, Kiokwa
Pele *l*-Bantu → Swahili, Pokomo, Shambala, Makwa, Makonde, Yao, Wenda, Bisa, Subiya, Xosa, Senga, Sotho, Swazi, Shona, Zulu, Pondo, Tlapi, Bulu, Benga, Thonga
Herero *r*-Bantu → Runda, Hima, Hehe, Tete, Nyoro, Ganda, Kikuyu, Sukuma, Nyanyembe, Kerewe, Komoro, Siha, Ronga, Gi-Tongo
BANTOID → ^{m}b-Bantoid (Dyaloa, Ekoi) + *r*-Bantoid (Pepel, Temne, Bulom, Biafada) + *l*-Bantoid (Fulup, Jara) + *k*-Bantoid (Basara) + *i*-Bantoid (Lefana)

AMERINDIAN → *k*-Algonkin + *l*-Uto-Aztecan + *b*-Pueblan +*i*-Athapascan
k-Algonkin→ Muskogee, Mixtec, Inka, Quechua-Muisca, Mochica, Aymara
l-Uto-Aztecan → Haida, Nootka, Tlingit, Kwakiutl, Pomo, Nahuatl, Aztec
b-Pueblan → Hopi-Zuñi + Mayas (Huastec, Toltec) + Tupí-Quaraní
i-Athapascan → Black Feet + Carrier + Navaho + Arawak

A survey demonstrating decompositions of large macro-families into homogeneous subclasses shows that superficial outer classification into continental neighbourhoods is only the first step to be followed by a next one, an inner genetic classification analysing large macro-families into prehistoric races. No national language can be attributed exclusively to one family because it usually contains a definite percentage of several other ethnic traditions. Deciphering local linguistic clusters can proceed from modern times to earlier stages but a more reasonable method is to proceed contrariwise by fixing linguistic archetypes of Palaeolithic races and judging modern dialects by means of their theoretical apparatus. Such archetypes cannot be recovered from Indo-European or Nostratic but must be deduced by a typological reconstruction of the original pure **racial dialects**. Their convenient names might be Palaeo-Negritic, Palaeo-Turkic, Palaeo-Tungic and Palaeo-Pygmic and their formal structure should correspond well to the pure types of living languages. The original appearance of an archetypal racial *x*-language with an

x-plural may be reconstructed by collecting structural anomalies common to all *x*-dialects in different families.

Human glottogenesis must have started with the rise of at least three different linguistic types: the equatorial zone was occupied by Palaeo-Negritic **prepositive** (prefixing, classificatory) languages with prefixing classifiers and nominal gender categories, northern Eurasia was a heartland of **postpositive** (suffixing, agglutinating) languages with postpositions and agglutinating declensions and southeast Asia abounded in **isolating** (non-affixing, analytic) languages with prosodic tonality and reduplicating grammar. Their division is in good concord with anthropology dividing mankind into three elementary racial varieties, Palaeo-Negrids (*Homo erectus*), Palaeo-Mongolids (*Homo neanderthalensis*) and Palaeo-Pygmids (*Homo pygmaeus*). There exist also ergative, synthetic, polysynthetic and inflecting languages but these are derived types spoken by secondary mixed races. Mixed types display heterogeneous features while archetypal systems exhibit structural uniformity.

	b-languages	***r***-languages	***k***-languages	***i***-languages
Type	prefixing	agglutinating	incorporating	isolating
Subject+**V**erb+**O**bject	S V O	S O V	S O V	S V O
Adjective Attr.+ **N**oun	N A	A N	A N	A ε N
Genitive Attr. + **N**oun	N G	G N	G N	N ε G
Numeral + **N**oun	Nu Pl_{gen}	Nu Sg_{nom}	Nu Sg_{nom}	Nu ε N
Possessive + **N**oun	Po N	N-Po	N-Po	Po ε N
Preposition + **N**oun	P N	N-P	N-P	P N
Conjunction + **N**oun	C N	N-C	N-C	C N
Noun + **p**lural marker	p-N	N-p	N-p	p N
Auxiliary+**P**articiple	-	A P	A P	-

Table 26 *The structure and word-order in palaeo-languages*

Table 26 demonstrates how the original palaeo-languages differed in word-order, morphology and syntax. Palaeo-Negritic languages tended to preserve the S V O word-order with an adjective attribute following the noun (N A). The same applies to the incongruent nominal attribute coming in the genitive after the noun (N G). Palaeo-Mongolean languages, on the other hand, apply the S OV word-order with the final position of verbs and use the A N and G N attributive construction as in Old English *stānes weall* ‘of-stone wall’. Their characteristic G N structures led to Turcoid izaphet attributes similar to Germanic compounds (*stonewall*). Their numerals are followed by a singular nominative as in *négy leány* ‘four girl’ (Hajdú 1985: 256) where Caucasoid languages give preference to the Russian type *пять девочек* ’five of girls’ with a plural genitive. Isolating languages build attributive constructions by

means of auxiliary words (relators). In the Chinese dialect Hakka its form is *ɛ*, in the Cantonese dialect it is an attributive particle *kɛ* and in Thai *kong*, *xeng*.

Palaeo-Mongoloid languages are classed as agglutinating, suffixing or postpositive languages because they use postpositions (postpositive prepositions) instead of prepositions (cf. Latin *vobiscum* 'with you') and 'postjunctions' (postpositive conjunctions) instead of Indo-European prepositive conjunctions (cf. Latin *populusque* 'and people'). Numerous postpositions in German *darüber* and English *thererafter* leave no place for doubts about a strong Palaeo-Turcoid admixture in Germanic languages as a reminder of Magdalenian fishermen surviving in Vikings. Eurasian postpositive morphology implied also applying postpositive possessive enclitics instead of proclitic possessive pronouns and the Ural-Altaic SOV word-order instead of the Indo-European SVO order. These languages have no congruence in gender and class, there are no nominal classifiers and no nominal categories. They abound in verbal categories using analytic constructions of auxiliaries and non-finite verb forms (participles, infinitives, gerunds). They prefer gerundial predication to Palaeo-Causasian *that*-clauses.

Palaeo-Mongoloid languages differed from the Caucasoid stock also in the consonant system and vocalism. Indo-European continued the Caucasoid tradition of simple *i - a - u* vocalic systems with numerous long diphthongs (*Dreiecksysteme*) whereas Ural-Altaic languages applied 9-vowel systems with rounded *ü* and *ö*. Their relation corresponded to Troubetzkoy's opposition between triangular vocalic systems (*Dreiecksysteme*) common in peasants' languages and quadrangular vocalism (*Viereckssysteme*) typical of Ural-Altaic hunters and horse-breeders (N. S. Troubetzkoy 1929: 39ff.). The distinctive value of Ural-Altaic vowels is lower because their quality in endings changes according to the stem. The rules of progressive synharmony means that a front vowel in the stem causes fronting in the final suffixes and a back vowel causes their backing. Some Ural-Altaic languages apply also raising and lowering and some use regressive synharmony.

The specific traits of Palaeo-Mongolian phonology and grammar are envisaged in contrast on Table 27. A few examples in Old and New English are quoted to illustrate that their peculiarities may appear as exceptions also in European languages. Ural-Altaic consonantism is based on the opposition of initial strong *fortis* stops *p- t- k-* and weak geminated stops *-pp- -tt- -kk* in medial positions. Reconstructions of Common Uralic consonant systems count with *fortes p t k* and geminated *pp tt kk* (P. Hajdú 1985: 206; W. Steinitz 1952) but exclude voiced stops *b d g* that are common only in mixed Turcoid languages. Stops in Indo-European loanwords were shifted to fricatives.

The Ural-Altaic consonant system displayed initial explosives a strong expiration that gave aspirated, abruptive or glottal stops neighbouring

languages. Grimm's consonant shifts (*Lautverschiebungen*) may be explained as their imprint into IE voiced and voiceless stops (Gamkrelidze - Ivanov 1982). These strong **expiratory explosives** stood in utter contrast to **inspiratory implosives** in Khoisan languages of South Africa and typical of Palaeo-Pygmic languages. Bushmen's clicks and implosives are produced with a clicking or sucking inbreathing sound effect similar to palatal stops in Eurasian languages. Palatal consonants, vocalic palatalisation and *k'>s*-satemisation are widespread in Sinoid, Negrito, Lapponoid, Slavonic and Gallic languages. They also possess nasal vowels and prenasalised stops ^{m}b, ^{n}d but this may be due to secondary contact with equatorial Palaeo-Negritic languages typical of strong nasal and voicing resonance.

PALAEO-CAUCASIAN



voiced	nasal	prenasalised
B	*m*	^{m}b
D	*n*	^{n}d
G	*ŋ*	^{ŋ}g

long diphthongs
triadic vocalism
voiced and voiceless consonants
no synharmonism
inflecting nominal morphology
synthetic verbal morphology
N G attributes (*walls of stone*)
NG-attributes
SVO-word order
s-plurals
ablaut alternation
ablaut preterits
optative subjunctives
present and preterit only
no consecution of tenses
subordinative hypotaxis with *that*-clauses

PALAEO-MONGOLIAN



fortes	Lenes
p-	*-pp-*
t-	*-tt-*
k-	*-kk-*

rounded vowels
quadrangular vocalism
fortes and lenes consonants
synharmonism, vowel harmony
agglutinating nominal morphology
analytic verbal morphology
izafet compounds (*of-stone wall*)
GN-attributes (*stānes weall*)
SOV-word order
r-plurals (*ċildru*)
umlaut plurals (*foot - feet*)
t/d-preterits
s-futurum and *s*-conditional
perfects *has gone, ist gegangen*
consecutio temporis
semipredication with gerunds

Table 27 *The opposition of Palaeo-Caucasian and Palaeo-Mongolian*

Typological reconstructions of the original palaeo-languages prove that there was no lawful stadial evolution of languages only their inertial growth and a gradual degeneration of three or four elementary pure linguistic structures. Table 27 demonstrates the principal opposition of Palaeo-Caucasian and Palaeo-Mongolian languages where the former shows transition from the pure Palaeo-Negritic classifying and prefixing languages to partially mixed suffixing Caucasoid structures. The right column principally applies to Palaeo-Turkic *r*-languages and Palaeo-Tungid *l*-languages. Less characteristic it is of Palaeo-Uralic *t*-languages and Palaeo-Scythic *k*-languages.

English Historical Grammar

Considerations about palaeo-languages may be read as a vain speculation about a long-forgotten chapter of human linguistic prehistory but in fact they are of vital import for modern philology and the historical grammar of modern European languages. Most modern languages have inherited several linguistic traditions that fight and clash within one body in the same way as the wolf, the jackal and the dingo within present-day mongrels and races of dogs. When we look at the English word-stock, nobody would regard it as a coherent wholesome structure because it is composed from many Latin, Scandinavian and Norman loanwords. Yet the same incoherence applies to phonetics, word-formation, morphology and syntax. Modern English is a wholesome organic being like a living dog that walks and breathes but its functional organs are not coherent because they descend from different parents. It resembles a mongrel dog whose head and body betray the fatherhood of a big Alsatian but its extremely short legs suggest the undeniable motherhood of a dachshund.

The English arose from Anglo-Saxons, Britons, Danes and Normans and all these ethnic factions contributed their grammatical structures to one English national tongue. Most structural incoherence is due to overlapping with structural patterns imported by Scandinavian, Norman or Old Norse invaders. Table 27 contrasts the linguistics types of the IE Neolithic farmers and the Mesolithic Mongoloid hunters but this opposition played a decisive role also in the British Isles and the Germanic cultural area. This table might also read ‘The opposition of Anglo-Saxon and Scandinavian structures in English’ because Anglo-Saxons (Angles, Saxons, Frisians and Jutes-Goths) descended from Indo-European peasants but Scandinavians mostly stemmed from the Northern Arctic Fishermen (3,000 *BC*). Their tribes inherited remains of Mesolithic Maglemosian microlith cultures of Palaeo-Turcoid origin and survived almost to our days as Vikings. This discrepancy accounts for about 40 per cent infusion of Turcoid structures in Common Germanic and modern Germanic languages. The most conspicuous Turcoid loans are rounded

vowels, 9-vowel system, vowel harmony (umlaut), strong aspirated *fortis* stops, medial gemination, GN-attributes (*stānes weall*) and compound structures (Turcoid *izafet* compounds), *r*-plurals (*ċildru*), umlaut plurals (*foot - feet*), the analytic verbal constructions and the SOV word-order in the German *wo er gegangen ist*, analytic perfects, *consecutio temporis*, gerunds and participial constructions. On the other hand, the IE heritage was preserved well only in Old Gothic (triadic vowel system, long diphthongs, ablaut preterits, optative subjunctives). In English phonetics and grammar the Turcoid component is much stronger than the IE component.

INDO-EUROPEAN		**PROTO-GERMANIC**		**PALAEO-NORDIC**
b d g	→	p t k	←	p- t- k-
		sp- st- sk-		
		b d g	←	β δ γ
p t k	→	f θ h		
		-vv- -ðð	←	-pp- -tt- -kk-
m n l w	→	m n l w		
		sm sn sl sw	←	^{h}m ^{h}n ^{h}l ^{h}w
		^{h}m ^{h}n ^{h}l ^{h}w	←	m- n- l- w-

Table 28 *Two-way projections into the Proto-Germanic consonant system*

Traditional comparative grammar did not see different ethnic layers and explained the development from Indo-European to Modern English as a series of inner sound shifts within one language. A new look at Common Germanic demonstrated that Grimm's sound shifts (*Lautverschiebungen*) had parallels in Armenian and could be due to ethnic mixing (Gamkrelidze, Ivanov 1982). Their natural account may explain them as an exchange of loanwords between Viking fishermen and Anglo-Saxon peasants. Table 28 demonstrates these contacts as 'two-way projections' making mutual **imprints** on two overlapping dialects. The chief problem consisted in the Viking (Palaeo-Turcoid) opposition of *fortes* and *lenes* that underwent aspiration in initial position and gemination in medial positions. According to this law, fricatives remained voiceless in initial positions but exhibited voicing and gemination in medial positions (*thin* /θ-/ vs. *leather* /-ðð-/). The Viking initial *fortis* sonants were imprinted into Old English as sounds with a strong pre-aspirated explosion (OE *hlāf* 'loaf', *hrōf* 'roof' and *hnutu* 'nut'). On the other hand, words of Indo-European (Anglo-Saxon) origin preserved non-aspirated initial sonants (OE *mōdor* 'mother', *niht* 'night'). The Viking word-stock can be seen in all words with pre-aspirated consonants ^{h}p, ^{h}t, ^{h}k, ^{h}m, ^{h}n, ^{h}l, ^{h}w while the Indo-European

word-stock was remarkable for pre-assibilated clusters *sp-*, *st-*, *sk- sm-*, *sn-*, *sl-*, *sw-*. These initial clusters were taken over from Indo-European dialects but they were due to earlier receptions of initial *fortes* from Mesolithic hunters. They probably arose from assibilating foreign pre-aspirated consonants ^{h}p, ^{h}t, ^{h}k, ^{h}m, ^{h}n, ^{h}l, ^{h}w. There were no one-way shifts within one system but only mutual imprints of overlapping languages producing 'two-way translations' into heterogeneous phonologies.

Classical historical grammar believed in lawful sound shifts operating as an imaginary clock on one national literary standard. It remained blind to numerous spoken tribal subcomponents that dominated or succumbed according as their speakers and kinsmen succeeded in social and military competition. When the Wessex king Egbert conquered Mercia in 829, England united also in using the Wessex literary standard, but its assumed sound shifts only changed the mutual hierarchy of spoken regional dialects. Languages do not evolve from their own will and needs but in accordance with the social and geographic possession of their speakers. The historical diagram on Table 29 demonstrates the linguistic evolution of English as a variable dependent on ethnic migrations and conquests. It was not a story of one united nation but of incessant mutual clashes between tribes of different origin. Besides the Fist Northern Culture of arctic fishermen there was the Indo-European Battle-Axe People and Scots as heirs of the Megalith culture (3,200 *BC*) coming from Spain. Anglo-Saxons conquered Celtic Britain and subdued the autochthonous populations of Britons and Gaels (Gaels – Goidels - Gwynt – Albans) but they 'Englished' Britain only at cost of being 'Britonised' by the absorbed Britons. The Norman Conquest resulted in a partial 'Normanisation' of Middle English though its effects were clearly seen only after centuries when English gradually 're-Englished' and the Norman impact weakened. New English emerged under the Tudors when London merchants seized the rule and expropriated the literary standard from Lancaster and Yorkshire landowners. The Celtic brachycephalic Gaels kept silent for centuries as artisans and small townsmen but they raised their heads during the Puritan Revolution in 1640. They seized the Parliament as the Puritan Roundheads and promoted their popular speech with many Celtic survivals to the official standard. What looked like sound shifts and consonant laws was actually inner reshuffling between social layers and military castes.

The basic stages in the evolution of English are seen on Table 30 displaying how its tenses and moods composed from three different ethnic components. One subgrammar was due to the old Anglo-Saxons whose system dominated in Old English and was partially restored again in Early New English.



Table 29 *The linguistic prehistory of British and Germanic nations*

The second stage started with the Norman Conquest and Anglo-Norman French whose reign melted Middle English into an analytic language with verb phrases combining auxiliaries with non-finite verb-forms. The new system was based on analytic perfects composed from the auxiliary *to be* and a past participle. Such constructions are evidenced in ME *lenten is cumen* 'spring has come', Estonian *olen lugenud* 'I have read' and Turkish *sevdí idim* 'I have loved'. The analytic layout of the ME verbal system was strengthened also by the analytic future tense and conditionals. These began to compete with OE subjunctives and replace them in all positions except for conditional clauses.

The analytic verbal systems enforced constructions of auxiliary verbs with non-finite verb forms, participles, gerunds and infinitives. Middle English took the gerundial construction over from the Anglo-Norman *gérondif* and adapted infinitives from Old English verbal nouns. Both forms are typical of Turcoid and Ural-Altaic languages where they function as a makeshift for hypotactic subordination and *that*-clauses. In Indo-European, Caucasoid and Bantu languages there is a strong tendency to use hypotactic *that*-clauses and apply subjunctives as special tenses for *that*-clauses. Under the Norman influence Middle English became reluctant to *that*-clauses and began to replace the clause *She commands that he be obedient* by the accusative-with-infinitive construction *She commands him to be obedient*. I. Poldauf (1958: 177) described this tendency as 'secondary predication', J. Hladký (1961: 105ff.) as 'condensation' and L. Dušková (1988: 542) as 'semipredication'.

The Norman rule confined the Anglo-Saxon and Celtic component to popular speech but new democratic changes made it emerge again in New English. Common townsmen infiltrated English grammar with remains of Celtic morphology, especially with progressive tenses (*I am hunting*) and 'predicatives of state' (*I am afraid*, *We are aboard*). They were taken from Celtic languages and through transitional forms *I am a-hunting, I am on fright* in popular speech they paved their way into the literary standard. The Puritan Round-heads began to use them in literary English and build its grammar on the opposition of simple and progressive tenses. The simple present adopted the auxiliary *do* and began to function as the Celtic *habitualis* (*I do not write*). This auxiliary stemmed from the Old English modal verb *dugan* 'to avail, zu taugen' and had the pronunciation *he doth* /daθ/ *know* different from the full-meaning verb *he doeth* /du:iθ/ *nothing*. Its counterpart was the *actualis* (*I am writing*) denoting presently proceeding actions. The progressive present 'I am allowing' reads in Modern Irish *táig ag ligean*, in Gaelic *tha mi a' leigeil* and in Manx *ta mee lhiggal* (Lockwood 1975: 107ff.). Outside the British Isles the habitual and progressive tenses can be seen only in Albanian, which has two progressives, *Po*(*punoj*) and *Yam tue punue* 'I am writing' (Ejntrej 1982: 84). The same choice of Palaeo-Gallic languages applies parallels to the English

English. Its present and past tense stood in opposition to subjunctive optatives applied after conjunctions and in *that*-clauses. There were no future tenses, no conditionals, almost no perfects, no gerunds and no progressive tenses. Now English exhibits a monstrous system of almost fifty tenses and moods but its huge structural complexity has grown from very simple elementary origins. ‘immediative future tense’ (*It’s going to rain*) and phrases denoted as ‘predicatives of state’ (*She stood aghast*).

ANGLO-SAXON SUBGRAMMAR

TENSE	**indicative**	**conjunctive**	***that*-clause**
present	*he is*	*he be*	*that he be*
past	*he was*	*he were*	*that he were*

NORMAN SUBGRAMMAR

TENSE	**indicative**	**‘conditional’**
present imperfect	*he is*	*he will be*
present perfect	*he has been*	*he will have been*
past (imperfect)	*he was*	*he would be*
past perfect	*he had been*	*he would have been*

NORMAN SEMIPREDICATION

GERUND	**active**	**passive**
present (imperfect)	*Asking*	*being asked*
past (perfect) gerund	*having asked*	*having been asked*

CELTIC SUBGRAMMAR

TENSE	***habitualis***	***actualis***
present	*I **do** not ask*	*I am not asking*
future	*I will ask*	*I am going to ask*
past	*I used to ask*	*I was asking*



Table 30 *Different ethnic layers in the English tense system*

Modern English represents a live amalgam of at least three subgrammars with several vital pure tenses but also many hybrids or changelings. Hybrid subjunctives such as *She have come* or *He were reading* are doomed to die because they mix forms due to the Anglo-Saxon, the Norman and the Celtic subgrammar. On the other hand, the simple present tense *They don’t play chess* is bound to serve in several incoherent functions: as a Celtic *habitualis*, as a Norman imperfect present and an Anglo-Saxon *praesens realis*. English

philology needs a tenable nomenclature acknowledging an inner hidden diversity of grammatical subsystems but discarding all secondary derived hybrids. It should be aware of the competition of several grammatical archetypes operating in modern Germanic languages, their structural coherence and typological diversity. It should admit that overlapping languages soak with isolated loanwords through neighbouring dialects and transplant into their soil also their phonetic and grammatical peculiarities. When adopting the Scottish place name *Loch Ness*, English tends to take over the Scottish phoneme Ξ, and when borrowing the Latin loanword *senior*, English has to apply the syntax of Latin comparatives (*He is senior **to** her* vs. *He is older **than** her*). At a definite level of quantitative growth such osmosis (soaking through) results in mutual **imprints** of subphonologies and subgrammars into the ruling literary standard.

The functional core of Modern English still rests on the Norman subgrammar that may be reconstructed as the structural *Urform* of most Ural-Altaic languages. A more adequate taxonomy of its tenses operating in English might speak of the present imperfect (s*he goes*), past imperfect (s*he went*), present perfect (s*he has gone*) and past perfect (s*he had gone*). The opposition of perfects and imperfects operates also in the category of mood that suffers much from the misnomer 'future tense'. F. A. Palmer, J. Lyons, G. N. Leech and R. Quirk refused to consider the English future tense as an indicative tense and proposed to regard it as a sort of mood. This form should be conceived as a form of unreal mood related closely to conditionals and called properly 'future mood', 'predictive conditional' or 'real predictive'. Their correspondence becomes apparent when *If I come I will see* in real (open) conditions is shifted into *If I came I would see* in unreal (hypothetical) conditions. However, it is not convenient to join some authors in calling *would do* a 'preterit' from *will do*, we had better call the former 'unreal predictive' and the latter 'real predictive' because they convey prediction. Then we would be free to re-classify the English mood forms as the real imperfect predictive (*she will go*), real perfect predictive (*she will have gone*), unreal imperfect predictive (*she would go*) and unreal perfect predictive (*she would have gone*).

Further inconsistencies are found in non-finite verb-forms exhibiting no symmetry to finite verb-forms. Semi-predicative verb-forms deserve taxonomy compatible with finite tenses because the correlation between gerunds and infinitives corresponds to that between indicative and conditional (predictive) mood. This incoherent usage might be corrected by introducing the pair of 'finitivals' and 'infinitivals'. Finitivals would cover all finite tenses while infinitivals would include all non-finite verb-forms. Their tenable taxonomy in English might consist of the imperfect indicative infinitival (*our doing*),

perfect indicative infinitival (*our having done*), imperfect conditional infinitival (*to do*) and perfect conditional infinitival (*to have done*).

FINITIVALS	**indicative**	**predictive**
present imperfect *realis*	***present indicative*** *he asks*	***future predictive*** *he will ask*
present perfect	***pre-present indicative*** *he has asked*	***pre-future predictive*** *he will have asked*
past (imperfect) *irrealis*	***pre-preterit indicative*** *he asked*	***pre-conditional predictive*** *he would ask*
past perfect	***pre-preterit indicative*** *he had asked*	***pre-conditional predictive*** *he would have asked*
INFINITIVALS	**indicative**	**predictive**
present (imperfect)	***present ind. infinitival*** *our asking*	***present pred. infinitival*** *to ask*
past (perfect)	***pre-present ind. infin.*** *our having asked*	***pre-present pred. infin.*** *to have asked*

Table 31 *A systematic taxonomy of English verb-forms*

Such terms might get a chance in academic grammars but they are unlikely to domesticate in live school usage. Live usage will always tend to omit *loci communes* and drop futile attributes such as ‘indicative’ or ‘imperfect’ A compromising solution might replace the redundant perfect/imperfect correlation by the pair of ‘preterit’ and ‘pre-preterit’. Such reformed or rationalised nomenclature of English verb-forms is suggested in Table 31. In its proposal *We will have written* would be referred to as ‘pre-future predictive’ and *She would have brought* as ‘pre-conditional predictive’. Redundant terms may be deleted by preserving distinctive attributes in ‘marked categories‘ and dropping them in ‘non-marked categories’ (Prague School coinage). Then the cumbersome term ‘pre-present predictive infinitival’ denoting *to have asked* could be reduced to ‘pre-present infinitival’ and the ‘pre-present indicative infinitival’ denoting *our having asked* would shrink to ‘present par-infinitival’. Such changes would meet requirements of both structural symmetry and easy practical reference.

SOCIAL SCIENCES

Static and Dynamic Sociology

The primary goal of sociology is to shed light on types and forms of societies in their synchronic distribution as well as diachronic development. The historical perspective of social growth is held in mind by **Neo-Evolutionism** (G. Lenski 1970; L. A. White 1975), a trend in modern sociology that attempts to reconstruct the evolution of societies from prehistoric up to modern times. Neo-Evolutionists can guess rough outlines of social history but they work with long-term periods that are too schematic to be applied appropriately to everyday history. The shortcomings of their method are compensated by advances of **dynamic sociology** that concentrates on short-time cycles in social growth. Admirable results have been achieved by the 'growth school' of economist sociology developed by P. Sorokin (1939) and his numerous followers (W. Rostow 1963, R. E. Lucas, B. Reich, J. Rifkin). Their studies on periodicity in modern societies and cycles of social development converged in theoretical results with the movement of philosophical **rupturism** in the early 70's. Its ideas were inspired by a group of radical philosophers (P. K. Feyerabend, T. S. Kuhn 1970, I. Lakatos 1971) who focused on milestones of modern science and emphasised the constitutive role of revolutions in scientific progress. The most influential contribution was Kuhn's study *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions* (1965) devoted to cultural dynamics and discontuinuity in the history of science. Their efforts coincided with the philosophy of *ruptures*, cultural breakthroughs and overthrows proposed in France by Michel Foucault in his *Les mots et choses* (1966).

Kuhn's observations on scientific revolutions and periodic declines of human knowledge were corroborated by fathers of the postmodernist discourse. J.-F. Lyotard's *post-histoire* and J. Baudrillard's *ahistoire* announced a huge retreat from historism to new **psychologism** showing a deep reluctance to evolution, society, systematics and formal logic. Postmodernist sociology (C. Geertz 1973; 1983; V. W. Turner 1979, 1986) turned attention from evolution to hermeneutics, understanding and interpretation. Whether taking a sophisticated form of 'deconstructed' or 'reconstructed metaphysics', psychologism in sociology has always tended to discuss society *in abstracto* (Giddens 1976) as if any science, say biology, could be based on talking on a mammal in general. Such discourse on society in our eternal, everlasting, omniscient and omnipresent mind necessarily abandons historical reality and lapses into talking about ourselves, about how society consists of our vague feelings and sentimental impressions. No matter how ingenious and sophisticated apparatus we invent, the only possible result are new *Prolegomena zu*

einer jeden künftigen Metaphysik, die als Wissenschaft wird auftreten können, vain speculation what to do if there appeared, if there existed a society.

The dialogue between historism and psychologism has always been associated in sociology with the issue of its systematics. R. K. Merton (1967: 2-4) misinterpreted A. Comte's historism when he reproached him confusing a systematics of societies for 'the history of their research'. Comte maintained that the evolution from human thought from theology to metaphysics and positive science is a tenable skeleton of any cultural development and sociology hovers suspended in nothingness if it is unable to link ancient societies with modern social groups. Sinking into psychologism and getting stuck in its vague rhetoric is often symptomatic of **microsociology**, defined as the study of small social groups and 'everyday life'. On the other hand, "**macrosociology** focuses upon large-scale and long-term social processes, including the 'state', class', the 'family', the 'economy', 'culture' and 'society'" (J. W. van der Zanden 1988: 9, 10). As such it cannot neglect history and geographic distribution because most things done at the micro level are determined by social relations at the macro level (Goode 1986). Any society must be fixed in time, positioned in space, aligned into a network of essential relations and scrutinised as it functions in real social processes. The psychological approach starts at the microsociological level by saying that any individual may form an arbitrary type of society of his own will and regardless of any historical laws. Denying history, evolution, determinism, society, logical categories and outer reality is an ominous trait of metaphysical thought. Such microsociology inevitably results in 'anti-sociology' criticised in Merton's lecture (1976: 180-5) on R. Kirk's *Canon of Anti-Sociology*. As a politologist of the conservative *New Right*, Russell Kirk refuses sociology as subversive left-wing rubbish. His views chime in with M. Thatcher's and V. Klaus's denials of 'society as an ideological fiction'.

An implicit condition of every macrosociology is considering societies from the historical, evolutionary and geographic point of view. **Historical sociology** starts with the prehistoric stage of tribal societies, continues with their historical transformations and ends with their present-day synchronic diversity. It enquires into different evolutionary stages of **social hierarchy** and explains how the 'division of labours' joins different ethnic layers into one choir of class-divided societies. This process also implies a transition from ethnic stratification to functional stratification. Feudal kingdoms had varied compositions of ethnic and professional layers but the engine of social labour drove them forth through the same series of analogous economic formations.

Each society is an amalgam of many local cultural, religious and dialectal traditions that give it an individual character and peculiar tinge but are of little import for essential functions. Classic studies mostly concentrated on **static**

sociology dealing with societies as fixed entities and static solid bodies without looking at common dynamic tendencies. Local traditions are not comparable to other cultures but when they develop in functional systems, they undergo parallel changes in different societies. The chaotic mixed **substance** of inertial local peculiarities in European countries is more or less immaterial for social studies, what really matters is the dynamic changing **form** that revolves in regular cycles and parallel sequences in different countries. The American, Russian and Chinese culture cannot bear mutual comparison but their economic growth oscillates in a similar rhythm of worldwide booms and crises. Despite different religious roots, their cultural development tends to pass through a similar chain of states and cultural styles inherent to all societies. Static ethnic substance in social growth is set moving by dynamic economic tendencies.

Founding sociology and social sciences on sound scientific principles primarily means abandoning contingent static pseudo-categories and discovering valid dynamic categories in an integral systematics of **social trends**. Such **dynamic sociology**, traditionally termed 'social dynamics' (Stewart 1978: 73, Murdock 1971: 319), does not concentrate on mixed local traditions but focuses on changing styles and general statistic tendencies. It resembles vector analysis because it treats social phenomena as vectors and dynamic tendencies. It constitutes a sort of **trendology** comparing analogous trends in the history of one culture and tracing similar patterns in other cultures in efforts to establish firm rules of their periodicity. Describing several centuries of European history as feudalism or capitalism gives a very vague characteristic of the real social development. Dynamic sociology must provide much more detailed and minute devices of theoretical analysis in order to trace social tendencies in decades and few years' periods.

Ethnic sociology brings satisfactory results in the early stages of human civilisation but it may fail and prove inadequate in modern history if it does not appropriately analyse tribal residues in modern mixed nations. Ancient and medieval civilisations dissolved pure ethnic and tribal categories and the modern age continued in dissolving their residues in industrial classes. If methodology takes this gradual dissolution into account, it changes its approach in accord with the changing nature its scope of study. As ethnic classification gradually grows into social and economic classification, ethnic, static or substantial sociology must naturally give way to dynamic, formal or stratificational sociology. This transition makes its way through historical sociology and completes its progress in three stages of **evolutionary sociology**. As seen in Table 32, this three-stage evolutionary sociology is plotted with **stratificational** and **geographic sociology** to form the co-ordinate space of general sociology as a whole.



Table 32 *The coordinate space of general sociology*

Societies as 'Social Species'

The crucial question of sociology concerns its elementary categories, 'types of societies' that function as social genera and species. The ultimate goal of sociology will be reached when it gives an elucidating periodical table of all types of societies on the present as well as the historical horizon such that any element and type might be defined just by locating its position in the system. The first step leading to this goal consists in revisiting the typological taxonomy of tribal, ethnic, historical and dynamic societies. Sociology cannot move forth since our scanty knowledge as to ethnic, historical and functional social typology is still in a pitiable, miserable state. A deeper analysis must analyse false, seeming categories of mixed, amalgamated and assimilated character and replace them by true essential categories fitting in typological networks. Then we might contemplate taking the second step, integrating these relatively independent typologies of societies into one systematic synthesis, into a periodic table of both ethnic, historical and economic classification.

Most current approaches classify social systems into hunting, fishing, horticultural, agricultural and industrial societies (Brinkerhoff, White 1988: 99-101) without attempting to distinguish between ethnic, economic and evolutionary classification. Neo-Evolutionists (G. Lenski 1970; L. A. White 1975) can provide a tenable evolutionary taxonomy but grope their way through unclear ethnic, economic and historical categories. Hunting societies represent tribes of hunters, agricultural communities are settled colonies of

peasants and fishing societies consist in seaside colonies of fishermen. These types may be called **social species** of sociology but they are closely associated with what we denote as professions or classes.

In biology living species reflect historical species, or as Ernst Haeckel put it, **phylology** (taxonomy of species) recapitulates **phylogeny** (evolution of species). His first law implies that the Linnean synchronic taxonomy of species mirrors their Darwinian evolution. As demonstrated in Table 33, this law applies also to human genera, to Greek φυλη and φυλαι 'clans', and hence also to human phylogenesis. In sociology it primarily means that the systematics of synchronic social species (classes) mirrors the prehistoric evolution of tribes (hunters, fishermen, plant-gatherers). When applying terms common in structural linguistics, we might say that **social synchrony** (contemporary classes) recapitulates **social diachrony** (prehistoric tribes). The theorem holds good with one reservation: ethnic typology reflects prehistory and social typology reflects history. Primitive societies and advanced civilisations form two successive stages of evolution. It is **historiography** that represents an equal match of sociology and studies historical societies as a foundation for modern social classification.

Haeckel's laws founding social phylology (synchronic classification of classes) on social phylogeny (evolution of social classes) concern also the fates of individual societies. They imply that **social ontogeny** (growth of an individual society) recapitulates social phylogeny and at the same time it is recapitulated by **social ontology** (synchronic social structure). General laws do not automatically decide issues of every-day history whose fates depend on many accidental factors. Table 33 draws evolutionary correspondences between prehistoric tribes and feudal castes that are generally valid for Africa, southeast Asia and Oceania but elsewhere they are contradicted by numerous counter-examples. In ancient India the Europids did not become serfs but the ruling caste of Brahmins priests. In Ancient Greece the ruling aristocracy first recruited from the Cyclopes (Bascoids) and then from two ancient Sea Peoples, Pelasgians and Dorians. Regardless of general tendencies, every kingdom had a different stratification of castes (social ontology) owing to their historical fates, mutual defeats and victories (social ontogeny).

The diagram on Table 33 outlines the human **sociogenesis** as a historical process integrating independent tribes into class-divided societies. Modern classes originated in medieval estates, ancient castes and prehistoric tribes and passes through several stages: (a) prehistoric (Palaeolithic) pure **tribes**, (b) Neolithic mixed communities and tribal **confederacies** practising shifting agriculture and nomadic cattle-breeding, (c) ancient settled civilisations with a loose hierarchy of **castes**, (d) ancient city-states (polities) with census classes (Latin *ordines*), (e) medieval kingdoms with **estates** and professional **guilds**,

(f) modern industrial **classes** (workingmen, peasantry, bureaucracy), (g) modern loose classes (intellectuals, British upper middle class) and economic corporations. General evolution (social phylogeny) consisted in the process of composing independent tribes into castes, estates and classes of civilised nations. Their new roles were determined by earlier economic specialisation transformed by civilisation to a higher level.



Table 33 *The origin of modern from prehistoric tribes and castes*

Social parallels to the evolution of animal species have definite limitations because in several aspects social species studied by sociology differ considerably from species in natural sciences. In their realm a given animal is either a feline or a canine or a bovine but it cannot be both species at the same time. In social sciences most phenomena may statistically fall into several different categories but they still observe the general principle of **organic integrity**: a giraffe cannot be reduced to an abstract principle of 'long-neckedness' and neither can conservatism be reduced to any fixed stale and a staunch doctrine. Its general essence lies in an **inseparable cluster** of analogous tendencies displaying highest statistic frequency when repeating recurrently in similar economic cycles.

Dynamic sociology treats social species formally as statistic populations exposed to inner pressures of density, cooperation and natural resources. Every society and social group is an organic body that dynamically changes its shape according to the extant hierarchy of social power. Its outer morphology resembles the architecture of pyramids and human housing shelters. The lower basement (**substructure**) consists of masses or common members that seem relatively stable because their inner circulating whirls are hidden to the observer's eye. Its upper roof (**superstructure**) composed from elites that look more dynamic because they are jutting into a wide variety of peaks, ridges and towers. Table 34 depicts elementary types of social structures as constructions

in an abstract 2-dimensional '**social space**' defined by parameters of height and breadth. The horizontal axis *x* expresses an index of polyverticality conceived as the number of peaks per the breadth of the members' base. The vertical axis *y* indicates the degree of economic differentiation between elites and common masses and the height of the ruling social hierarchy.



Table 34 *Types of social structures in a 'social space'*

According to the number of towers and excrescences, societies may be classified as totalities, dualities, tripartities and pluralities. A **totality** tends to have one central dominant peak sloping down into wide lower floors. Dualities have two vertices with steep towers and tripartities have three distinct towers of lesser height. A **plurality** is a convenient name for a roof structure with many high peripheral towers but a low depressed centre. An **equality** (*egalité*) may be defined as a low structure with a wide base, low peaks and slowly sloping roofs. It is an ideal social model of left-wing ideologies looking like a cone compressed from a low central peak down to the low broad base.

Such concepts seem to define the static social form but in economic history they dynamically change and revolve in evenly-spaced periodic cycles. Tables 36, 37 demonstrate how the 20th century started with a state of decentralised plurality but in due course big monopolies began to fuse and centralise so as to become ripe for Keynesianism and Roosevelt's *New Deal*. The post-war totalities soon dissolved into loose economic units independent upon the state and paved the way to the postmodernist state of new economic plurality. In Table 36 pluralistic regimes tend to form political oligarchies while totalitarian systems incline to bureaucratic autarchies. Economic growth requires rapid changes in the social pyramid and the ruling economic hierarchy.

Social Structure

The inner partitioning of sociology must be tailored in close analogy to the inner layout and branches of society. Economists proceed from the state as a whole to social classes. Their categories rarely coincide with those of empirists who proceed from individuals up to small social groups considered as products of their talent for submissivity or leadership. Such social units are traditionally divided into small natural *primary groups* and large organised *secondary groups* (Cooley 1909). German sociology distinguishes a similar pair of terms in *Gemeinschaft* and *Gesellschaft* (Tönnies 1887). Primary groups include the family, *clique*, work group (team), old-fashioned neighbourhood and friendship group (Vander Zander (1988: 110). Members of informal primary groups feel as an *ingroup* with natural solidarity and address one another as 'we'. Members of secondary groups form 'organised units' (Gurwitch 1958) and treat their bosses as *outgroups* of distinguished people denoted as 'they'.

Most theories of social stratification neglect its ancient historical origins and divide society into social layers, castes or classes according different degrees of social mobility. 'Caste in its pure form is a social-class system that allows no movement at all' (Stewart 1981: 172). The criteria of class stratification are sought in various 'life styles' (M. Weber 1955), 'social roles' (B. Barber 1957; R. H. Turner 1978: 1ff.), 'social positions' (K. Davies - W. Moore 1945), 'social status' (Bendix, Lipset 1953) or social power and prestige. 'The difference between a status and a role is that we *occupy* a status and *play* a role' (Linton 1936; Vander Zanden 1988: 90). Social status is understood as social respect shown to individual talent without considering social conflicts and economic conditions. The poor without any talent hold a 'slave status' but when they change their role they may achieve a 'master status' (Martin - Greenstein 1983). The talented are said to liberate from 'low-ranking positions' and acquire 'high-ranking position' (K. Davies - W. Moore 1945) or 'top positions' (Bottomore 1966: 48-67).

The most common error in modern approaches to classes lies in abstract psychologism reducing the social status to talent, personal charm, vigour and assertivity manifested in communication. Psychologism neglects economic relations and overestimates modern American social mobility when a top golf player of humble origin may earn more money than an effete Boston patrician. It does not distinguish clearly between **masses** who draw the economic carriage forth as horses and **elites** who are mounted on its seats and steer its direction. **Economist sociology** (É. Durkheim, M. Weber 1955, P. Sorokin, W. Rostow 1962) tries to trace deeper foundations of social life in economic forces divided by their ownership relations to available means of economic production. Economists insist on the decisive role of economic institutions and

on their division into the **economic basis** (substructure) and **superstructure**. ‘The total sum of economic relations forms the economic structure of society, its real basis, over whose foundations there is a legislative and political superstructure vaulting’ (K. Marx, *Preface to ‘The Critique of Political Economics’*). Their opposition is in symmetry with the concepts of ‘social being’ (productive forces, natural sources, means of production) and ‘social conscience’ (ideology, law, politics, religion) that functions as its reflection. People possessing the decisive means of production belong to the ‘ruling class’, while the working-class forms the huge majority of common masses.



Table 35 *The layout of the social superstructure and substructure*

Economists realise that society is not an aggregate of private personal affairs but a live collective organism driven forth by the inner economic engine that generates cultural values and these inspire people with ambitions setting the inner wheels into rotation. On the other hand, they forget that the relation

between the basis and its superstructure must be conceived historically as an evolutionary series where higher forms originate as a superstructure over primitive lower forms. Every stage in evolution arose as an enlargement of previous forms that survive involved in its wheelwork and continue to function as its basis. Economist sociology begins its considerations upon society from the elementary material or economic level but forgets to anchor economy in more elementary ecology. As human anthropology starts from primates and apes, so sociology must start from human prehistory and economy must start from **ecology** enquiring into the nutrition of aboriginal populations. Modern economy is a complex aggregate of dark forces that whirl in a turmoil of economic booms and remain a transcendent sphere concealed to human understanding. Ecology provides the simplest model of primitive economy speaking in terms of natural resources, tribal domains, overpopulation and migrations. Modern industrial economy may be understood only as an enlargement of nutrition chains circulating in an aboriginal horde and family.

The integral layout of social structure is envisaged in Table 35 as a space with two axes. Along the horizontal axis *x* there are different **age groups** distributed according to various grades of maturing and ageing. The vertical axis *y* stages a scale of social institutions and classes needed for their functioning. According to age groups common citizens become students, soldiers, workers and pensioners and take different roles in the economic basis. A human individual may live alone in the desert (individual sociology) or in a small family circle (domestic sociology) where his range of activities is reduced to primitive nutrition, sexual reproduction, bringing up children, supporting retired grandparents and ageing. But every family must take part in a local division of labours, in a local exchange of products and other communal activities that join its members into **communal sociology** (local, rural or urban sociology). Communal authorities serve as a more accomplished form of family care because they control public education, housing and health care. When successful in private, domestic and local structures, people may rise to privileged positions in communal, regional or national institutions involved in the political and cultural superstructure. Higher levels of social activities are studied by **institutional sociology** analysing institutions designed by the government to control the state, national economy and culture.

The inner structure of society may be represented as a self-reproducing cyclic automaton that returns periodically back to the original state, or if possible, it adds something more to its substance and evolves in an ascending spiral of progressive growth. Table 36 demonstrates its functioning in several central or peripheral circles that superpose upon the inner core at higher and higher levels. Whatever level people manage to reach, their nutrition, production and physical reproduction always recapitulates the successive

stages of human evolution. Their activities rise from low individual biology to domestic and local microsociology and from communal life to higher institutional macrosociology concerning national culture, religion, society and state. The social constitution of societies (social ontogenesis) briefly recapitulates the cultural evolution (social phylogenesis) from tribal communities to civilised societies. Their reproduction proceeds in many concentric circles and accessory loops that extend elementary circles, repeat their stages and bring them to higher orbits. Any historical stage of society may be represented as an **evolutionary extension** of its previous stage. Every society is stratified as a dendrogram of a tree involving all the inner layers under new outer peels.



Table 36 *The involution of layers as a self-reproducing automaton*

Economist sociology achieved highest perfection in P. Sorokin's studies that could distinguish as many as forty social classes with a distinct economic status. Sorokin began to realise that classic static classes (peasantry, yeomanry, craftsmen) were only passive inertial forces that left the decisive role to **dynamic elites** and **dynamic masses**. Their concepts shaped in the considerations that the Italian sociologists Vilfredo Pareto and Gaetano Mosca devoted to elites as privileged classes of people holding the loftiest positions in national economy, politics and art. They noticed that elites come and depart, arise and perish. Briefly speaking, 'history is a graveyard of aristocracies' (Pareto 1936: III, 2053). Much of their thought suffered by undue biologisation, instead of going into the economic roots of social change, they

contrasted ’feeble, effete aristocracy’ to ‘vigorous lower classes’ preparing to siege their bulwarks. Yet their theory of the **circulation of elites** rested on sound foundations since it refused stereotypes of static sociology and replaced them by the cultural dynamics of rapid social change. Whether this circulation took shape of a ‘technocratic’, ‘administrative’ or ‘managerial revolution’ (Burnham 1943), it confirmed M. Weber’s idea that social progress is impossible without periodic overthrows carried out by charismatic popular leaders introducing new norms and modifications (Giddens 1972: 19)

The idea of **dynamic classes** is due to **dynamic sociology** that studies changing social roles in short-term periods. Every economic cycle opens space for a new economic strategy that brings new wealth to new groups of producers and consumers and makes them assume a new social position. While static classes accept new dynamic changes passively without changing their social status, dynamic elites make the best of new chances to seize power. Where Marxist sociology interpreted the post-war development as one victorious campaign of working-classes, the western sociological tradition observed periodic revolutions of bureaucratic, technocratic and managerial elites, accompanied also by upheavals of working and consuming masses. Max Weber (1955) predicted the future of bureaucratic elites, James Burnham (1943) foresaw the rise of the managerial class, C. Wright Mills announced the reign of authoritative power elites (1956: 18) while E. A. Shils foreboded the rule of technocrats. The former approach rested on static social stratification that concerned economic formations lasting several centuries while the latter could work with a minute classification of social layers that changed and transformed within one decade.

Static sociology could not give an adequate account of social development because it perceived society as an amalgam of many abstract, secondary and derived layers without considering their dynamic role. The static view of **ruling classes** concentrates on old rich well-to-do generations and neglects vanguards of young people in cultural media who fight for new standards of life style, fashion and literary taste. The static **rear-guards** of older generations adhere to old standards of life and slow down the speed of economic reforms but dynamic **vanguards** go to the wars and wage real battles. With the rapid pace of economic booms, social progress is passed over as a relay from one ascending elite (bureaucracy, technocracy, plutocracy, theocracy) to another that is adapted better to new economic trends. The same perpetual change of economic strategies divides the masses who shatter the reign of old elites and give the reins to new elites. Every economic decade generates another dynamic type of working-class (volunteering builders, industrial proletariat, small petty bourgeoisie, consumers’ masses, the unemployed *Lumpenproletariat* etc.). Table 37a-b brings a proposal of their

systematic general classification based on their analogous development in the light centralistic cycle 1891-1945 and the dark corporative cycle 1945-1997.

A. DYNAMIC TYPOLOGY OF ELITES

Eucracy: (1) a bureaucratic elite and (2) its rule in centralistic and totalitarian regimes confessing utopian ideals of a 'good ruler', 'good reign' and 'good state'. A strict rule of strict laws, strict morals and strict bureaucracy.

Esthocracy: (1) an Epicurean bureaucratic elite in centralistic and totalitarian regimes and (2) its rule in times when court revels focus attention on beauty, aesthetics, women, love, courtesy, sentiments and feelings. A transition to the ideals of 'beautiful woman', 'beautiful landscape', 'courteous behaviour' and 'sentimental adventure'.

Aularchy: the rule of bureaucratic elites in bright ages consisting of the successive stages of eucracy and esthocracy.

Technocracy: (1) the social class of the technocratic elite, engineers, economists and (2) their rule in countries at times of industrial booms.

Democracy: 'direct democracy' as rule of popular tribunes that are elected at public gatherings and represent people in parliaments.

Democy: the rule of trade unions and popular working-class parties during booms of consumers' societies before the outbreak of stagflation.

Demarchy: different forms of popular movements (communarchy, hyparchy, democy) that win dominance in times of revolutions and street riots.

Autocracy: a hegemonistic block of totalitarian aularchy with popular demarchy (popular Protestantism, peasants' rebellions, utopian and communist movements) ruling in bright ages.

Plutocracy: (1) the financial elite' and (2) its rule in periods of deep stagflation (long-term stagnation with fast inflation and rising prices). Liberalisation at the market produces a class of new parvenus and *riches noveaux* who buy old castles and want to imitate old aristocracy.

Theocracy: (1) divine clergy and (2) its rule in dark ages when the state resigns from providing secular education and unemployed intelligence has to find shelter in monks' monasteries and act under religious cover.

Idolarchy: (1) a type of theocracy based on traditional churches and orthodox monastic orders, (2) an elite of clergymen confessing the cult of saints, martyrs, idols, icons, relics and heraldic coats of arms.

Militarchy: (1) a military elite and (2) its rule in the final phase of long-term crises when economic conflicts (overpopulation, unemployment) can be solved only by a new colonisation and a 'sacred war' against barbarians.



The development of dynamic elites and masses in the bright post-war centralist cycle 1945-1997



The development of dynamic elites and masses in the dark corporative cycle 1897-1945

Table 37 *A dynamic classification of classes*

B. DYNAMIC TYPOLOGY OF MASSES

Proletariat: the productive working–class employed in factories during the long-term industrial boom (*saeculum clarum*) in prosperous totalities and autarchies.

Pauperiat: the poor masses in oligarchies at times of long-term stagnation (*saeculum obscurum*) and corporative ownership.

Urbarchat: *Lumpenproletariat*, the riff-raff and rabble in dirty urban quarters, bums and hoboes recruited from the poor, the unemployed, the crippled and the homeless in times of dark ages.

Suburbarchat: the poor living in suburban tenement houses and provisory huts in workers' colonies, bums and hoboes wandering from villages to get a job in large towns and cities.

Communarchat: young unemployed people getting jobs in public works, volunteering brigades of builders living in temporary communes (volunteers building up dams in Communist regimes, the poor employed with building 'hungry walls' by Charles the Fourth in Prague in the 14th century).

Hyparchat: petty *bourgeoisie*, craftsmen, artisans, street vendors, prosperous lower classes, factory workers with odd jobs and illegal earnings focused on bettering their family budget, *Petty Englandism* in the mid-50's.

Technarchat: classic industrial working-class proletariat in manufactures and factories in times of industrial prosperity and rapid industrial booms.

Consumeriat: wide masses of consumers enjoying good wages, low prices and advantageous loans and credits during booms of consumers' goods.

Demarchat: a type of working-class consumeriat organised in strong trade unions and working-class parties.

Anarchat: (1) a class of unemployed young generation living in squats and dilapidating houses, (2) movements of anarchism in periods of transition from centralistic autarcheum to corporative oligarcheum.

Thearchat: a social group of unemployed young generation falling victim to esoteric sectarianism and finding shelter in superstitious sects.

Exarchat: a type of pauperiat in dark ages that joins expanding colonial companies in order to make fortune overseas.

Endarchat: a type of pauperiat in dark ages that has come from barbarian provinces to work as slaves or servants in large cosmopolitan cities. It beats cosmopolitan pauperiat by offering hard work for lower wages (*metoikoi* in Athens at times of cynic philosophers Antisthenes and Diogenes, modern *Gastarbeiter* immigrants from the Third World).

Cleptarchat: an urban type of criminal gangs and pauperiat living on criminal activities (theft, burglaries, shoplifting).

Pornarchat: an urban type of pauperiat living on prostitution, gambling, casinos, circuses, fun fair shows and other popular revels.

Phalangsteriat: a type of *declassé* pauperiat that joins the services of rich oligarchs and landowners to act as their bodyguards and bailiffs.
Polemarchat: a young generation of landless people who join colonial armies as soldiers of fortune to conquer new land (Xenophanes' hired soldiers of fortune, medieval crusaders, Waldstein's *landsknechts*, Pizarro's *conquistadores*, armies of the East Indian Company in the 17th century).
Agrarchat: poor townsmen and peasants' masses in villages who find consolation in the agrarian self-sufficient economy at times of wars, plague and starvation).

The Systematic Taxonomy of Social Sciences

The present state of social and cultural sciences is determined by several limitations: (1) we have a lot of evidence and individual visible phenomena that represent complex amalgam entities but we are unable to analyse them into **pure elements**, (2) since we cannot discover the very elements, we cannot grasp the rules of their **composition**, and (3) apply a convenient **calculus**, (4) although in the course of history social phenomena repeat in **recurrent series**, but we have no efficient tools for their **comparison** and tenable **classification**, (5) we have no valid **general categories** allowing us to establish membership relations between categories and individual specimens, (5) having no valid categories, we cannot think of their **systematic taxonomy**, (6) having only particular descriptive histories of different cultures, we cannot discover their general guidelines and reconstruct one single tree of **historical evolution** common to all societies.

This state of social sciences is given by the impossibility to uproot several inveterate biased preconceptions that stand in their way and hinder their progress. Their authority is strengthened by perpetual returns of hermeneutic interpretation and **methodological creationism**, two traditional weapons of religious scholastics that plagued natural sciences before Aristotle, Theophrastus, Linné and Darwin. Their modern versions do not render social genesis as a story of one Creator and his seven days' creation but as a moving fairy-tale about lots of minor creators creating infinitely many incomparable little individual worlds of their own. Each work of arts, science and philosophical thought is treated as a unique entity and miracle that respects no deterministic laws, no categories, no universals and no general classification, so that we can establish no scientific theory worth that name. Literature, arts and philosophy remain the last resort where we still hover in the realm of vague intuitive magic giving joy to the savage mind.

This approach is one of a pious believer, theologist and metaphysician but also a modern reader, spectator and user who want to aesthetically rejoice in

purchased goods. The scientist's credo is different, it claims that there does exist a usable and workable tradition of European science that can elucidate the user's chaotic impressions and replace them by firm scientific knowledge. The key opening the sesame's entrance lies in the regular **periodicity** of cultural cycles that govern every ecologic, demographic and economic process and permeate also spiritual and cultural life. Every cycle is a succession of **cultural trends** setting into motion an elite or a mass movement that seizes the historical initiative to turn the wheel of history one step further. Analogous economic pressures **generate** analogous values, ideas and cultural situations. Trends are waves sweeping large groups of young people into a whirl of activities whose historical sense is hidden to their understanding and must be disguised by false pretexts. They are **dynamic vectors** swaying social forces regardless of their historical origin, geographic location and mixed inner constitution. Classic social sciences could not reveal their laws because they neglected comparable and classifiable trends and occupied their mind only with static amalgam blocks of mixed nature (traditions, nations, religions) that can be neither compared nor classified.

Every bright cultural cycle deals with one central issue of conflict between religious reformation and counter-reformation, between **Protestantism** and a sort of Jesuit Fundamentalism. Protestantism votes for an alliance of the common people with a 'good ruler' (**eutypy** – 'good hero') whose 'good state' (**eucracy** - good government) brings an idyllic utopia on earth (**eutopy** - 'good place'). Its program is summed up in More's, Defoe's and Rousseau's **utopianism** dreaming about rural, pastoral and political idylls located in the Golden Age (**euchrony** – 'good time'). Their dreamland utopia is inhabited by the race of 'good-natured man' (**eutypy** - 'good character') and 'noble savage' celebrated by all humanists and altruists. Its inhabitants feel cosmic optimism (**eupathy** – 'good feeling of bliss and happiness') and make up fantastic dreams about progress in a future communist golden age (euchrony). Philosophers conceive this cosmic optimism as love for the material nature as a whole and preach physical materialism. Their views defend 'good nature', ideal cosmic order and rational knowledge (**eusophy** - 'good wisdom').

In literature and arts the upheavals of religious Protestantism engender the aesthetics of **classicism**. Classicists dream about the classic age of antiquity (Golden Age) when people lived in an idyllic state of bliss and happiness (eupathy). They dream about an ideal monarch, ideal place (eutopy), ideal age (euchrony) and ideal man (eutypy) located in a rural pastoral setting of ancient Arcadia. Painters and sculptors embodied these dreams in principles of **eumetry** ('good measure', Golden Mean) requiring ideal proportions. The human body, abodes and sanctuaries should have ideal and perfect proportions, i.e. average size, symmetric shape, sound heavy constitution and moderate

functional decoration. In sciences these requirements lead to **normativism**, known to the ancients as Aristarchos' analogism: this insists on standard spelling (orthography), standard pronunciation (orthography), standard constitution (orthopedy) and perfect harmony (**euphony** - 'good sound'). Every return of such standards stemmed from a system of economic values generated regularly in all periods of post-war reconstruction and building booms. It tended to renew common, public and state ownership and enforce centralistic bureaucracy with a *dirigiste* planning economy (**eunomy** – 'good economy') and a strict rational state control. Rational economy required **puritanism** as a code of strict morals, modest manners and inexpensive worship (**eudoxy** – 'good belief'). Max Weber analysed Puritanism in his *Die protestantische Ethik und der Geist des Kapitalismus* (1904) and found in its rationalism, secularism and deism driving forces of modern capitalism.

The ideology of 'perpetual Protestantism' has a shadow antipode in '**perpetual conservatism**'. Its adherents Hobbes, Swift, Kafka, Orwell and Beckett represented a viewpoint devoted to antiutopias, skepsis, cosmic pessimism and phenomena of absurdity. In their eyes blissful utopias perverted into monstrous labyrinths where individuals suffered from merciless tyranny and state bureaucracy. Their optics exchanged rural idylls (eutopy) for an urban cosmopolitan mummery, for a bad dream about decadent, rotten life at a bad place (**dystopy** – 'bad utopia', cacotopia – 'bad place'). Their contempt for human nature is shown in Swift's Yahoos and their contempt for rational science in his Laputans. Their visions are situated in the hell, purgatory or subterranean caves where the coming race of lordly supermen waits to destroy the mean primitive humanity (Bulwer-Lytton: *The Coming Race* 1871). In all dark ages conservative philosophers (Epimenides, Pherekydes, Orphists, Pythagoreans, Eleatics, Plato and Socratics) took resort in caves to preach doubts about material existence. Lewis Mumford and postmodernist sci-fi novel-writing have devised a lot of 'technological cacotopias' situated in the depths of subterranean caverns, submarines and spaceships. J. Cameron's *Aliens* (1989) revealed a new sort of alienation: the hero lives in a gloomy world where all humans turn into slimy serpents and repugnant monsters sent as extraterrestrial ufonauts by alien civilisations.

The submarine disease of conservatism was known to Romantic poets as well as the Baroque Age. Romantic and Baroque art exhibited an odd bent for excentricism and all sorts of deformities and malformations. Instead of ideal proportions and moderate measure they indulged in unnatural deformities (**dysmetry** - 'deformed proportions'), instead of peaceful life in harmony (euphony) they found joy in war, strife and dysharmony (**cacophony** - 'bad sound'). They always showed wry faces in a wry mirror, people turned into repugnant insects as in Kafka's *Metamorphosis*. Their heroes resemble

loathsome populations of dwarfish and giant folks in *Gulliver's Travels* (1726). Swift's and Kafka's conservative anti-utopias abhorred the mean nature of man and gave it a distorted embodiment in grotesque characters and types (dystypy, cacotypy). Romantic philology had a distant predecessor in the ancient Anomalists (Crates, Antigonos) who displayed a strong interest in anomalies and irregular word of slangs and dialects. Their treatises did not focus on regular grammatical analogies but concentrated on irregular **cacocraphy** ('bad spelling, ugly writing') and **cacoepy** ('bad pronunciation'). Their taste rejoiced in caconyms ('bad names', 'ugly words', misnomers and barbarisms), cacology (bad choice of words, 'faulty diction') and musical dissonance (cacophony).

reign	eucracy	esthocracy	technocracy	democracy	idolocracy	theocracy
economy	eunomy	esthonomy	technonomy	demonomy	idolonomy	theonomy
science	eusophy	esthosophy	technosophy	demosophy	idolosophy	theosophy
religion	eudoxy	esthodogy	technodoxy	demodoxy	idolodoxy	theodoxy
space	eutopy	esthotopy	technotopy	demotopy	idolotopy	theotopy
time	euchrony	esthochrony	technochrony	demochrony	idolochrony	theochrony
type	eutypy	esthotypy	technotypy	demotypy	idolotypy	theotypy
measure	eumetry	esthometry	technometry	demometry	idolometry	theometry
emotion	eupathy	esthopathy	technopathy	demopathy	idolopathy	theopathy
sound	euphony	esthophony	technophony	demophony	idolophony	theophony

Table 38 *A proposal of an integrated taxonomy of cultural styles*

Utopias and anti-utopias are only abstract extremes whose points are linked by a continuous scale with several intermediate degrees. Table 38 depicts this scale as a sequel of trends that come in series during most bright cycles. Their tenable classification may be formulated in aesthetic categories modifying the idea of beauty. **Eupathy** with *eu-* 'good' implies concentration on the good and its close neighbours, the just, standard, healthy, sound and stable. **Esthopathy** (from εσθίεν 'enjoy') seeks the aesthetic category of the beautiful, its closest allies being the sentimental and the fashionable. **Technopathy** is a suitable term for esthetic formalism and its love for geometric forms, abstract numbers and technological construction. **Demopathy** expresses the aesthetic ideal of social realism depicting ordinary characters and every-day life. **Idolopathy** represents a counter-reaction against demopathy by backing up the position of the well-to-do. Its emphasis on the *décor*, icons, symbols and sacred cult leads to **theopathy** that means divine worship, spirituality and religious exultation. Such categories correspond well with the traditional systematics of literary trends as follow: **classicism** (eupathy), **sentimentalism** (esthopathy), **formalism** (technopathy), **realism** (demopathy), **traditionalism** (idolopathy), **spiritualism** (theopathy). In dark ages spiritualism (theopathy)

may prolong into a series of **catastrophism** (cacopathy), **hermetism** (mystopathy) and **monumentalism** (orthopathy)

Each cultural trend looks like a 7-year old reign of one generation in politics, literature, arts, music and fashion. Philosophers, artists and fashion designers hardly ever realise that their taste has something in common but they fight with enemies in their cultural field as relentlessly as political parties in a parliament. Their governing cabinets take efforts to seize decisive influence in dailies, publishing houses, parishes and art galleries. What joins them together are projections of one axiologic hierarchy into different cultural fields, nowadays often called **paradigms** (T. Kuhn 1965; J. H. Turner 1978; J. H. Turner – S. Turner 1993). A paradigm is something like *vision du monde* (L. Goldmann 1965, 1970), it has its space, time, social type, as well as its norms and aesthetic feelings. –**cracy** denotes a type of social elite and its political rule. The lexical stem –**nomy** is applied as a designation of an economic cycle and its ruling economic elite but its reference may extended also to social norms, ethic standards and laws (from Greek νόμος – law). The root –**sophy** denotes what is referred to as *épistéme* (Foucault 1966) or *conpures épistémologiques* (Bachelard 1978: 49), i.e. 'a system of knowledge' common in philosophy and science. -**metry** refers to the proportions of an esthetic ideal, -**chrony** to its temporal constitution (nostalgic past, hopeful future), -**topy** to local setting (Arcadia, pastoral idyll, desert island) and -**typy** to the ideation of the major hero in respect to minor figures. All these aspects integrated into an *n*-dimensional space form a **cosmos** (technocosmos, democosmos). Colinear trends in art, sculpture, music, ethics and mythology develop different combinations of its dimensions but stem from one common axiology.

Such systematic taxonomy would be worthless if it did not correspond to historical reality, if its validity could not be confirmed by an arbitrary segment of cultural development in any country. Validity does not presuppose strict regularity because cultural cycles may be retarded or accelerated, they may slip through or repeat or give in by interference to outer pressures. Social and cultural development may be measured effectively by economic and demographic statistics or by methods of **statistic ideometry**. Its procedures were adopted for devising statistic maps of literary history so as to measure parameters of a **literary process**. They consisted in counting statistic figures of books published in different genres every year. Since literary production includes also books on philosophy, law, science and religion, and it correlates also with similar figures from music and fine arts, such historical maps give a reliable idea of cultural processes as a whole. Their illustration on English literature published in Great Britain is entered with a detailed description of statistic procedures applied on Table 51 in the chapter on literary history.

Cultural Periodicity

German *Geistesgeschichte* (W. Dilthey, H. Rickert) maintained that cultural history consisted of unique accidental events that were neither recurrent nor repeatable and obeyed no deterministic laws. Scientific historiography warns against such *a priori* refusals because lawful periodicity is common in all physical and economic processes and in all fields of science it provides an essential key to systematic knowledge. Once we are able to explain historical events in periodic tables as recurrent phenomena, we possess a tool similar to Mendeleyev's **periodic table** of chemical elements. Most historical societies are accidental amalgams made up from many components of unclear and incomprehensible nature. Yet scientific historiography must follow chemistry in purifying these mixed substances into regular chemical compounds and analysing these compounds into pure elements that exhibit a lawful and predictable chemical behaviour.

As soon as social sciences discover their pure elementary **units**, they will be able to compare regular periodicity in their historical occurrence and integrate them into a **systematic taxonomy** of higher categories. History is an **integral process** of social life exhibiting curves of periodic oscillation manifested in ups and downs of economic prosperity. Society is driven forth by peristaltic contractions of economic booms and crises that pulse in its bowels in a regular rhythm and show periodicity similar to processes in natural sciences. Its dynamic growth may be simulated by self-regulating automata with a finite number of states and fixed rules of transition from one state into another.

At first glance cultural history looks like a chaotic process filled with haphazard deeds of accidental personalities but when seen from the bird's eye view on historical maps its course exhibits regular patterns. The graph on pages 97-104 represents the cultural evolution of Europe as a continuous curve of rises and declines in a sinusoid form. The curve corresponds to regular tides and ebbs of economic cycles and traces their probable cultural periodicity also in ancient times. Culture makes progress as if governed by an inner **historical clock** hidden in the peristaltic contractions of the bowels of worldwide booms and crises. People can slow down their pace or accelerate them by rational reforms, but however violent interventions they might exert, they can never disturb and change their inner rhythm for a longer time.


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Theseus’ synoikismos
Age of Heracles
Calchas‘ astrology
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MYCENEAN AUTARCHEUM
Orestes’ empire
Peloponnesos almost united
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Kodros‘ astrology
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Ionians beaten and expelled
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DORIAN OLIGARCHEUM
Messenian serfdom accomplished
Isthmios‘ ritualism
Lykurgos’ Constitution
offensive senatism


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-540 Peisistratos' reformation
-530 and his absolutism
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Homeric
Renaissance
Age of Hesiodos
Telecles'
absolutism
Hesiodos' decadence
Eumelos' theocracy
Messenian
independence
Messenian protestation
1st Messenian war
2nd Messenian war
Religious revival
Terpandros, Klonas
Thaletas, Alkman
offensive
senatism
Spartan counter-reformation
Great Colonisation
aristocratic constitutions
Dracon's
oligarchy
Epimenides' mysticism
Solon's social reforms
tyrannies flourishing
Milesian physicalism
Ferekydes' mysticism
Anaximenes'
materialism
Peisistratos' Academy
Athenian
protestantism?
Onomakritos' Orphism
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autarchism
ATHENEAN
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Pythagoreanism
Kimon's oligarchy
Pythagorean
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Persian wars
Eleatic idealism


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Sophist Encyclopaedism
Anaxagoras, Hyllas
Prodikos, Protagoras
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Socratic idealism
oligarchies
ascending - Kritias' oligarchy 404
Dionysios oligarchy
Plato's metaphysics
Demosthenes'
defensive senatism
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Speusippos
Academism
popular
reformation
Hellenism
Alexander's wars
Macedonian absolutism
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Filetas, Zenodotos, Simmias,
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Eratosthenes
Stoics
Stoicist decadence
Kleomenes, Agis
Spartan reformation
Punnic
Wars
Analogism
HELLENISTIC
AUTARCHEUM
Aristophanes of Byzantium
Aristarchos of Samos
Anomalism: Krates
Dionysios Thrax
Sulla's oligarchy
Cicero's Stoicism &
conservative ritualism
ROMAN
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offensive
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Ciceronian senate


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literary elegism
Tibullus, Propertius
Ovidius Naso
Varro's encyclopaedism
Virgil's humanism
Christian protestation
Pliny's comparativism
Seneca's stoicism
Nero's counter-reformation
offensive senatism
Christians persecuted
Traianus' centralism
Plutarchos comparativism
Fronto's Second Sophistics
ROMAN AUTARCHEUM
Hadrianus' descendent autarchism
Aurelian's inquisition persecuting Christians
Christian theology
Tertullian's Montanism
Plotinus mysticism
Gallienus' oligarchy & Thirty Tyrants
colonate feudalism
defensive regionalism
Nonnius Nemesianus
bagauds' protestation
Diocletianus
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GALLIC AUTARCHISM
Christians persecuted
Donatists' protestation
Constantin's Christian reformation
Constantin's culminating absolutism
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
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persecuted
emperor Constans persecutes Arianism
Ambrosian mysticism
Ambrosian Theocracy
Holy Fathers: Hieronymus, St. Augustine, Prudentius
Neo-Platonism: Hypatia, Synesios
defensive regionalism
Hunnish conquest, Atilla defeated 450
ascending autarchism
Theodorich
king of Ostrogoths
GOTHIC AUTARCHEUM
Germanic kingdoms of Visigoths,
Ostrogoths and Anglo-Saxons
strong state bureaucracy & centralism
Cassiodorus
Fulgentius
emperor Iustinianus
BYZANTINE AUTARCHEUM
senate opposition weakened
Gregorian theocracy
Augustine sent to baptise
Anglo-Saxon kings
offensive missionarism as a
weaker form of crusaderism
Gregorian
counter-reformation
Sergius‘s monotheletism
Arabs conquer Damaskos 635, Jerusalem 637,
Persia 640 and North Africa 640-710
Leonine theocracy, pope Leon II’s *Liber pontificalis*
Willibrord missionarism in Frisia
defensive regionalism
Karl Martell & Pipin’s
military expeditions
politic reintegration
Petrus Pisanus


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Schola palatina
Alcuin, Diaconus
Paulinus, Eginhart
CARLOVINGIAN
AUTARCHEUM
Auvergne scholastics
Auxerre scholastics
Auvergne
counter-reformation
Normans conquer Normandy
NORMAN OLIGARCHEUM
Odon de Cluny
religious ascetism
plague 941-2
defensive regionalism
Otto I proclaimed Roman emperor
ascendent autarchism
Ottonian Renascence
Eckehart, Hroswitha
Gerbert
OTTONIAN AUTARCHEUM
Fulbert
Notker Labeo
Patarian
protestation
emperor Henry IV
descendent autarchism
Roscellinus
nominalism
1st crusade to Jerusalem 1096
offensive crudaderism
Anselmian
counter-reformation
Bernard de Clairvaux
mysticism
Waldenses
Albigenses


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NORMAN OLIGARCHEUM
Simon of Montfort's crusade against Albigenses
Magna Charta Libertatum 1215
offensive senatism
Dominican inquisition
Simon of Montfort's rebellions
St. Thomas scholastics
Duns Scotus scholastics
Avignon papacy
Occamist experimental science
Hundred Years' War
Law's mysticism
AVIGNON AUTARCHEUM
Wycliffite Reformation
Gerson's scholastics
Hundred Years' War
Grand Rhetoricians
Innocenc VIII's inquisition
Humanism
Anglican
Lutheran
protestation
WEST-EUROPEAN AUTARCHEUM
Trident inquisition
Huguenot
protestation
Molinist inquisition


A. Waldstein's **expansive crusaderism**
SPANISH OLIGARCHEUM
Thirty Years's War
offensive senatism
Restoration absolutism
Fenelon's kvietism
Berkeley's solipsism
Montesquieu's sociologism
churchyard meditation
ascendent autarchism
Encyclopaedist Science
Volney's ideologues
CENTRAL-EUROPEAN AUTARCHEUM ENLIGHTENMENT
French revolution
Payne's concept of human emancipation
Schelling's mystics
Comtean positivism
Junghegelianer
Schopenhauer's metaphysics
descendent autarchism
Spencerian evolutionism
Durkheim/Masaryk's realism
Nietzsche's metaphysics
Einstein's relativism
Sorokin's sociologism
expansive crusaderism
Heidegger's metaphysics
Adorno's empirism
Foucault's rupturism
Derrida's metaphysics
offensive senatism
corporative pluralism
philosophy of human rights

Revising elementary categories of sociology primarily means their revisiting in such a way that every term used fits all its periodic occurrences in cultural and political history. Many commonplace terms (democracy, oligarchy, totality, bureaucracy) are so plagued by incorrect usage that we have to prefer new coinage to their tedious redefinitions. In order to avoid redundant coinage, one terms is used for (1) a class, (2) its dominant political reign, (3) the short-term period of its reign and (4) a longer term of its historical dominance.

ELEMENTARY TYPES OF REGIMES

Democy: (1) The social classes of crafsmen, artisan townsfolk, countryside peasantry, modern working-class and imported slaves. (2) The Protestant reign of common people in populist regimes, a popular government of peasants' communities, civic society or public majority applying the institution of 'direct democracy'. Direct democracies imply a rule of public councils and popular tribunes elected by public gatherings (Greek *ekklesia*, Roman *comitia*, medieval urban communes).

Aularchy: (1) The social class of state bureaucracy (clerks, police, scribes in the Egyptian Old Kingdom, French *légistes* and *gens de robe*, Chinese *fa-ti*) subordinated to a strong centralistic ruler. (2) A centralised totalitarian rule of state bureaucracy with the decisive role of one strong absolutist ruler.

Oligarchy: (1) The social class of the private well-to-do magnates, patricians, bankers and feudal princes. (2) A decentralised rule of independent feudal princes, land-owning magnates and trans-national corporations centred in scattered decentralised regions. It is a system of decentralised administration that guarantees great liberties to rich magnates at cost of a new serfdom inflicted upon the common people. It represents an economical model where a small elite minority of owners possesses the majority of land and controls the decisive amount of land, financial capital or productive means.

Autarchy: (1) A civic, popular and national self-government that combines in different ratios into one ruling coalition the centralised state aularchy and popular democy. These two arms of autocracy join their efforts in order to weaken the strength of the privileged upper classes (magnates, corporations and private owners). Its basic precondition is a strong sector of the state (royal) ownership completed by high rates of the public and the civic sector.

Autarcheum: (1) A three-cycle period of 'golden age' consisting of periods of an ascendent, culminating and descendent autarchy. Its phenomenon may be illustrated on Augustan Rome, Charlemagne's empire, Renaissance and Enlightment. The immense bloom of rapid economical development is accompanied by flourishing arts and sciences. The popular national reformation allows protestant states to emancipate from under the rule of strong empires and liberate from their financial and military hegemony. (2) A

ring of peripheral national protestant states that have united in their anti-colonialist resistance against the dominant world empires (Protestant states in North Europe united against the popes in Amiens and Rome, the underdeveloped third world after the post-war decolonisation).

Ascendent autarchy starts with a syndrome of national reformation characterised by a strong predominance of the centralised state bureaucracy (renaissance, enlightment) and aims at a strong secular state.

Descendent autarchy is remarkable for a decay of state centralism, growing role of the consumers' society, the dominant role of public democy and the strong influence of trade unions (Athens under Pericles, Rome under the Antonins, the 19th century positivism).

Oligarcheum: (1) a three-cycle period of a 'dark age' dominated by the rule of great empires (Sparta, Roman Empire, Habsburgs' Spain, British Empire). (2) The heartland of large colonial empires comprising the central *cosmopolis* and the surrounding *megalopolis* of satellite states.

HISTORICAL TYPES OF AUTARCHY.

Tyrannís: The ancient Greek form of autarchy based upon the reign of a strong sovereign ruler supported by popular gatherings and direct democracy.

Ghibellin monarchy: A medieval type of autarchy applying an exclusive sovereign position of the monarch with an exclusive role of courtiers in the court administration and the authorities of the royal town.

Absolutism: A New Age autarchy in large agrarian kingdoms with a strong ruler supported by strong state bureaucracy and protestant national church.

HISTORICAL TYPES OF OLIGARCHY.

Crusaderism: A type of global expansionism under the pretext of a 'saint war', conquests of monks' and knights' orders and soldiers of fortune haunted by religious fanaticism against infidels and heathens.

Senatism: (1) A strong rule of 'high parliamentarianism' with a strong senate opposition that kindles resistance against the central royal power. The aristocratic senate of lords functions as an instrument defending the interests of the richest land-owning magnates (aristocratic rule of *areopagus* in Classic Athens, Roman senate under Cicero, the *Magna Charta Libertatum* granting feudal rights, the British House of Lords under Queen Victoria, the post-modern age and its idea of human rights). (2) A type of aristocratic constitutions granting liberties to rich oligarchy (Lykúrgos' reform of aristocratic constitution in Sparta, *Magna charta libertatum* passed under the Anglo-Norman king John the Lackland in 1215).

Regionalism: A model of a scattered decentralised theocratic empire with many independent counties and strong local rulers.

Dominium: An early extensive type of oligarcheum where the military power acquired a huge formal control of neighbouring countries but it managed to enforce its hegemony only by collecting a symbolic tribute.
Xenarchy: A rule of a foreign conquerors' minority over the peasants' community and the autochthonous people of a subdued nation (Norman conquest and William the Conqueror's rule in Britain after 1066).
Endarchy: A rule of the vernacular aristocratic elite that has managed to expropriate the autochthonous peasants' majority's land.
Theocracy: A rule of religious corporations and divine clergy that have absorbed the land possession of the local yeomanry and peasantry to such an extent that they subdued peasants' communities to serfdom.

POLITICAL SCIENCES

Dynamic Trends in Economics

Political history revolves in cycles from centralistic absolutism to pluralistic decentralisation according to different types of public ownership. Totalities are associated with the original state of undivided common or public ownership while pluralities presuppose private and corporative ownership. Totalities bring periods of lucky utopias of rapid peaceful development and high prosperity, whereas pluralities are typical of rich stagnating societies full of luxury, decadence and wars. Ovid remembered the ancient times of common ownership as a **golden age** (*aurea proles*) remarkable for prosperity, stability and peace. He could see its live model in *Pax Romana*, in peaceful stability established in the Roman Empire by the caesar Augustus. His descendant Nero might symbolise its opposite, the **silvern age** (*argentea proles*) as a period of hectic decadence and baroque luxury. Similarly, the medievals distinguished ‘bright centuries‘ (*saeculum clarum*) of prosperous royal absolutism and ‘dark centuries‘ (*saeculum obscurum*) of papal theocracy and ‘warring princes‘.The graph on pages 97-104 records their periodic returns in even and odd centuries as the reigns of the **autarcheum** (renaissance syndrome) and the **oligarcheum** (decadence syndrome).

The inner cause of their perpetual alternation lies in what was known to the ancients as the conflict between public ownership (*ager publicus*) and private ownership (*res privatae*) (Bartošek 1988: 197). Public ownership in totalities must be protected by economic strategies of **protectionism** close to J. M. Keynes’s *New Deal* or French *dirigisme*. Private ownership in pluralities must be reinforced by free-trade strategies in the wake of A. Smith’s **liberalism**. Most theorists assume that mankind must firmly pursue one ethical ideal of inner organisation, but economics and statistic econometry tell a different story: there is no social growth without changing social values and political elites, there is no progress without circular revolutions and reforms. State interventions may carry out only reforms in accord with the general trend of economic cycles in neighbouring countries.

The modern periodisation of economic cycles passed from ‘bright’ and ‘dark ages’ to economic statistics. The scientific theory of economic booms and crises was developed by the Russian Mensheviks’ school including Pitirim Sorokin, N. D. Kondratyev, S. Kuznets and W. Rostow. Sorokin (1939), Kerensky’s secretary and *émigré* to the U.S., made his repute by studies on the dynamics of cultural cycles. Nikolai D. Kondratyev analysed the periodocity of long-term cycles with a special emphasis on periods lasting five decades. His book *Bolshiye cikly konjunktury* (1928) observed the first quinquagenary

cycle between revolutions in 1789 and 1848 with an inflex point (vertex) in 1814. The second cycle lasted from the boom of 1844-1851 to the industrial era 1890-1896 with a point of inflexion in 1873. E. Souček developed his partial observations on the cycle 1897-1945 and prolonged them to the post-war era 1947-1996 that culminated in 1974 before the crisis in 1975-1976 announcing stagflation. In Germany this research pursued a line of study called *Konjunkturforschung* (Spiethoff 1923, 1955; Schlumpeter 1912, 1939). In the post-war era it was applied by Jürgen Kuczynsky to the history of working-class masses. A huge upsurge of exact methods made both lines of research fuse with the mainstreams of modern statistic **sociometry** (Adolf Cost, J. L. Moreno) and **econometry** (Ragnar Frisch).

Economic growth generally pursues an ascending curve of industrial progress but periodic booms and crises give it a shape of a broken zigzag sinusoid (Sojka, Konečný 1996: 75). Waves of rise (prosperity) and decline (decay) in economic production repeat in cycles of definite but variable length. Kitchin's cycle lasts about 40 months, Juglar's cycle takes 6-10 years, Kuznets's cycle is of twenty-year duration, while Kondratyev's cycle approaches almost half a century. Moreover, some economists speak about periods lasting one century and two-centuries' epochs. C. Juglar's ten-year cycle consists of several Kitchin's cycles corresponding to the successive phases of revitalisation, expansion, boom, stagnation, depression and crisis. The rise of economic production takes about five years, three years exhibit transient oscillation and two years display a marked decay. Kuznets's 20-year period is a chain of two Juglar's cycles that are split apart by a weak depression but closed by an extremely deep crisis (S. Kuznets 1966, 1971).

Every boom shifts the focus of dynamic growth from one economic sphere to another and throws people into the whirls of different economic trends and strategies. The first three booms in a bright age bring a rapid industrial growth accelerating agriculture, building industries and a production of machinery. After reaching the point of inflexion the curve begins to descend because production concentrate only on consumers' goods and best incomes flow from services, tourism and finances. The boom of consumers' goods is ominous of a breakdown and *stagflation*, a syndrome of long-term stagnation accompanied by high inflation. The market is saturated, prices are rising but and high employment lowers economic demand. The *dirigiste* planning is abandoned, state companies are privatised by huge financial corporations and national economy heads for a new 50-year age of corporative ownership.

The main types of 10-year cycles may be described as a sequel of productive strategies ensuring the cyclic rotation of the economic automaton: (1) **accumulation** (an agrarian boom accumulates financial capital in the hands of strong state owners and makes their investment flow into costly public

projects), (2) **edification** (the phase of reconstructing the industrial basis, heavy machinery, engineering and factories, ’building fever’ with a boom of construction activities), (3) **industrialisation** (industrial boom, a return from heavy machinery to light machinery and electric devices), (4) **consumption** (transition to producing consumers’ goods, ‘consuming fever’ with a boom of mass production and working-class consumption), (5) **stagflation** (’speculative fever’ with a boom of financial speculation at the cost of stagnation or decline in industrial production, a rapid growth of prices and costs).

A Classification of Short-Term Economic Cycles

A system of terms acceptable in economic theory is listed below in bold-faced letters in parentheses. However, a different set of catchwords is given preference because we have to coordinate economic and cultural trends (see Table 39). For reasons of obtaining comparative taxonomy acceptable for all fields of culture and social life, they are preceded by less common terms ended in *-nomy* to suggest economy oriented to producing ‘good’ (*eu-*), beautiful (*estho-*), functional (*techno-*), buyable (*demo-*) and luxurious goods (*pluto-*).

Eunomy (**accumulation**): low prices and wages, cheap working force, a wide use of the unemployed and the homeless in hired armies carrying out state labours on public buildings. A fast growth of agricultural production oriented to ensure a state of self-sufficiency in food. Strengthening administrative bureaucracy and centralistic mechanisms of state control in order to restrict private owners and their corporative businesses.

Esthonomy (**edification**) ’reconstruction phase’: concentration on mining ores, coal and other raw materials, the fast growth of building industries, a reconstruction of machine equipment in large factories, renovating machines in large companies, utopist public projects, peasants’ cooperative farms founded.

Technonomy (**industrialisation**): a great boom of industrial production, extensive development of industrial planning, stabilising the system of social security and insurance for working-class masses and wide walks of society.

Demonomy (**consumption**): a great boom in producing consumers’ goods, industries focus on wide public masses, raise their wages and lower their prices to increase sale. Their standard of living is rising and their rights are growing thanks to trade unions and left-wing parties enforcing democracy.

Plutonomy (**stagflation**): a turning-point announcing a long-term stagnation of industrial production accompanied by a rapid inflation, high prices of realties and consumers’ goods, high unemployment and tough competition. Producers concentrate on advertisement, wrapping and higher quality. The dominant role is played by finances, banking and stock-brokers’ activities.

1826 ========== crisis in 1826-1829
1827 the first wave of
1828 romanticism in 1826-9
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1830 July revolution in 1830
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1836 the second wave of romanticism
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1838 ======= ==== crisis in 1837-1839
1839 ====== ***demarchy*** ==========
1840 rural populism
1841
1842 EUNOMY
1843 **ACCUMULATION**
1844 prosperity between 1844-1951
1845 agrarian boom
1846 EUCRACY: Communist utopianism
1847 ========== agrarian crisis
1848 ===== REVOLUTION in 1848 === 1847-1848
1849
1850 ESTHOCRACY
1851 ESTHONOMY
1852 building boom
1853 **EDIFICATION**
1854 the Crimean War
1855 from 1854 to 1856
1856 *Parnassism*
1857 ========== crisis in 1857 =======
1858 attack on Napoleon in 1858 *sentimental realism*
1859 a war in Indo-China
1860 in 1858-62 liberalisation from 1860
1861 Mexican expedition 1861-7 **INDUSTRIALISATION**
1862 TECHNONOMY
1863 rapid industrial boom
1864 TECHNOCRACY
1865 technocratic administration
1866 ========== financial crisis in 1866 ========

PLUTOCRACY
STAGFLATION
PLUTONOMY
a boom of
financial speculation
a long-term depression
rapid inflation

1867 *positivism & evolutionism* DEMARCHY: political liberalisation
1868 *literary naturalism* **CONSUMPTION**
1869 DEMONOMY
1870 consumption boom
1871 == revolution in 1871 == Paris Commune
1872
1873 ========== crisis in 1873 ========
1874 MacMahon's monarchism
1875 ========== depression in 1873-9 ======
1876 a long-term depression
1877 IDOLARCHY: **STAGFLATION**
1878 monarchist traditionalism European agrarian crisis
1879 from the 70's till the 90's
1880 a short-term rise
1881 the second wave of naturalism a rise in 1878-1882
1882 *impressionism*
1883 ========== crisis in 1882-6 ======
1884 ========== a deep crisis in America
1885 *literary decadence* a boom of financial speculation
1886 boulangerism in 1886-1889 a long-term depression
1887 **STAGFLATION**
1888 *literary symbolism* PLUTONOMY
1889 corruption, inflation and usury
1890 ======== ***polemarchy*** ======= European crisis
1891
1892 monopolies blooming
1893 a bill protecting public health passed in 1893
1894 agrarian boom
1895 **ACCUMULATION**
1896 EUNOMY in corporative ownership
1897 social legislation
1898 Dreyfus's affair
1899 10-hour working day for women and children
1900
1901
1902 ========== crisis in 1900-1903 =======
1903 anti-clerical laws passed by radicals between1902-4
1904 strikes for a 10-hour working day in 1905
1905 ESTHONOMY in corporative ownership
1906 **EDIFICATION** *unanimism*
1907 a great rise in mining coal, ores and raw materials

1908 financial capital
1909 exported abroad
1910 *cubism*
1911 TECHNOCRACY *new civilism*
1912 TECHNONOMY *modernism*
1913 boom in armament industries
1914 **INDUSTRIALISATION**
1915 First World War in 1914-1918
1916
1917 ========== revolutionary wave in 1917 ==========
1918 *dadaism*
1919 short boom
1920 high unemployment in 1920
1921 inflation
1922 high investments
1923 inflation & devaluation
1924
1925 DEMONOMY *sociologism*
1926 **CONSUMPTION**
1927 boom of consumers' good
1928 *liberal consumerism*
1929 DEMARCHY: Social-Democratism
1930 ========== Great Depression ======
1931 ======= depression from overproduction ======= *populism*
1932
1933 the ascent of fascism
1934 **Idolarchy**: ***traditionalism*** long depression
1935 *conservative traditionalism* state corporativism
1936 *historical novel* PLUTONOMY
1937 boom of armament industries **STAGFLATION**
1938 pre-totality stagflation is typical of lower prices
1939 and greater state control
1940 *hermetism* agrarian boom
1941 *agrarianism* war campaigns raging
1942 pétainism mass destruction
1943 **Militarchy**: rule of generals and military leaders
1944 most stagflation crises are ended by 'sacred wars'
1945 and colonial expansion

1944 De Gaulle's government of national resistance
1945 programs of nationalising industries
1946 reforms of social insurance
1947 ======= ***aularchy*** =======
1948 Monnet's 4-year plan in 1946-1950
1949 **ACCUMULATION**
1950 EUNOMY
1951 high investments into reconstructing industries
1952 EUCRACY: post-war communism
1953
1954 ESTHOCRACY: social civilism *nouveau roman*
1955 ESTHONOMY *phenomenalism*
1956 **EDIFICATION** – Rueff's plan
1957 asanation of flats and public housing
1958 financial catastrophe in 1958
1959 Algerian crisis *theatre of the absurd*
1960 *poésie quotidinienne*
1961 *civilism*
1962 4th national plan 1962-1967
1963 ========== Europe building crisis in 1963 ===
1964 programs of social insurance
1965 *formalism* **INDUSTRIALISATION**
1966 *structuralism* industrial crisis in 1966
1967 *generative* French riots
1968 *grammar* students' strikes in 1968 =========
1969 economic planning abandoned
1970 *Maoism*
1971 *Tel Quel* **CONSUMPTION**
1972 *sociologism* DEMONOMY
1973 consumers' society
1974 boom of consumers' goods
1975 Brandt's *Sozialmarktwirtschaft*
1976 consumption crisis in 1976-7 ==========
1977 rising prices
1978 higher unemployment
1979 *punk* Thatcherism
1980 *skinheads* PLUTONOMY *historising*
1981 **STAGFLATION** *traditionalism*
1982 long-term depression *ecologism*
1983 privatisations of state companies *postmodernism*
1982 PLUTOCRACY: rule of rich countries

1983 Le Pen's *Front National*
1984 *New Age* rapid inflation
1985 *fatalism* Reagan's armament
1986 *apocalyptic postmodernism* military boom
1987 *catastrophism* militarchy
1988 *deconstructed metaphysics*
1989 free market devaluates weaker currencies
1990 Eastern revolutions **STAGFLATION**
1991 *irrationalism* speculative boom
1992 *hermetism* foreign capital
1993 *occultism* in great want
1994 *anarchism* high criminality
1995 MYSTARCHY: and corruption
1996 new sectarianism
1997 ==== ***plutarchy*** ==== a crisis of capital investments in 1997
1998 EUCRACY: T. Blair's *New Labour*
1999 EUNOMY in corporative ownership
2000 **ACCUMULATION?**
2001 Blair's *Third Way* *new classicism*
2002 or *New Labour* *new syndicalism*
2003 new anticlericalism
2004 ====== agrarian crisis? ======
2005
2006 political models of Clemenceau's *Radical Party* in France
2007 liberalism in analogy to Lloyd George's *Liberal Party*
2008 **EDIFICATION**
2009 ESTHONOMY
2010 big monopolies and oligopolies fusing
2011 globalist expansion
2012 fast-growing armament
2013 ESTHOCRACY: new fashionable society
2014 ====== building crisis? ====

Table 39 *Industrial cycles of economic growth in France*

Political Trends in Dynamic Politology

Politics is a dynamic complement of economy because it functions as a tool enabling people to regulate economic production and redistribute its yields to different groups of citizens. Every state primarily serves for protecting the ruling system of ownership and for guarding the lawful privileges of owners. The distribution of political power seems to be something stemming from the

people's will and their votes in elections but its ultimate shape always tends to reproduce the ruling distribution of economic power. Political representatives are confirmed in their reign by elections but the constitutional layout of the political representation is predetermined by the ruling economic hierarchy and its inner tensions. The hierarchy of authorities and the system of government cannot be changed by haphazard decisions but must legislatively reproduce the shape of centralised or decentralised hierarchy in economic ownership.

Political bodies have a typology analogous to the morphology of social systems on Table 34. Socialists rely on a broad lower social base, on trade unions, working-people and common consumers. Socialist parties attempt to compress higher peaks and lower them to attain greater equality. Communists tend to preserve a strong totality with a broad social basis and centralistic state control. They confide in strict discipline, powerful state centralism and strong administrative bureaucracy. Agrarians and Christian democrats preach populism idealising the unspoilt organic community of countryside peasantry but their esteem for the paternalistic authority of ownership is not limited by egalitarianism. Conservatives esteem authority but entrust its privileges to narrower elites on higher levels, to entrepreneurs, factory-owners and prosperous middle classes. They admire a high hierarchy with many steep towers of economic power independent upon the state.

Political parties apply different philosophies of social architecture that can be defined as: (a) an **ideal extreme** of quantitative changes of social conditions, (b) an exactly delimited **sector** of a political space, (c) abstract **vectors** defining the direction of social growth, (d) a **tensor** of deformations of the social pyramid, (e) a system of mathematical **inequalities** in a space between ideal extremes as in Table 40. Each approach defines a different mathematical model of formalising sociology.

communism:	restriction of elites	totality
socialism:	emancipation of masses	equality
liberalism:	individualisation of elites	plurality
conservatism:	elevation of elites	hierarchicity
fundamentalism:	intolerance to infidels	duality

communism	**democratism**	**conservatism**	**fundamentalism**
intolerant left	left-wing	right-wing	intolerant right
state	masses	elites	church
authorities	work	royalty	crusades
punishment	human rights	commandments	terror
collective	society	family	orders, mafias
enlightenment	science	faith	fanaticism

Table 40 *Inequalities in the 'political space' and their classification*

Most people tend to regard political programs, say conservatism, as a real thing, as political opinions of a conservative party represented by its real members in a definite country at a definite time. They see in politics only its outer manifestations, real persons, parties, symbols, texts, standards and heraldic coats of arms. But political tendencies are not identical to social institutions and particular people. It is extremely difficult to compare the conservative platforms of W. Pitt, B. Disraeli, R. Churchill, W. Churchill and M. Thatcher, let alone Soviet and Chinese hard-line conservatives, because they operated in different times and different types of societies. What remained invariant in their programs were not identical social concepts but analogous **tendencies** of social transformations supported in different phases of social growth. These remain invariant and stable because they acted upon the society from the same dynamic angle and direction. Their conservatism does not consist in identical ideas but in parallel social trends and tendencies.

The historical clock of social evolution dictates centralistic or pluralistic models that penetrate all areas, inclusive of political parties and social movements. The state transmits its genetic information to the smallest social cells, to town councils, political clubs and non-government organisations. One organising *idée directrix* is mirrored from the social macrocosm into all layers of a local microcosm. Table 41 introduces a convenient morphology for social movements and elementary types of political parties. Numbering in Table 41 corresponds to several specific types of political parties:



Table 41 *A schematic layout of social movements*

1. **elitist parties**: *parti de cadre* 'party of cadres' (Duverger 1951, 1981), *parti de notables* (Charlot 1970: 63ff.), Weber's *Honorationpartei*,
2. **leader's party**: *Führerpartei*, 'one-man party',

3. **mass parties**: Weber‘s *Massenpartei* (Fiala, Strmiska 1998: 77ff.), *parti de masses* ‘mass party’ (Duverger 1951, 1981), *parti d‘électeurs* ‘a voters‘ party’ (Charlot 1970: 63ff.),
4. **apparatus party:** Weber‘s *Patronagepartei* and *Bürospartei*,
5. **popular parties**: all-people’s party, catch-all party, *attrape-tout*, omnibus party ‘everybody‘s party‘, *Volkspartei* ‘popular party‘,
6. **unrestrained parties**: syndicalists’ parties of ‘direct action’ (*l’action directe*) led by an illegal vanguard of intellectuals.

The chief leitmotif of any political strife is obviously the perpetual struggle between centralistic state bureaucracy and money-owning oligarchy, discussed in terms of utopias and antiutopias. The historical survey on pages 97-104 makes it clear that societies evolve through transitional stages in periodic cycles from centralistic totalities (autarchy) to decentralised pluralities (oligarchy). Every **autarchy** can be considered as a historical power block contracted between people’s masses and **aularchy** (from Greek αυλη – court), here defined as a strict centralistic reign of the court and state bureaucracy. Every political regime may be explained as a balanced power block contracted between three elementary components, or speaking more accurately, between two social forces united against the third component declared to be their enemy: **aularchy** (bureaucratic elite, state administration, intelligentsia in the state-controlled sector), **oligarchy** (private elite, independent magnates, clergy in orders) and **demarchy** (public masses, common people, working-class). In dark ages before a new totality gets ripe oligarchies do not profile as pluralistic plutocracies but tend to form **militarchy** (a strong block of the ruling party, its falanges and shock troops, police, army and armament industries). Most political regimes may be described as mixed dynamic units made up from different ratios of the following three or four social forces:

- **aularchy** - *communism, bureaucratism, centralism,* dirigisme, *absolutism, paternalism, totalitarism, protectionism*
- **demarchy –** peaceful liberal democracy: liberalism, civilism, social democratism, civic public parties, *petite-bourgeois* radicalism
- **oligarchy** (plutarchy) - conservative oligarchy in transitional epochs of crisis and decay: conservatism, corporativism, clericalism, monarchism
- **militarchy** - imperial military regimes: fundamentalism, chauvinism, imperialism, expansionism

Many authors tend to imagine that politics is an invention of the 20th century and refuse to compare its patterns with the historical past. The political past is gone because its story occurred in a series of lower formations but each cycle comprised a succession of regimes comparable to our days. **Formations** may be defined as long-term cultural cycles lasting two centuries while **regimes**

may denote dynamic short-term reigns of elites whose duration does not exceed a decade. Table 39 demonstrates that Pareto's circulation of elites roughly coincides with economic booms and crises. The term 'regime' must not be understood literally, it is usually a 7-year upsurge of a political trend that dominates in the parliament and often manages to enforce its own cabinet but soon ebbs and departs as a result of social earthquakes aroused by the nearest crisis. The graph on page 89 presents a dynamic classification of circulating elites interrupted by an intermittent interference of popular movements. A **popular movement** usually consists in a four-year period of public disobedience when a forthcoming crisis sets street masses into motion and awakens the left-wing intelligentsia to start campaigns in cultural media in order to replace the ruling elite. Our estimate is that on average a 6-year peak of the dominance of a ruling elite that culminates during a boom is interrupted by a 4-year peak of dominance of a popular movement culminating in the transitional period of depression. Popular movements never form cabinets but their vanguards play as indispensable a role in the **political process** as the ruling elites functioning as upper-class vanguards. As seen on page 89, both are needed for operating the underlying **economic process** because without political reforms no change of economic strategies would be feasible.

Aristotle's treatise *Athenian Constitution* gave an outline of politological taxonomy that is more penetrating than numerous present-day approaches. It could clearly distinguish μοναρχία, αριστοκράτεια and πολιτεια as ancient political formations but applied also the terms of τυραννίς and ολιγαρχία that had appeared recurrently as dynamic short-time regimes in different formations. Though being a staunch supporter of ολιγαρχία, he gave an unbiased account of the Periclean δημοκρατία and its basic institutions in popular tribunes and public gatherings (*Athenaion politeia*, 26-27). However, installing democracy in Athens was attributed also to Theseus and Peisistratos whose rule is usually classified as τυραννίς. Also his ολιγαρχία appears in reference to both Kritias' Thirty Tyrants' Government and much earlier Dracon's tyranny. His account of Athenian constitutions seems to coincide with the present taxonomy in dividing long-term political formations into stages of τυραννίς (here aularchy), δημοκρατία and ολιγαρχία.

K. Marx projected our political future in terms of building up communism, but in fact all political formations and all economic cycles have one common program: the **erosion of communism**, the 'deconstruction' of the national state ownership and its gradual transfer into the hands of private oligarchy. This complex process proceeds in several standard phases that may be explained on the conflicts between Perikles' democracy and Kritias' oligarchy. Every longer economic cycle begins with the victory of state bureaucracy over private oligarchy and a post-war reconstruction of state-controlled economies. The

state bureaucracy (*aularchy*), inspired by communist utopias, however, soon abandons strict laws (*eucracy*) and decays into the pleasure-seeking fashionable courtiers (*esthocracy*). Under young Perikles‘ reign (eucracy) in the 440’s the Old Sophists (Anaxagoras, Protagoras, Hippias, Antiphon) preached classicism, materialism, encyclopaedism and humanism. During his esthocracy in the 430’s his friend Euripides passed to writing his best sentimental tragedies and his adherent Protagoras converted to a philosophy of sensualism. In the 430’s their rich *blasé* sons formed a merry-making Gilded Youth and began to rebel against their fathers by antiutopias. They started sympathising with Gorgias’ rhetoric formalism, Nikias’ ideals of technocracy and Kritias’ high society. Where Krates and Pherekrates idealised utopias without slaves, Kratinos and Eupolis‘ comedy Golden Age (*Chrysún genos*, 424) mocked at utopias and their returns to the ‘noble savage‘. Where the Older Sophists defended democracy, emancipation, slaves, barbarians and their human rights, the Younger Sophists (Kallikles, Thrasymachos, Kritias) refused them as absurd fantasies. In 411 and 404 *BC* they attempted to overthrow democracy by oligarchy under the auspices of the Spartan army. Though rich oligarchs were defeated, they managed to seize the economic power and commenced a new dark age of private corporative ownership.

These fates of Classic Greece have been retold many times again, e.g. by the battles between Defoe’s Whigs and Swift’s Tories, as well as the quarrels between H. Wilson’s post-war socialism and M. Thatcher’s conservatism. The circular rotations of the economic engine tend to generate series of similar cultural situations and allow us to define general patterns of political regimes suggested in Table 41. Bureaucratic utopias are supported by regimes with the formula *aularchy* = *eucracy* + *esthocracy*. *Demarchy* (people’s rule) remains isolated as a revival of autarchy with a greater participation of masses that culminates after technocracy but may emerge in transitional popular movements also before eucracy and esthocracy. Antiutopias are supported by oligarchic regimes with the formula *oligarchy* = *technocracy* (Gilded Youth) + *idolarchy* (plutocracy) + *mystarchy*. Such terms may be used for denoting successive series of political tendencies in bright cycles but fail to cover their high variability. Some terms might be perceived as a token of an undue predilection for verbalism but they justify their use by frequent misinterpretations. Modern authors often mistake oligarchies for democracies, which renders all usage pointless and calls for restoring their original meaning by coining terms ‘democy’ and ‘demarchy’.

The political battles between classicist social utopias and technocratic antiutopias, whether taking place in journalism, philosophical fantasies or sci-fi comedies, occur in successive series of cultural situations generated by economic cycles. The graph on page 89 lists series of cultural trends that tend

to repeat in bright and dark cycles with the victories and defeats of different ruling elites. Table 42 attempts to arrange these trends in circles and specify their political equivalents for purposes of their systematic classification. A different type of taxonomy was chosen for bright cycles of national bureaucratic economy and for dark cycles of corporative private economy, even though they exhibit similar or analogous patterns. Economic cycles repeat similar successions of waves but these waves display much variability because they propagate on levels of various height.



Table 42 *A classification of political trends in bright and dark cycles*

Geopolitics

The inner political system is never an arbitrary fancy and or a haphazard invention of its citizens, it forms as a lawful resultant of many inner and outer economic forces determining strictly its probable shape. The inner political constitution of a country is always closely associated with a definite state of foreign affairs. An autonomous inner political development is possible only in the bright ages of peace when all countries act as independent kingdoms and states. In the dark ages of wars most countries lose their independence and divide into two camps: on one hand there are satellites in the services of one strong victorious empire (global hegemon, paramount hyper-power) and on the other its victims and enemies. Bright ages generally last two centuries and form a blissful period called **autarcheum**. Dark ages, here called **oligarcheum**, also last two centuries, but they take a dramatic course full of migrations, conquests and sacred wars. Their alternation may be explained in terms of religious faith because every bright age brings a **reformation** and every dark age a **counter-reformation**.

K. Marx took into consideration only the inner political development and neglected foreign affairs as due to secondary influence. He conjectured that the western advanced industrial countries would be the first to reach the stage of communism but he forgot that strong empires never succumbed to lures of popular rebellions. Social revolutions and democratic overthrows never took place in military powers but remained confined to the independent national kingdoms, poor provinces and subjugated colonies. The period 510-82 *BC* in the history of Rome was full of democratic overthrows until Rome became a strong military power and its barbarian provinces began to supply the Roman *plebs* with slaves, bread and games. Sudden prosperity killed their revolutionary potential and gave them a chance to acquire estates in the provinces. The Roman metropolitan proletariat became provincial aristocracy and provincial proletariat became new metropolitan proletariat. Sparta set another example because it never admitted democratic reforms until it lost its dominions in the Peloponnese. Strong empires have their own **imperial history** that differs from pathways of small countries. Religious reformations and Protestant heresies are common only in the exploited provinces because local oppression is multiplied by global oppression.

The crucial law of imperial history states that empires arise and perish, and undergo a **circulation of empires** analogous to Pareto's circulation of elites. They come into being by conquests and die of inner decadence when unable to face a new provincial protestation. The Athenian protestation revolted against Sparta whose small empire condemned to bondage peoples of the Peloponnese. If the Athenian naval alliance had been a bit luckier it would

have shattered the hegemony of Sparta in the same way as Macedonia had half a century later. Rome shattered the hegemony of Macedonia and Carthage but its empire did not survive the opposition of Germanic tribes. Christians revolted against Rome and their religious protestation became the faith of new awakening nations. Lollards protested against French popes in Avignon and Puritans in Elizabethan England revolted against the Habsburg emperors in Spain. When Francis Drake made England into a naval power decadent Spain collapsed and England occupied its leading place. Also the British empire lasted only few centuries to be overshadowed by a new Puritan giant, the U. S. looming behind to overtake its relay. This is the secret of '**Perpetual Protestantism**' and all religious reformations that beat the threatening counter-reformation by counter-reforming their own democratic roots and becoming new global hegemons. Protestantism in the oppressed provinces will defeat the decaying counter-reformation of metropolitan elites if provincial elites turn their commercial expansion into a new imperial expansion.

Strong naval and military empires never arise thanks to accidental battles but presuppose a sort of regional decentralisation that creates favourable conditions for the expansion of supranational corporations. Modern monopolies and oligopolies had equally successful expansive predecessors in the East Indian Company, medieval monk corporations, crusaders' knights' orders, and Greek amphictyonies. Their heydays could periodically come in the dark periods of deep depression when overpopulation, unemployment, starvation and exhausted sources weakened kings and made wealthy provincial princes wage wars and military expeditions to conquer new land. Such conditions got ripe in all periods of private decentralised corporative economy: the Ionian Colonisation (11th c. *BC*), Great Colonisation (7th c. *BC*), *Völker-wanderung* (4th c. *AD*) and Sacred Crusades (13th c. *AD*). Conquests, colonisations and sacred wars had to be inspired by religious fundamentalism culminating during the Roman decadence, the Gothic and Baroque Age or in the era of Romanticism. On pages 97-107 36 they are denoted as descendant epochs of **crusaderism** that usually precede an ascendant decadent cycle of **senatism**. By this we mean upheavals of lords' feudal liberties reached at the cost of peasants' harder serfdom. The Constitution of Lykurgos in Sparta, *Magna charta libertatum* (1215) and Caroline *Bulla Siciliana* (1356) were all known to strengthen the power of aristocratic parliaments and weaken the authority of kings. Other typical symptoms were plagues, famines, witch hunting, inquisition courts and other symptoms of counter-reformation (on the graph they are marked by blocks with darker filling).

Periods of counter-reformation (oligarcheum) alternate with periods of reformation (autarcheum) when empires begin to shrink and national states regain their independence. As a token of their newly-acquired independence

they install their own **national church** (Elizabethan Anglicanism, Gallicanism, Austrian Febronianism, Czech and Moravian Brethren) with the king as the national pope. The symbol of national unity emerges in a strong ‘good ruler’ with a strong state bureaucracy (ancient τυραννίς, medieval ghibellinism, modern absolutism, post-war communism) who has to suppress the decentralised power of rich magnates in the provinces and the strong aristocratic opposition in the parliament (Kimon’s *Areopagus*, Cicero’s *Senatus*, Simon de Montfort’s rebellious parliament, La Rochefoucauld’s *Fronda*). This is possible only by making a treaty with popular masses and strengthening their influence by principles of direct democracy with public gatherings (Greek *εκκλησία*, Roman *commitia tributa* and *concilia plebis*, Russian *soviets*, Libyan *djamahiriya*). Illustrations may provide Peisistratos’ reign in Athens, Hellenism, the Augustan Peace in Rome (*Pax Romana*), the Carolingian and Ottonian Renascence, Renaissance or the Age of Enlightment. The absolutist reign of the ruler and his national reformation from above is usually accompanied by a sort of democratic movement or popular reformation from below (on pages 97-104 they are marked by blocks with lighter filling). Balancing power between the state (aularchy), people (demarchy) and magnates (oligarchy) is so carried out by the instrument of state authorities (*dirigisme*), direct democracy (low parlamentarianism) and senatism (high parlamentarianism), respectively.

Periods of reformation and counter-reformation presuppose different types of international organisation between states. Every autarcheum is an epoch of independent **national states** and global **decolonisation** when large empires shrink and their dominions win freedom. Their rights are protected by a system of peaceful international organisation (UNO, UNESCO) based on principles of equality and peaceful cooperation. On the other hand, during the period of oligarcheum all empires begin to grow and subjugate weaker neighbours, at first by commercial expansion and then by military invasions. Their imperial policy requires removing frontiers separating national states and a new type of a supranational organisation of the world allowing **supranational corporations** to penetrate deep into the surrounding barbarian countries. Such corporations do not obey the state and the monarch but enjoy great freedom in decentralised regional integration of small counties led by powerful magnates and ambitious local princes. These proclaim **separatism** and strive for administrative independence upon the state and central government. Thus **supranational integration** in the world during an oligarcheum presupposes **regional integration** inside decentralised states. Such organisation is necessary for large empires to release free capital and overcrowded population, migrate to colonies and conquer new land, i.e. start new **colonialisation**. Thus

in terms of geopolitics, every oligarcheum brings a new colonialisation and every autarcheum a new decolonisation.

A. AUTARCHEUM:

a. **national** integration: states live in peace as national state-controlled kingdoms with centralised state authorities and autonomous organisation.

b. **international** integration (UNO, UNESCO), a peaceful system of international organisations uniting all nations on principles of equality.

c. **federal** integration: ethnic minorities live in provinces enjoying peaceful independence and administrative **autonomy**.

B. OLIGARCHEUM:

a. **regional** integration: counties and districts become independent administrative units ruled by rich magnates and warring princes.

b. **corporative** integration: national property is crumbled into private estates possessed by rich magnates or private corporations.

c. **supranational** integration: private corporations function on supranational principles in order to penetrate into weaker barbarians countries.

d. **global** integration: strong states became powerful empires and global hegemons with strong armies supporting the penetration of private corporations into barbarian countries independent national, countries.

e.

WORLD	**MEGASTATE**	**STATE**	**MINISTATE**
iinternational organisations UNESCO	continent	subcontinent	region
world	empire	national state	county - district
	military powers	nation	local tribes
	kosmopolis	federation	autonomy
	global hegemons	defensive	dominium
	theocracies	blocks	church
	elites	secularism	elites - mafias
		bureaucracy	

Table 43 *The disintegration of national states*

The processes of integration and disintegration proceed on several levels and encroach upon several types of states, see Table 43:

a. **world -** international world organisations on equal principles,

b. **megastate -** hegemonistic powers, empires, expansive realms,

c. **state -** national kingdoms and states with a centralised government,

d. **ministate** - autonomous counties, tribal districts, dialectal regions.

During an epoch of autarcheum large states and empires invigorate their centralist state control but allow provinces to function as a free **federation** of national states where every nation enjoy their own national **autonomy** with an

autonomous school system and cultural institutions. Since national states are integrated well into international world organisations, **internationalism** goes hand in hand with federalism and autonomism. During an epoch of oligarcheum large empires change into megastates crumbled into ministates with a regional decentralised organisation. Large hegemonistic empires grow and inflate while peripheral barbarian national states crumble and lose their autonomous federative provinces. In order to subject weaker neighbours empires kindle **separatism**, they corrupt local chieftains in barbarian countries to urge them to sell their land to new colonists and separate their autonomous federative districts from large national states. A convenient example is set by the 30's when Germany and Hungary withdrew from UNO and began to assimilate neighbouring adjacent areas by kindling local separatism. So Tiso in Slovakia was lured to separate from Slovakia, Croatia was lured from separate from Jugoslavia and Kosovo was helped to separate from Serbia.

The economic gist of such integrative processes remains hidden until we explain them on Kritias's oligarchy and the forthcoming oligarcheum in the 4th century Greece. Aristocratic Sparta as a global hegemon could not subjugate democratic Athens until it corrupted its oligarchy grown from the Gilded Youth and idle sons of democratic politicians. Democrats esteemed slaves and barbarians as their equals but new rich oligarchy made them a source of new gorgeous wealth. Xenophon and the like hired private armies that fought in foreign kings' services and hunted barbarian slaves concentrated in large manufactures (*ergasteria*). Democratic Athens became a supranational oligarchic *kosmopolis* full of rich *parvenus*, poor immigrants from provinces (*metoikoi*), imported slaves and poor unemployed Athenians who had to close their shops because they could not compete with oligarchs' slaves. So metropolitan working-class disappeared and could find jobs only as soldiers and servants at the gorgeous courts of new oligarchs. New economic, financial and military freedom only condemned the common people to new serfdom, bondage, slavery, servitude and clientism. Imperial Rome improved this model by exporting poor veteran soldiers as colonists supplied with land in conquered provinces and employing Germans in armies hunting new slaves.

Systematic Taxonomy in Historiography

Historiography can accomplish its scientific constitution only after revisiting its categories in such a way that most historical events will be elucidated as part of lawful processes exhibiting high periodic recurrence. W. Dilthey and H. Rickert proclaimed that there was a principal difference between 'nomothetic natural sciences' and 'ideographic historical sciences', the former dealing with deterministic laws and the latter enquiring into isolated

unique events. Modern humanities have refused such misleading scepticism by discoveries of high periodicity in economic growth. Historiography and sociology will grow adult and become mature by getting married to one another and giving birth to a child that is both ‘sociologised history’ and ‘historised sociology’. Synchronic sociology makes no sense without diachronic historiography and their systematic taxonomy will not exist without reconstructing the **social phylogeny** (sociogenesis) of mankind.

Human history is a complex process flowing like a wild river and it is pointless to discuss individual societies or social groups without respect to co-ordinates of human sociogenesis as a whole. There is no safe sociological classification without locating any phenomenon on three basic axes: ‘sociogeny’ or **social genetics** that sums up the evolution of human races and their ethnic traditions, ‘sociochrony’ or **social history** tracing the chronology of social changes in autonomous societies and ‘sociography’ or **social geography** enquiring into the extensive growth and geographic expansions into the surrounding neighbourhood. These three sub-disciplines plot the theoretical space of **historical sociology** that provides a rational account of human social history. Historical sociology should not be separated as a special isolated field because it forms a living core of sociology as a whole. It serves as a reminder that any sound sociology should function as a history-based and economy-based study.

The preceding chapters attempted to shed light on human **microhistory** as a process of circulating elites and regimes whose duration does not exceed a decade. Their considerations would remain incomplete without **macrohistory** as a process segmented into long-term periods, epochs and eras. H. Cysarz proposed to develop a field of historical research that would concern with their study under cover of **historionomy** or **periodology**. Its issues were discussed intensely by positivist evolutionism (H. Spenser, H. L. Morgan, J. Lubbock) in the late 19th century and by Marxist historians between the two world wars. Both school tended to conclude that historical epochs coincide with **economic formations**. The former classified them according to tools and implements (Lubbock’s Mesolithic, Neolithic), the latter according to the exploited.

Russian historians reached agreement in adopting V. V. Struve’s (1950: 15) five-stage periodisation counting with prehistoric communities, slavery, feudalism, capitalism and communism. This discussion, summarised by Eric Hobsbaum and M. Shapiro in the magazine *Marxism Today* (August 1962, 282-4), refused ‘ancient feudalism‘ (A. G. Prigoshin 1930: 159ff.), J. M. Kobishchanov‘s ‘eternal feudalism‘ in the Ancient East as well as E. Welskopf‘s ’patriarchal slavery’ in oriental despocies. For all ancient civilisations it accepted the doctrine of one stage called by A. I. Tyumenyev *allgemeine Sklaverei*. The Soviet doctrine neglected K. Marx’s ‘Asiatic mode

of production' as well as F. Engels's 'military democracy' but its gravest error consisted in absolutising artificial contradictions between slavery and feudalism. It omitted to see that ancient civilisations in Egypt, Mesopotamia, China and India followed the same evolutionary stages as Ancient Greece and Europe in the Middle Age. Their rude generalisations about ancient city states fully erased records mentioning agrarian feudalism (*heilotes* in Sparta, *penestai* in Thessaly, *klárótes* and *afamiotes* on Crete and *hektamoroi* in Athens, cf. Aristotle, *Athen. Pol.*, 92, 2).

The theory of human **sociogenesis** in prehistoric, ancient and medieval civilisations should be built on regular periodicity of demographic crises when overpopulation and starvation led to new colonisations. When independent tribes integrated into civilised societies, the dominant position was seized by the military caste of warriors extorting money, tributes and taxes for their princes. The original stage of **tribalism** when independent tribes worked for themselves and could do with a primitive exchange of labours was abolished and replaced by the rule of military violence. The transition from scattered tribal confederacies to pretty kingdoms was made possible by **tributalism** when chieftains began to extort tribute from neighbouring tribes. In due course an irregular collection of tribute by warring princes grew into **feudalism** when the princes transformed tribal confederacies into stable counties and obliged commons to pay tithes to the regional counts. The economic system of feudalism developed in several subsequent stages:

A0. **tributalism** (Latin *tributum* 'tax') - chieftains make raids on neighbouring tribes and collect an annual or biannual tribute.

B1. **beneficialism** – kings endow their earls (beneficiaries) with beneficiary fiefs (Latin *beneficia*) owned as a temporary pay for administrative functions.

B2. **feudism** – feoffees take their beneficiary fiefs into long-term possession (*feudum, copyhold*) and may bequeath them to their sons providing they properly fulfil their military defensive duties.

B3. **allodialism** - feoffees take fiefs into permanent hereditary possession and own them as their inalienable property (*allodium, freehold*).

B4. **censualism** – feoffees, guilds and estates become more independent and begin to pay taxes to the state according to census categories defined by the amount of their property.

C1. **mercenarism** – the Renaissance mode of production employing servants, maids, farm-hands and soldiers just for board and lodging. It abolished serfdom but subdued serfs to new forms of hiring servitude.

These successive stages define laws of **inner local growth** that operated in the early history of the Old Kingdom in Egypt, Ancient Greece as well as medieval Europe. Their clear tectonics in ancient societies was obscured by

more conspicuous milestones of **outer global growth** that consists in spreading advances of one dominant cultural centre into its outer neighbourhood. Classic economic history could not decipher minor stages of social growth and preferred to treat ancient civilisations in large blocks. Its periodisation distinguished the Ancient Age (slavery), the Middle Age (serfdom) and the New Age (capitalism) but could not explain the social dynamics of short-time development. It failed to see that most civilisations had their autonomous history passing through stages A0-C1 according to their own economic forces without regard to other civilisations. The assumed slavery ruling four thousand years *BC* in Egypt could have little importance for contemporary Europe, Siberia or Alaska. Economic progress moves forth in intensive as well as extensive direction. When an ancient kingdom had accomplished an intensive local growth through stages A0-C1, it had to get hold of surrounding kingdoms and accomplish a cycle of extensive evolution during which new regions repeated stages A0-C1 and old provinces had to repeat them on a larger scale. Such **global involution** of peripheral kingdoms into central empires proceeds in accord with **local involution** integrating peripheral barbarian tribes into larger class-divided empires. The original cultural centre in Mesopotamia united small city-states but gradually grew stale in order to give relay to other hegemons, to Assyria, Persia and Rome.

formation	**tributalism**	**feudalism**	**capitalism**	
totality	*monogeny*	*monarchy*	*monocracy*	I
'in-government'	*endogeny*	*endarchy*	*endocracy*	II
plurality	*polygeny*	*polyarchy*	*polycracy*	III
'out-government'	*exogeny*	*exarchy*	*exocracy*	IV
'after-state'	*Epigeny*	*eparchy*	*epicracy*	V
duality	*digeny*	*diarchy*	*dicracy*	VI

Table 44 *A systematic taxonomy of political macro-regimes*

Every historical process exhibits a definite degree of local and global periodicity when the social and economic engine revolves from the state of initial totality to an intermediary stage of decentralised plurality, and through a period of duality (civil wars) back to a strong united centralised state. Such cycles repeat the development B1-5 from beneficialism to allodialism and censualism at regular intervals. Table 44 offers a minute 6-grade subdivision of formations into several series of political **macro-regimes** classified according to the degree of centralisation. The Middle Age in Europe included two formations (tributalism, feudalism), which were composed from five macro-regimes. Polyarchy (strong regional counties under John Lackland)

turns into exarchy (independent petty kingdoms) and this changes into eparchy (new integration, 14th century) and diarchy (War of the Roses) but the stage of total disintegration (exarchy) was common only in smaller countries. Table 45 applies this periodisation to the history of England and attempts to demonstrate its periodic course in three similar formations.



Table 45 *A comparison of three formations in England*

IDEOLOGICAL SCIENCES

Ideography

The first attempts to found a systematic ideology as the study of cultural opinions were launched by Destutt de Tracy in his *Éléments d'idéologie* (1801). His term *idéologie* came into wide usage but suffers from ambiguity because it denotes political doctrines as well as their general theory. Alfred Toynbee (1937) and his close follower A. Lovejoy (1947) coined the concept of **history of ideas** as a field inquiring into historical changes in human thought. Much of their theoretical apparatus was derived from a parallel German trend called ***Ideengeschichte*** (Dilthey 1919) focused on changes in *Weltanschauung* as a source of artistic styles. Modern authors prefer to deal with social opinions under the cover of 'cultural anthropology' or **culturology** (A. L. Kroeber 1952; L. A. White 1975; Soukup 2000: 194-5). This label seems promising but exhibits disadvantages in misleading connotations involving also material culture. An influential stream in structural anthropology continues to apply the traditional concept of **mythology** (C. Lévi-Strauss: *Mythologiques* I-IV 1964-1971) that tends to restrict the scope of study to ancient aboriginal cultures. It associates 'ethnic psychology' with legends and oral tradition but displays the same ambiguity as *idéologie*.

The need to anchor cultural studies in the prehistoric and aboriginal roots is appropriately emphasised by contemporary Neo-Evolutionism (G. Lenski 1970; L. A. White 1975). Neo-Evolutionists maintain that ideology is a continuation of the evolutionary tree of animal, human (anthropological) and ethnic psychology into the realm of social psychology. This must be kept in organic unity with material sociology since it expresses spiritual activities of economic forces. A proper pair of terms for these two inseparable fields of study might be **psychosociology** and **ecosociology** focusing on ecologic, economic and demographic aspects of social life. Their latent danger lies in reducing social thought to chaotic individual psychology and neglecting its specific social traits. Our choice favours (general) **ideography** or **macroideology**, which is a tempting coinage owing to establishing symmetry to other fields of science. The former word suggests a tendency to descriptive approaches to science but fits its theoretical purpose. Its close ally is **ideometry** as a discipline measuring cultural development in quantitative indices and counting statistic profiles of cultural trends.

The inner division of ideography should exhibit a mirror-like symmetry to disciplines of sociology. Its natural starting-point lies in ethnic, static or substantial ideography concerned with the ethnic substance of ideology. The term 'substantial ideography' suggests dealing with the inertial substance of

cultural thought found in prehistoric myths. Because this inertial ethnic substance plays a passive role and cumulates as a static heap of various local traditions it may also be referred to as static ‘ideography’. But it is only ‘ethnic ideography’ that gives it a clear content and suggests its links with antiquity.

Static ideography has a rational justification as a bridge linking prehistoric myths with modern social thought. It provides a useful ethnic analysis of ancient cultural phenomena and their prehistoric roots but may function also as a brake if modern mixed assimilated nations are mistaken for primary categories. Since no evolutionary taxonomy of prehistory and cultural history is taken into account, cultural studies often start and also end in the modern chaos of mixed classes, mixed genres and mixed cultural traditions. Modern Christianity, Islam or Buddhism are incoherent clusters and amalgams of ancient rites surviving as inertial substance but their study requires a tedious decomposition into the original ethnic layers. Their adequate analysis is provided only by ‘cultural dynamics’ (Stewart 1978: 73, Murdock 1971: 319) that concentrates on parallel changes in countries with various religious traditions. As early tribal communities have evolved into modern classes, their myths have simultaneously evolved into modern religions. Static ideography brings satisfactory results when inquiring into ancient cultures but it will dramatically fail when studying modern cultures. Modern cultural history can be studied efficiently only by **dynamic ideography** that compares cultural trends as dynamic changes in the cultural form irrespective of their original ethnic substance.



Table 46 *An inner layout of ideography*

Basic fields of ideography are depicted in Table 46 as a 3-dimensional co-ordinate space with a spatial, a temporal and a social axis. The vertical axis *y* is defined by **social ideography** and its primary interest is in the hierarchy of social stratification subordinating various layers of popular folklore to one ruling official standard. The frontal axis *z* attempts to express geographic aspects of cultural diversity. It defines **geographic ideography** and inquires into how different cultures propagate or shrink in space. The horizontal axis *x* is divided into three sections. The first belongs to **ethnic ideography** that provides cultural substance inherited from prehistoric tribes. The second section is due to **historical ideography** that explains how prehistoric tribal mythologies merged into ancient and medieval religions. The cultural dynamics of their mixing and transforming in cultural cycles is left to **dynamic ideography** concerned with changing styles, fashions and trends.

Ideology

Society can exist and march forth only when driven by social psychology. Its members always respect ‘a ladder of ruling social values’ that motivates their economic behaviour and sets them all moving one way. Every boom tends to exaggerate one-sided economic growth and so prepares its own end. Its one-sided strategy helped as a good remedy for the ailments of the previous crisis but now it prescribes an overdose of medicaments unbalancing the social body in an opposite direction and sends it into the fits of a new crisis. The national economy may, however, recover even without any medicaments and rational treatment from economic physicians. Chaotic ideologies act like fever responding to a critical state of an inflected human body with a defensive counter-reaction. They will agitate the diseased economy by high temperatures that are sure to kill any alien bacterial invaders. So irrational social passions and rational economic reforms offer two alternative tools for controlling the inner balance in a social system. Before a government can act as the social brain and take steps to carry out new reforms, social psychology will show discontent at the previous order and suggest dim silhouettes of the forthcoming order. In this way ideology serves as the spiritual maintenance steering the society’s economic engine.

Most authors conceive **ideology** as a sort of scientific doctrine consisting of rational political ideas but its inner nature does not consist in rational sophistry. As the primitive savage behaves in a way controlled by unconscious impulses and hormones, so the modern man acts in economic matters as if driven by unconscious, irrational passions because their inner nature is not legible to his rational thought. Every ideology has a rational core in a ‘ladder of ruling economic and social values’ but these invisible values must be

materialised by visible facts and reasons. Ideology functions as combustible gas in the piston of a motor-car engine. Its goal is to send the social automaton from one unbalanced state to another state granting more optimal balance. Ideologies respond to inner pressures inside the social body and arouse people into action in order to reinforce desirable reforms. New reforms are impossible without exchanging the old ruling political élite and without a new generation of younger people ascending to political leadership. The **cultural process**, whose study defines the chief scope of cultural sciences, consists in a perpetual **circulation** of economic elites, strategies, goals and cultural values. It is a spiritual process simulating the maintenance of a material process. It is a as a mime play controlling the economic engine that drives forth the society and its social growth. Spiritual culture provides only a spiritual instrumentation of what is carried out physically by social, medical and technical care.

The circulation of elites takes place in all fields of social life, its progress being disguised as a natural exchange of generations. If various generations fight for their fashion in clothing, hairstyle and music, they actually fight for the same goals as their political vanguard fighting for important political and economic reforms. The circulation of political elites goes hand in hand with the circulation of cultural trends, aesthetic fashions and artistic generations. The Elizabethans discussed such changes of political taste as manners, humours or temperaments. The ancients had a telling saying *O tempora, o mores*. The moderns refer to them as ‘ideologies’, ‘artistic fashions’, ‘literary styles’ or ‘cultural paradigms’. We hardly ever understand their economic sense but we may synchronise them clearly with ups and downs of the demographic, social and economic growth. Every crisis darkens the social mind with infernal visions of apocalypse and doomsday and every boom brightens its soul with a vision of blissful idyllic romance. The former vision conceals spasms of decaying oligarchies and the latter totalitarian utopias.

When a new generation ascends to rule and power, it identifies its goals with a new style in music, clothing and haircut and cannot provide any rational program except for confused aesthetic feelings. This is why politicians need **ideologues** whose job is to clothe irrational passions, obsessions or manias with noble garments of political doctrines. Ideologues are employed as shamans, priests, philosophers and thinkers who are paid for giving a divine, logical or historical justification to the extant ruling order and celebrating its heroes as holy fathers. They usually find such justification in authorities of high repute, in the Bible, Koran or Marx’s Capital but all reasons they give are false and misleading. Even if they were able to grasp the economic ropes pulling their limbs and see through the whirls of economic values guiding their steps they would hardly disclose the real truth. If they tried to arouse people

into political action by true arguments of statistic trends in economic growth, they would loose their job like magicians who disclose their tricks.

People admit that ideologies have to do with political manipulation but tend to accuse of demagogic lies scientific doctrines that sincerely disclose their bias. On the other hand, they bow to religion and demagogy concealing their bias in a naive belief that they preach the genuine authentic truth. Such people do not approach mental disorders of ideology as expert psychiatrists but as innocent patients and addicts dependent on its drugs. They want to be cheated by the false lures of art, astrology and religious rites, and being bored by the monotonous speech of statistic numbers, they fend off any serious political science as a fallacy and lie. Ideology wants people to refuse science and confide in blind religious faith.

Ideology functions as *camera obscura* that inverts the shapes of reality and deforms it according to subjective economic needs. It does not lie in rational ideas, doctrines, theories and arguments used as a pretext for enforcing economic interests but in **cultural values** expressing the dynamics of economic forces. This is why it should be called **axiology** and its considerations should concentrate on **cultural trends** swaying economic growth. Rational doctrines vary from country to country according to religion, local traditions and political creeds but their role is always secondary because they just translate general feelings into the local dialect. Their deeper essence lies in cultural values that change simultaneously in neighbouring countries like the tiding and ebbing waves of seas. The Renaissance, Baroque or Romanticism arrived in many countries at the same time regardless of local Catholic, Protestant, Orthodox or Muslim traditions. Because such cultural styles show a high degree of regular occurrence and historic periodicity, they can be compared and classified in historical and geographical arrays. Their statistic study offers a safe key to constituting systematic cultural sciences. The metaphysical approach to cultural sciences maintains that culture consists of isolated works of art, individual creations, personal discoveries, arbitrary fantasies and private ejaculations. Systematic science links isolated creations into an integral process of styles, trends, periods, cycles, evolution and history.

Cultural Fields

Ideology is a kind of spiritual work assisting material technology and pursuing the same goals as material work. It helps authorities, police and law in administering what Th. Adorno called ‘scientific technology of power’. Its work is most efficient if it abandons rational planning and perverts into mystification. Such false work applies theatrical devices to pretend highest achievement presented to the public as magic, miracles and supernatural

wonders. The best-paid ideologues are those who produce utter and utmost lies. Ideologies use different means of expression but pursue similar political goals. Social services, legislation, religious ceremonies, political doctrines, journalism, literature and art represent only different means of manipulating individuals so as to file them up into troops capable of one political action. Wars, law, ethics and religion are just a continuation of politics with different tools and means. Art, literature and philosophy are just a just a continuation of ideology with different means of expression. They form **cultural fields** that look like autonomous spheres developing their own theoretical apparatus of terms and categories but undergo similar changes under the pressure of the same social forces and must therefore be treated in unity.

Cultural fields may be classified according to their inner structural relations or the degree of ideological mystification. As shown in Table 47, technology, ethics, politics, art and religion may be arrayed into a scale of positive and negative evaluation with several degrees of 'supernaturalisation'. Positive glorification is applied to the **protagonists** of the forthcoming élite, while negative demonisation is aimed against the cultural **antagonists** who acted as protagonists of the departing élite. The negative scale of demonisation ranges from -8 to 0 while the positive scale of deification ranges from 0 to 8. Every ideology glorifies the heroes of the ruling top of the social pyramid and condemns the heroes of the departing élite. The positive glorification of a modern product in the user's guide consists in its advertisement starting with technical recommendation and ending with aesthetic beautification. Political advertisement starts with aesthetic beautification and through ideological heroisation it may result in religious sacralisation or even deification. So ethics, art, aesthetics, journalism, mythology and religion act as extended arms of industrial and social technology.

The inner hierarchy of cultural fields will remain obscure until we reveal the economic logic of their historical occurrence in sequential series. Social classes (bureaucracy, *mondaine élite*, technocracy, clergy) naturally tend to adopt their own specific normative, aesthetic, technological or religious approach to social reality but when they ascend to power they usually cultivate this approach as the **dominant genre**. Dominant genres change with times and ruling elites like tiding and ebbing waves. There are times that give **cultural dominance** to law, education, aesthetics, technology or religious spirituality, and if we look closely at their inner development, each of these fields undergoes also a similar sequence of shifts in the aesthetic, technological or religious focus. Arts develop from normative and educational art to social and formal art and then to religious art. A deeper statistic analysis would show dependence upon the periodic oscillation of subsequent economic cycles. If the ticking historical clock strikes an age of decadent stagnation, science decays



Table 47 *The hierarchy of ideological evaluation of elites*

into religion, religion harangues generals to wage a ‘sacred war’ and on its ruins the winners devise political utopias or sentimental idylls. Utopias get stale and have to give way to the everyday prose of technology and science. Such trends repeat in circular or spiral patterns circumscribing an imaginary triangle of all cultural fields.



Table 48 *Triangular rotations of ideologies between 1928-2004*

Table 48 attempts to demonstrate two ‘triangular rotations’ of elites, political ideologies and dominant cultural patterns on the cultural styles of the 20th century. These rotations proceed with economic cycles according as society moves from revitalisation to prosperity and decay. Dynamic growth is accompanied by periods of positive scientific ideologies that pass from utopias and education to technology and science. Periods of stagnation are accompanied by false ideologies that pass from religion to metaphysics, occult sciences and astrology. The crises in 1929-1932 and 1975-1977 announced periods of long stagnation accompanied with excesses of religious fundamentalism and ‘sacred wars’. Both were preceded by long periods of

peaceful economic prosperity that led to rapid industrial growth and an amazing bloom of sciences. Inquiring into such sequential patterns allows a **sequential taxonomy** of cultural fields different from their classification on formal principles.

The Ethnic Substance of Ideology

Sociology considered as a history-based study means that modern societies still operate on genetic traditions of living mankind and cannot be reduced to formal models of abstract populations. Sociology should not concern with questions how a larger group of extra-terrestrials would live together in a caravan camp but should respect the real **social substance** of surviving ethnic traditions that takes different **social forms** in the melting-pot of modern nations. Modern art, literature, religion and philosophy look like new inventions of a creative genius but when studied on a broader historical scale they reappear as new **emersions** of older traditions that disappeared for a few decades because they immersed into the waves and submerged into the deeper depths of the cultural mainstream.

Sociologic parallels to the Linnean and Darwinian classification will sound as futile abstractions until we demonstrate their constitutive meaning for understanding social reality, architecture, religions and folklore. There is no understanding of modern sociology and culture without elucidating one **evolutionary tree** of ethnogenesis (origin of human races) continuing with sociogenesis (uniting tribes into societies) manifested also in a parallel stream of **ideogenesis** (growth of spiritual culture). All social processes presuppose a form of spiritual control and cannot move on without a parallel ideogenesis, without a sort of **mythology** that functions as ‘spiritual sociology’ and an engine driving social growth. Myths, customs and religions do not perish but survive in the melting mixer of the modern culture. Social history is an incessant oscillation of periodic changes that consist in perpetual immersions and emersions of several ethnic traditions.

Agricultural polytheism (hylozoism). The oral tradition of Neolithic peasants can be traced back far into remote prehistory and old myths of naturist religion. All agricultural cults coincide in worshipping Mother Earth, Father Heaven and their divine children symbolised by the sun, the moon, thunder or water. Their divine family was divided into several generations of natural phenomena with labels of gender expressing their cult of fertility and the philosophy of sexual dualism. This naturist religion permeated the polytheist faith of most peasants’ tribes all over the world and guided also the first steps of ancient philosophical thought. Ancient Greek, Indian and Chinese philosophy derived the origins of life from four primordial elements, earth, air,

water and fire. Their interest in elements was not due to chemical alchemy but to primitive agronomy focusing upon the agents of water, soil, fertility and heat. These agents were animated as divine principles that control the weather and regulate the supply of nutrient substances needed for a rich harvest.

The central figure of chthonic cults was Mother Earth and her lover adored as the god of vegetation. This god was celebrated as a martyr deity who departs as an old man into the underworld every autumn and the next spring he is resurrected as a little child. In Egypt Isis represented the goddess of love and Osiris her lover symbolising crop, fertility and vegetation. In Mesopotamia their roles were entrusted to divine lovers Ishtar and Tammuz. In Christian iconology they were depicted as the Holy Virgin hugging Jesus as a little baby and Three Ladies bewailing his dying body crucified on the Holy Cross. In Africa peasants carved wooden statuettes representing a mother cuddling with a small baby on her lap. All these myths deified the elementary labours of sowing and reaping corn by myths of human nativity and resurrection.

The agricultural folklore gave a vivid description of early farmers' matriarchal communities living in quadrangular 'long houses' and villages with a male and female moiety. The all-pervading principle of **sexual dualism** was visible also in the declensions of Indo-European languages labelling all live and inanimate things by masculine or feminine gender. Their original shape is still preserved in Negro-Australian classifiers dividing all entities into humans, animals, trees and plants. Sex categories were subordinated to age classification and **ancestral cults** worshipping old grandmothers and dead ancestors as divine deities. In China Confucius reformed the vernacular tradition of ancestral cults into rites of **filial piety**. In Melanesia and Latin America this cult presupposed eating the dead grandfather or grandmother's body and hoarding their skulls under the pillow. The Tupí-Guaraní farmers in South America desired to inherit their divine powers by eating them in the form of ashes put into a drink or baked in a cake. The Christian *eucharistia* promoted eating the god's dead body and blood to the rite of Holy Communion.

The unity of agricultural folklore is seen also in fairy-tales about kings (heaven) coping with drought, dragon-killers (sun) and princesses (earth) sacrificed to dragon monsters (water) controlling the supply of rains. It included also Australian plant-gathering aborigines whose fairy tales told about girls raped in woods by gods and metamorphosed into trees and flowers. Their atmosphere was reminiscent of Greek myths relating legends about pastimes of Zeus raping fairies on Olympus. The myths and rites celebrating the martyrdom of cultural heroes suffering from injustice reappeared again in ancient tragedies and medieval mysteries. All religious revivals returned back to processions with saints' reliquaries and an exulted cult of their bones. As

Aeschylus' tragedies were inspired by Eleusinian mysteries, Shakespeare's, Corneille's and Schiller's tragedies were inspired by the Christian *eucharistia* and *passio dei*. Also modern fundamentalism develops a sort of 'victimology' reviving ideas of medieval martyrologies that worshipped suffering saints.

Plebeian humoralism. The Negrito, Pygmies and Lapps had a specific folklore telling stories about their trickster hero beating giant animals by clever tricks. In European fairy-tales the trickster hero of dwarfish stature was known as Jack Thumb and Jack the Giant-Killer but in older fairy-tales his role is always played by a **trickster animal**. The medieval **mock-heroic epic** described him as the witty Fox Renart (*Reynard the Fox* or *Reineke Fuchs*) cheating the silly bear, wolf and stork. J. Bédier and G. Paris considered this mock-heroic tradition as an expression of the Gallic sense of popular humour (*esprit gaulois*) and discussed its possible eastern origins. Enquiring into the tradition of European **fables** since Aesop and Phaedrus, they found surprising analogies in Buddha's *Tipitaka* 'Three Baskets of Knowledge' from the 6th century *BC*. They devised a theory of Indian descent of European fables due to early migrations from India.

Such theories may be refused as absurd until we reveal their common ground in the folklore of all short-sized Lapponoid populations with cremation burials. Buddhists were the first Indian sect to introduce cremation and burn the dead with widows on funeral pyres. Their custom to hang the ashes of the dead ancestors on the *stupa* columns along main roads has striking parallels in the Roman *populi Albanenses* who put the ashes into *columbaria* on high columns along busy streets. Archaeologists called them **incinerators** or Urn-Fielders because when they travelled with the Andronovo culture (1,500 *BC*) from Turkmenistan and settled down in Europe as the Lausitz culture (1,300 *BC*), their cemeteries were concentrated in urn fields. Fables about trickster animals may be traced also along migration routes of Lapponoid incinerators in America. Their distant forefathers were the Negrito in southeast Asia who migrated southward as far as Tasmania. Another stream proceeded northward as far as Canada an California where they spread the Athapascan oral folklore telling stories about the trickster heroes Coyote and Hare. These popular dwarfish heroes won over big giant animals by using their witty cunning tricks.

Buddhism started as a popular mendicant sect of poor travelling preachers similar to Muslim dervishes or Greek sophists and cynics. In the Middle Age the mendicant tradition of beggar philosophers was revived by Italian Minorites (Franciscans), English Lollards and Czech Taborites. They spread protestant discontent whenever the poor artisan townsfolk rose to public protest and street rebellions. The medical doctrine of travelling preachers and cynic beggars concentrated on the theory of four secretory saps that circulate

in the human body (gall, bile, blood, slime) and determine four humours or temperaments (sanguine, melancholic, choleric and phlegmatic temperament). This philosophy of **humoralism** (from Latin *humor* 'sap, liquid, humidity') allowed Democritus, Hippocrates and Gallen to found a new cynic tradition in Greek philosophy, science and medicine. Plutarchus applied its tenets for a typological analysis of human temperaments and characters. He took this method over from Theophrastus and his Peripatetic School at Aristotle's Lyceum (Dikaiarchos, Duris of Samos) who drew evolutionary outlines of ancient Greek sciences. They were the first to adopt the historical, comparative, typological and sociological approach that proved to be a reliable foundation of modern sciences.

Besides influencing ancient sciences and medieval Protestantism, philosophical humoralism continued to inspire traditions of popular realistic literature. Hippocrates' idea of various social types, characters, temperaments and humours was inherent in many ancient popular genres, comedy, iambography as well as Aesop's fables and Pseudo-Homeric mock-heroic epic. The Middle Age saw their continuation in medieval bourgeois satire, La Fontaine's fables and *commedia dell'arte*. In modern times its inspiration did not perish but flew into a large stream of all modern artistic **realism**. Its key idea as developed by Breughel, Rablais, Balzac, Brecht and Hašek consisted in the *comédie humaine*, in the social typology of human characters seen from the viewpoint of popular humour. This philosophy permeated Ben Jonson's 'comedy of humours' as well as Molière's 'comedy of manners'. It united Horace's satire with the tradition of Lazarillo de Tormes' picaresque novel and modern realistic prose.

Ichthyophagous transmigrationism. The Oceanic and Polynesian folklore tells myths about the cultural hero Tagaro or Tagalo who brings fire and teaches people how to catch fish. This hero has one or several twin brothers whom he kills in order to punish them for their feeble and lazy mind. Their names seem to be derived from the Altaic god Tengri who killed his bad twin brother for his clumsy interventions in wonders of creating the world. The twin myth was imported by the Turcoid and Tungusoid fishermen from the Middle East, the heartland of their race and languages. It contained all the tenets of the Palaeo-Mongolian **dualism**, a faith worshipping a good god of Heavens as an antipode to a bad god dwelling in the underworld. Most pastoralists all over the world confess a sort of dualist faith opposing the good god of heavens (Hebrew Jehovah, Persian Ormuzd or Ahura Mazda) to his bad brother or eternal adversary (Hebrew Satan, Muslim Sheitun, Persian Ahriman).

The names Tengri, Tagaro and Tagalo refer to the earliest ancestors of fishermen's tribes. Tagalo seems to refer to descendants of Tungus fishermen with *l*-plurals who settled down as the Chinese Dungans, the Taiwanese and

the Tagalog in the Philippines. The Telugu in South India were their distant kinsmen but came with a different branch through Afghanistan. On the other hand, Tagaro and Tengri may be greeted as divine ancestors of Turks and all Palaeo-Turcoid tribes speaking languages with *r*-plurals. Their early ancestors (Etruscans – *Tyrrhenes*, Iberians – *Hiberni*, Kimmerians - *Cimbri*) belonged to two stocks of ancient Sea Peoples plundering the southern seas with pirate raids. Owing to their nutrition and post-dwellings on the seaside, lakeside or riverside, the ancients called them *ichthyofagi* 'fish-eaters' or 'piscivores'.

Their myths all tend to dream about catching a shark or hunting the skull of a strong warrior. Another goal granting the highest bliss was being swallowed by a shark or being killed by a strong warrior because it guaranteed a transformation into the body of a strong killer. This **transmigrationism** was typical of ancient beliefs confessed by all fishermen's primitive tribes. It rested in a specific idea of after-death life giving human souls a chance to survive by migrating and transforming into an animal shape. The Palaeo-Mongolian races never held elderly persons in high respect and in times of starvation, they expelled them into the wilderness. The Eskimo set them on a floating floe while the ancient Jews exposed them in the desert so that they might fall a prey to wild vultures. The seafarers deposed their dead by sinking their bodies down into the sea depths. The Dravidians who are akin to the Old Indian Sivaists burnt them and threw their ashes into the river. They all worshipped the water element and used it in a wide variety of **purification** rites. Christians inherited them in the rite of christening and, as is obvious from Empedocles' *Katharmoi* 'Purifications', their clear vestiges were present also in Pythagoreism.

Pastoralist dualism. The big-game hunters were of Uraloid and Bascoid stock and their dualism resembled faiths confessed by fishermen's tribes. The opposition of the god and the devil is common to most cattle-breeders of Africa including the Massai and the Hottentots. Their dualism developed from **totemism** and its higher stage **animism** that bow to animal ancestors, lake-spirits, forest-spirits and mountain-spirits. The Bascoid branch worshipped feline totems, cats, lions, sphinxes and jaguars (the Olmecs in America). Leonine sphinxes stood in front of pyramids in Egyptian Thebes but they also vexed Oidipus' mind as enigmas haunting Greek Thebes. All their architecture, graves, mounds, churches and town-halls, was based on stone vaulting, on domes and cupola-shaped buildings out of large heavy megalith stones. The Greek *tholos* referred to Menelaos' sepulchre as well as the town-hall in the *agora* of Athens. The Peruvian Quechua called it *chulpa*, the Beaker Folk in Britain *cairn*, the Russians *khourgan*, the Anatolians *maussoleion* and the Moslims *mosca*. The Bascoids also became part of legends about one-eyed Cyclopes brandishing shields with the sun symbol. At dawn on solstice

holidays they waited for the first sun beam to light the stone array and point to the sacred treasury.

The Uraloids worshipped as their totem ancestors wolves and confessed also a sort of **lycanthropy**, a belief in people able to turn into werewolves over night. They also confessed fatalism and nagualism assuming that every man has a fate hidden in a live animal (Indian *nahuatl*) and may decease by killing this animal *Alter Ego*. In the Russian fairy-tale Kostey the Immortal the hero may kill the bad wizard only by shooting down the duck that acts as his nagualist *Alter Ego*. The duck will drop an egg and breaking this egg will terminate the wizard's life. His fate encoded in the egg is called *ört* 'destiny' and has probably a common origin with the Old Germanic *Wyrde* 'fate'. The bird, egg and tree play important roles also in the myths concerning the Creation of the World. At the very beginning there was a World Egg lying in a nest on the World Tree and hatched by the World Bird (Uralian *ukko* 'duck', Russian *utka*). The Uralic tribes had remote kinsmen in Mongolians, Buryats, Sarmatians, Assyrians and Normans, who all had a very strong military organisation and used this for subduing populations of peaceful neighbours. Their raids and conquests allowed them to rule as an aristocratic upper class in large empires. From hunting big game they passed to horse-riding and breeding cattle so as to reach the highest stage, breeding the man, serf and slave. Practically every heroic epic all over the world may be attributed to their *bogatyrs* 'warriors' and singers. Medieval heroic epics and romances are full of allusions to Palaeo-Mongolian mythology even if we are unable to trace the eastern descent of their heroes.

This brief outline of **substantial ideography** has conveyed one important message: prehistoric tribes merged into medieval castes and prehistoric ethnic myths merged into social layers of medieval cultures. When the French historians Guizot, Thiers, Mignet and Thierry analysed the early medieval history of France, they clearly distinguished *le clergé, l'aristocratie, la bourgeoisie et le peuple*. They realised that what looked like one kingdom, language and nation had actually concealed different castes and estates: the Merovingians reigned over their Frankish chaplains and they both held the rule over the Gauls enslaved as the commons. Their history, architecture, art and literature were made up from several races, several types of languages, several ethnic cultures and oral traditions. Most ancient and medieval cultures were divided into the following five traditions:

Heroics: heroic epic, *Heldenlied, Heldenepos, Lobgesang*
Gallantry: courtiers' culture at medieval courts, *courtoisie, Minnesang*
Scholastics: clerical culture cultivated by medieval clergy and monasteries
Sophistry: ancient secular science Ancient Greek logography and sophistics
Fabulistics: ancient popular culture of fables and popular iambography.

In the medieval society every caste, estate or guild cultivated their own autonomous tradition that enjoyed a permanent continuation in their local independent milieu but now and then it penetrated to the surface as the **official culture**. If a period of literature was flooded by a wave of fables, comedies of humour or epic songs and cosmic dualism, it did not mean that mankind made a new cultural discovery and a literary genius invented a new genre. It simply meant that one ethnic tradition emerged to prominence owing to a military conquest or a social movement. Other ethnic traditions did not disappear but only receded and withdrew into the social background. Periodic revivals and declines in the history of literature, arts, language, philosophy and science had one common **social cause**: at the top of society there appeared a new class of people with a different ethnic tradition and had managed to establish this tradition as the official cultural standard.

Owing to mixed multiethnic populations merging into modern nations, French cultural history looks like the spiritual ripening of one Romance, French or Gallic people. But the genuine Gauls represented only a majority of lower-class townsfolk remarkable for witty satiric folklore springing from the treasury of their *esprit gaulois*. Every second century brought a new revival of popular protest and Protestantism that brushed old popular legends and restored to life a new era of popular realistic literature. Every revival was, however, followed by a century of counter-reformation accompanied by a rise of upper-class culture flourishing at courts. Its heydays came with the Merovingian, Frankish and Norman *courtoisie* and knight's gallantry flourishing in Arthurian romances and troubadours' love lyric.

Table 49 outlines the cultural growth in medieval France to illustrate the theoretical model of literary evolution and introduce convenient terms for classifying its elementary categories. Cultural progress is explained as a flowing river of emerging and immersing old ethnic traditions on higher and higher levels. Historical development is symbolised by the curve of economic development that gives relay to different classes and at intervals it shifts their cultures to the foreground, or dooms them temporarily to oblivion. If a social caste seized the political power, it installed its language and culture as the **official standard** and made its folklore protrude as the dominant mainstream of the historical period. It did not have to devise its ceremonies and official ideology anew because it could adjust old legends and rites for new purposes. Every revival started with imitating earlier precursors and lauding classics because the urgent need longing for new forms lacked convenient substance. Old substance does not perish but survives as inertial passive matter and waits for new generations of creative geniuses who will mould it into a new shape. Departing generations should be discarded out of consideration as epigones

because they defend outdated standards mixed inorganically with ideals of younger generations.



Table 49 *A theoretical model of the cultural process*

Historical Ideography

Revisiting categories presupposes acknowledging that they cannot be reduced to isolated ideas, works, authors and nations but rest in more essential entities: epochs, trends, genres, paradigms and processes. The scope of study in cultural sciences is the **cultural process** conceived as a dynamic totality of cultural activities throughout history in a given area or civilisation. Its basic segments are cycles of various length that principally coincide with social and economic cycles. This implies a mapping φ of the social process into the cultural process and a general homomorphism of their social and cultural segments. Such homomorphism holds good if trends and cycles are regarded as dynamic statistic tendencies and naïve readers do not mistake them for real historical phenomena (real regimes, real literary schools etc.). A **trend** is defined as a dynamic wave of ideas, books, works, artefacts, discussions and

social activities united by one dominant direction and concentrated in a short-term period, not exceeding one decade. Every trend exhibits a dynamic curve with a starting-phase (onset), the medial phase and the final phase (termination). Trends are associated closely with **generations**, with age groups fighting for new standards of taste against older generations in power.

The most difficult point about **cultural dynamics** is its concern with invisible ghost-like entities where **cultural statics** can offer visible and palpable things (works, symbols, texts, authors). Trends are not real movements and social groupings of real people but invisible fashions whose parallel rule in the literary, aesthetic, religious and scientific process can be revealed by only a tedious statistic analysis. Every trend brings a new **cultural paradigm** that may be defined as an axiological system of values, standards and norms pervading the whole society but primarily inspiring the young generation that intuitively grasps them as the only possible cultural and economic strategy. These norms are projected into different cultural fields and cultural genres in a way that is difficult to understand and explain but may be evidenced safely by historical statistics. A **genre** may be defined as a kind of cultural tradition associated with a definite social **rite**, e.g. comedy and tragedy originated in religious processions. Every trend defines a **cultural paradigm**, a set of social attitudes associated by one common vision of the world projected simultaneously into different cultural genres.

A simple way of defining a system of terms segmenting the cultural progress may be proposed by means of Noam Chomsky's generative grammars. Instead of standard rewrite rules with $\rightarrow$, we prefer to use common defining equations:

$$formation = macroregime1 + macroregime2 + \ldots$$
$$macroregime = regime1 + regime2 + \ldots$$
$$cycle = trend1 + trend2 + \ldots$$
$$\varphi(macroregime) = \varphi(regime1 + regime2) = trend1 + trend2$$
$$trend = literary\ paradigm + religious\ paradigm + scientific\ paradigm \ldots$$
$$paradigm = genre1 + genre2 + \ldots$$
$$Merovingian\ paradigm = Heldenlied + Heldenepos + Lobgesang + \ldots$$

Changing waves of political, artistic and literary taste involve different cultural styles such as 'classicism', 'sentimentalism' or 'realism'. Such waves represent gushes of changing social attitudes that are difficult to describe, let alone to count and measure. Measurable units can be found only in a set of books published during one year (newspaper articles would not form a reliable statistic specimen of higher informative value). This method was called **ideometry** and applied to the history of Greek, Roman, English, French and German literature. Figures of at least twenty titles in different literary genres

are sufficient to describe the dynamic tectonics of a literary wave that becomes a **dominant trend** in 5-to-8-year periods. A detailed description of ideometric methods is given in chapter on literary history (see the legend appended to the historical map on Table 52.

A subjective moment of statistic evaluation comes when deciding whether a given artefact is a classicist, sentimental novel or realistic novel. Regular patterns of trends are slurred by **transitional movements** in popular realistic literature whose influence must be subtracted in order to calculate neat statistic profiles of ruling literary elites. The dominant trends of elites and the subdominant movements of popular realistic literature Needless to say, a useful method of verification is to carry out an independent statistic analysis of artistic production in music, sculpture and other fine arts. If various cultural fields attempt to set up their own specific taxonomy, all serious attempts fail and converge to one common system of taxonomy with a similar classification of trends. This is why they have to be kept together under one cover and one term. A usable classification of literary and artistic trends co-ordinated with science, religion and philosophy is proposed in Table 38.

CULTURAL SCIENCES

Literary History and *Kunsthistorie*

The first step to scientific literary history requires acknowledging that literature is a live part of the cultural, social and economic process that activates and feeds with blood all arms of society. It should be defined as ‘a study of the literary process’ (F. Vodička) involving authors, their works and changing esthetic norms. It should provide its deep economic and statistic analysis because some authors claim that there is little difference between industrial and **literary production** (J. Baudrillard 1981). Its goal is not to deliver exulted laudatory hagiographic tirades on individual poets but to study dynamic changes in the aesthetic standards radiated from the society as a whole and consider them as expressions of its aesthetic visions sublimating in its participants’ mind as a mirror of inmost needs. No zoologist would ever conceive evolution as laudatory harangues on outstanding representatives of domestic cattle and none could imagine lecturing modern biology as the study an abstract animal without outlining the contours of systematic phylogenesis. The same holds good *mutatis mutandis* for literary theory and history, their concern is not with a general work of art or individual works regarded as arbitrary purposeful creations of creative personalities. Both should concede the dominant role of aesthetic norms obsessing large throngs of authors to create similar genres inspired by similar ideals and conveyed in similar form.

Given a literary or artistic work of art, we need an apparatus establishing its membership relation to general categories as regards cultural trends, epochs and other historical co-ordinates. Most literary historians never worry about such attribution because they notice only explicit allegiance to literary schools that authors hardly ever conceal and neglect unconscious submission to impersonal literary standards of the times. They imagine that literary authors build their collected works in the same way as prophets write a biblical canon for the sect of their faithful worshippers. Instead of tracing how Victor Hugo or Immanuel Kant changed their cultural attitudes with the changing times, they approach their works as one stately temple forming an integrated architectural whole endowed with a sacred mission to convey some deeper esoteric wisdom. This religious approach to literature is utterly fallacious because there were several independent Hugos and Kants working on different poetical and philosophical systems, each acting as a spokesman of a different epoch. As Picasso had his ‘pink period‘ distinct from his ‘blue period‘, so they experienced several creative periods that filed them up into different offensive troops and made them fight different combats in battle arrays with their contemporaries. The martial and cultural history cannot be crumbled into

individual skirmishes between individual soldiers but concerns the fates of nations and huge masses of people who fought for their material existence and better tomorrows. Literary historians should trace the flux of literary production in the historical process of making, they should record battles and count literary armies including captives and casualties. Literary, artistic and philosophic trends engage in frictions and clashes that are more similar to theological disputes than strategic operations of armies in civil wars but they usually pursue the same historical cause. Literature and arts are only continuation of warfare with other means.

Literary historians pursue other calling than literary readers who worship literary prophets, martyrs and saints and enjoy aesthetic pleasures of the Holy Communion in the sanctuaries of art. Their discipline has a long record of *histoire sans noms* ('history without names') surveying large-scale historical processes without reducing them to isolated authors and works. One line of such studies was initiated by W. Dilthey (1911: 3-4) and G. Simmel (1921) in the beginning of the 20th century. Their followers in literary history and *Kunsthistorie* devised theoretical principles of German *Ideengeschichte* (R. Unger, H. Glockner, H. Cysarz, H. Wölfflin, H. Nohl). Their approach deeply influenced the guidelines of the '*history of ideas*' that became popular in English-speaking countries (A. Toynbee 1932; A Lovejoy 1941). A new wave of interest in *histoire sans noms* came in the 20's with the vogue of sociologism and once more after the war (A. Hauser 1958, 1975: 89ff.).

Modern sociology of art returned to studying the literary process in the 70's when Michel Foucault (1966, 1971) and his followers paid heed to the study of cultural paradigms (*épistémes*), cultural patterns of epochs separated by radical revolutions (*ruptures*). The American critic Frederic Jameson applied his ideas to the Marxist theory of art and called such paradigms 'aesthetic ideology'. One of the side-road outgrowths was **ideography** as a discipline concerned with mapping cultural trends on chronological maps and historical diagrams. Supporters of formal approaches took efforts to apply statistic procedures common in modern demography and demometry. Such analysis was provided by **ideometry** as a method of statistic description of cultural processes. Its ultimate was *histoire sans nommes* resulting in statistic curves of literary production that measured its fluxion, density, speed, ursurges and ebbs.

The cognitive import of ideography may be illustrated by the chronological map of English literary development on Table 52. It attempts to include also a good historical survey of trends in linguistic studies in order to demonstrate that there is a meaningful *liaison* between art and scientific methodology. This chronological map records literary trends according to data obtained by a statistic analysis described on the ideometric map of Table 51. The basic idea is that the literary process may be made measurable by counting its smallest

units, books and booklets published in various genres during one year. Table 50 gives a list of symbols applied in the ideometric analysis: literary genres are denoted by different types of letters (bold face, italics, silhouette, relief) while trends are designated by vowels according to literary styles: *a* - classicism, *e* – sensualism, sentimentalism, elegism, *i* – formalism, *o* – realism, *u* – traditionalism, *y* – monumentalism.

The cultural growth of English literature and English linguistic studies is a process occurring in a 3-dimensional space (time *x* place *x* social hierarchy). In Table 52 the geographical axis was omitted but, theoretically speaking, it should organically complete the yearly chronology (vertical axis) plotted against social hierarchy (horizontal axis). Table 51 records social stratification by filing popular literature in left columns and official literature in right columns. If coded symbols of different genres tend to form clouds of higher density, their groupings are called **trends**. For instance, the years 1596-1601 in Elizabethan England brought a wave of essays, satiric pamphlets, characters, portrays and comedies of humours (Jonson, Chapman, Day, Breton) that may be called 'humoralism'. This philosophy of saps in the human body influencing human temperament is common to most of popular satire and should be classified as a type of a more general taxon called **realism** The statistic diagram on Table 50 records all occurrences of popular realism by the vowel *O-o,* the upper-case letter being reserved for official literature and the lower-case letter being left for popular literature. Different literary genres are represented by different types of characters: prose by plain characters, poetry by bold characters, dramatic genres by italics and essays by understriking.

Any systematic classification of literary and artistic trends presupposes adopting a systematic code of **designation** where every trend has a standard name specifying its particular term and general taxon, chronology, duration and geographic distribution. A **code** of a trend must contain standardised general term (*taxon*), accepted in general by the academic public, orientation code (*index*), widely used 'nickname' (*catchword*), geographic area (*zone*), historical co-ordinates (*epoch*) and social status (*stratum*):

CODE = **Taxon** *Index* [catchword, epoch, zone, stratum]
Realism F1596-1GBp ["*Humoralism, Jonson's clan*", England 1596-1601, popular]
Formalism L1928-3CEa ["*Prague School*", Czechoslovakia 1928-1933, academic]
Formalism S1928-3CEa ["*Wienerschule*", Austria 1928-1933, academic]

The Prague School is classified by a unique taxon **Formalism** L1928-3Cea coding the following legend: "*a formally oriented **l**inguistic trend lasting from 1928 to 1933 in **a**cademic circles of **C**entral **E**urope"*. Its dating reveals it as a geographic variant of **Formalism** S1928-3CEa read as "*a formally oriented **s**cientific movement trend lasting from 1928 to 1933 in **a**cademic circles of*

***C**entral **E**urope*“. The literary activities of Ben Jonson’s generation are denoted by index **Realism** F1596-1GBp reading as *“a realistic trend in the **p**opular literary **f**iction of **G**reat **B**ritain lasting from 1596 to 1601“*.

GENRE	TYPE	TYPEFACE PRINT	SYMBOL
left-wing	x u	lower-case letters	o
right-wing	X U	upper-case letters	O
POETRY	**V v**	**bold**	VO = **O**
SATIRE	~~F~~ ~~f~~	~~double-cross~~	FO = ~~O~~
EPIC	O o	silhouette bold	OU = *U*
NOVEL	R r	ordinary basic	R0 = O
SHORT STORY	P p	silhouette type	PO = O
DRAMA	*D d*	*italics*	DO = *O*
TRAGEDY	*T t*	*italics*	TO = *O*
COMEDY	*C c*	*silhouette italics*	CO = *O*
OPERA	~~Q~~ ~~q~~	~~single-cross~~	QO = ~~O~~
MASQUE	~~*M*~~ ~~*m*~~	~~*single-cross italics*~~	MO = ~~*O*~~
ESSAY	E e	understriking	EU = U
SCIENCE	E e	understriking	Eo = o
JOURNALS	**J j**	**bold understriking**	JO = **O**
EVENTS	*X x*	*italics & understriking*	XO = *O*
PAINTING	A a	relief	AO = O
SCULTURE	I i	bold relief	IO = I

CULTURAL STYLE	SIGN	IDEOLOGY
CLASSICISM	**A a**	normative philologism prescriptive analogism illuminative encyclopaedism
SENSUALISM	**E a**	sentimentalism, elegism exotic geographism, diffusionism
FORMALISM	**I i**	formal logicism panlogism
REALISM	**O o**	sociologism, evolutionism popular realism
TRADITIONALISM	**U u**	hermetism, psychologism antiquarianism
MONUMENTALISM	**Y y**	heroism militantism

Table 50 *The coding tables of symbols applied by statistic ideometry*



CLASSICISM
utopias: Thomas More
pastoral eclogues: Barklay, J. Skelton
court satire: Skelton
humanist philology: Colet, Lily, Grocyn
materialist physics: Linacre

Humanism: Linacre, More,Colet



COURT ELEGISM
Skelton‘s love lyric
at the Tudor‘s court



REFORMATION
monasteries abolished
Church reform
Bible translated
POPULAR REALISM

Protestant philology
translations, editions



TRIDENT COUNTER-REFORMATION
Mary Tudor
RELIGIOUS TRADITIONALISM

martyrologic exegetics



MONUMENTALISM
Queen Elisabeth enthroned
Puritan revival

new normativism

ELIZABETHAN CLASSICISM
Gascoigne’s circle


EUPHUISM
ELEGISM
defences
of poetry
HUMORALISM
comedies of humours
Ben Jonson‘s school
SHAKESPEAREAN
HERMETISM
JACOBEAN
DECADENCE
NEO-CLASSICISM
Jonson‘s idyllic masques
Bacon: The New Atlantis


CIVILISM
CAVALIERS'SENSUALISM
POPULAR
PURITANISM
METAPHYSICAL
HERMETISM


MONUMENTAL HEROISM
METAPHYSICAL HERMETISM
Antiquarianism
Prescriptive
Analogism
HEROIC ELEGISM
Exotic
Geographism
war
peace
plague
rebellions
WHIG DEISM
Liberal
Economists


CATASTROPHISM
Modernism
Solipsism
POPEAN CLASSICISM
Normative
Philologism
Geographism
é = picaresque realism


Moralism
CHURCHYARD POETRY
TRADITIONALISM
New Clericalism
JOHNSONIAN CLASSICISM
Encyclopaedism
MACPHERSONIAN
REGIONALISM
Antiquarianism


STERNEAN
SENTIMENTALISM
Geographism
UTILITARIANISM
GOTHIC ROMANTICISM
Feminism
Blakean anarchism
LAKE SCHOOL ROMANTICISM
Antiquarianism


BYRONIAN CLASSICISM
Philologism
SCOTTISH MONUMENTALISM & ANTI-CLASSICISM
Exotic Geographism
MODISH SENSUALISM
DICKENSIAN REALISM
Comparative Evolutionism


Logical Formalism
PRE-RAPHAELITE ROMANTICISM
CARROLLIAN FORMALISM
Antiquarianism
GASKELLIAN CLASSICISM
Positivism
DARWINIAN EVOLUTIONISM
FORMALISM
Anti-Darwinism


FABIAN SOCIALISM
Sociologism
YEATSIAN DECADENCE
WELLSIAN UTOPISM
Psychologism
Physiologism
GEORGIAN VITALISM
Diffusionist Geographism



Freudian Sociologism

METAPHYSICAL TRADITIONALISM



JOYCEAN MODERNISM

WAR-TIME APOCALYPTISM



Psychologism

POST-WAR CLASSICISM



Encyclopaedism

CIVILISM: ANGRY YOUNG MEN



Empirical Sociologism



Table 51 *An ideometric map of English literary and linguistic trends*

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

1548 **MARY TUDOR**
1549 **COUNTER-REFORMATION**
1550 Mary Tudor married Edward
1551
1552
1553
1554
1555 Queen Mary burned 287 persons
1556 her martyrs were archbishop Cranmer
1557 and bishops Hooper, Ridley, Latimer
1558 Mary Tudor died
1559 Queen Elisabeth enthroned
1560 her proclamation of Anglicanism
1561
1562
1563
1564
1565 **MONUMENTALISM**
1566 Puritan revival
1567 Puritan martyrology
1568 John Knox
1569
1570 **Antiquarianism**:
1571 Matthew Parker
1572 *De Antiquitate Britannicae Ecclesiae* 1573
1573
1574
1575 **poetic anthologies:**
1576 G.Gascoigne:
1577 *Sundrie Flowers*
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1587

Trident council's permanent sessions 1546-1547

RELIGIOUS TRADITIONALISM

Jesuits abandon England

ELIZABETHAN ABSOLUTISM
CLASSICISM
Spenser's eclogues
The Shepherd's Calendar 1579

EUPHUISM
Lyly's *Euphues*

COURT ELEGISM

romantic comedy: Peele, Munday, Greene

1588 Marprelate controversy
1589 Antipuritanism
1590 **PLATONIC ELEGISM**
1591 **elegy**: Davies, Daniel, Constable
1592 Drayton, Lodge, Percy
1593 **exotic tragedy**: Marlowe
1594 Nashe, Kyd
1595 pauper revolts in 1595
1596
1597 **Comedy of Humours**: Jonson,
1598 Marston, Day, Heywood
1599 essays, characters: F. Bacon, J. Hall
1600
1601
1602
1603 **SPIRITUALISM**
1604 religious traditionalism
1605 **tragedy of suffering**:
1606 Shakespeare: *Hamlet* 1602
1607 metaphysical poetry: Campion, Davies, Donne
1608 Catholic theology: J. Donne
1609
1610 **decadent tragedy of passion:**
1611 Shakespeare: *King Lear*
1612 Chapman: *Bussy d'Ambois*
1613 Marston: *The Insatiate Countesse*
1614 Fletcher: *Valentinianus*
1615
1616
1618 Jonson: *The Golden Age Restored*
1619 Jonson‘s idyllic masques
1620 masques, pastorals, eclogues
1621 Bacon: *The New Atlantis*
1622
1624
1625 pauperism, plague
1626 **PARLIAMENTARY PURITANISM**
1627 Puritan opposition: Eliot, Pym, Hampden
1628 they passed Petition of Right
1629 **Bourgeois realism**: Dekker

CLASSICISM


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1667
CAVALIER ELEGISM
Gilded Youth
court decadence
Cavaliers
Herrick
Suckling
Lovelace
Hedonism
Puritan opposition
W. Prynne
Paris exiles
Hobbes
Cowley
Taylor
Puritan
Revolution
Milton
Marwel
Hartlib
Utopian
Sociologism
METAPHYSICAL
HERMETISM
Vaughan
Crashaw
Cambridge Platonism
astrology
MONUMENTAL HEROISM
colonial opera
Davenant
Dryden
Antiquarianism
war
peace
plague
rebellions
DRYDENIAN CLASSICISM
Dryden
Cowley
anti-Puritan
satire
Normative
Philologism
Waller & Marwell
controversy


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1706
CIVILISM
revival of
empirical
sciences
Empirism
civil
comedy
Shadwell
Settle
HEROIC ELEGISM
modish comedy
A. Behn
N. Lee
Whig
opposition
Deists &
Latitudinarians
Tory
burlesque
Whig revolution
Liberal Economists
Petty Locke
North Child
TORY MODERNISM
Moderns vs. Ancients controversy
burlesque drama
burlesque satire
Modernism
MONUMENTAL HEROISM
heroic epic
Blackmore
religious epic
Berkeley‘s
Solipsism


1707 Whig journalism
1708 Marlborough
1709 Addison
1710 Steel
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1748
POPEAN CLASSICISM
Pope
Swift
King
Arbuthnot
Normative Philologism
Prescriptive Analogism
Whig liberalism
Law‘s inflation reforms
free-thinkers
J. Toland
A. Philips
Aestheticism
Whig utopianism
Defoe
PICARESQUE
REALISM
Defoe
Chetwood
Geographism
Exotism
Swiftian
anti-utopism
DOMESTIC
REALISM
Moralism
CHURCHYARD POETRY
New Tory Conservativism
Walpole‘s cabinet overthrown
Grave-school poetry: Gray, Young
New Clericalism


JOHNSONIAN CLASSICISM
S. Johnson
H. Fielding
T. Smollett
Prescriptive
Analogism
Encyclopaedism
Normative
Philologism
MACPHERSONIAN
REGIONALISM
Macpherson
Chatterton
Percy
Antiquarianism
STERNEAN
SENTIMENTALISM
L. Sterne
O. Goldsmith
H. Brooke
Exotism
Geographism
CRABBEAN TRIVIAL REALISM
G. Crabbe
R. Sheridan
Utilitarianism
J. Bentham
T. Malthus
A. Smith


1790
1791
1792 Blakean anarchism
1793 W. Blake
1794 W. Godwin
1795 T. Holcroft
1796 Feminism
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1800
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1813 `Cockney School‘
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GOTHIC ROMANTICISM
A. Radcliffe
M. L. Lewis
BALLADIC FATALISM
CATASTROPHISM
Lake School
Wordsworth
Coleridge
Southey
Scott
Antiquarianism
SHELLEYAN
ANARCHO-COMMUNISM
Shelley
Byron
Keats
Hunt
Edinburgh
Reviewers
SCOTTISH
REGIONALISM
W. Scott
J. Hogg
J. Galt
BYRONIC TITANISM
Antiquarianism
naval novel
F. Marryat
rogue novel
Exotism
Geographism
MODISH
SENSUALSM
Disraeli
De Quincy
Bulwer-Lytton
silver fork novel


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1870
Comparative Evolutionism
DICKENSIAN REALISM
CHARTISM
Punch sketches
and cartoons
Dickens
Thackeray
Oxford
Movement
Newman
Keble
NONSENSE FORMALISM
Edward Lear
J. S. Mills and
his formal logic
Logical Formalism
SENTIMENTAL
PHILANTHROPISM
Ch. Dickens
E. Gaskell
H. Smith
CHRISTIAN
SOCIALISM
Ch. Kingley
D. Maurice
PRE-RAPHAELITE
TRADITIONALISM
Rossettis
J. Ruskin
Antiquarianism
Archaism
Tennyson
Swinburne
HEROIC
MONUMENTALISM
Encyclopaedism
Positivism
PROLETARIAN
REALISM
G. Eliot
E. Gaskell
IDYLLISM
A. Tennyson
UTOPIANISM
J. Ruskin
Darwinian Evolutionism
Ch. Darwin
H. Spencer
G. Meredith
A. Trollope


world crisis
ANTI-UTOPIANISM
Anti-Darwinism
S. Butler
W. Mallock
CARROLL'S
FORMALISM
L. Carroll
Formalism
FABIAN
REALISM
Shaw
Gissing
Sociologism
Economism
CELTIC
DECADENCE
W. B. Yeats
A. Machen
Hermetism
Psychologism
Interpretive
Anomalism
WELLSIAN UTOPIANISM
H. Wells
G. B. Shaw
E. A. Bennett
Physical Relativism
ANTI-UTOPISM
H. Belloc
G. K. Chesterton
Distributionism

1911 **GEORGIAN VITALISM**
1912 Bridges
1913 Noyes
1914 Binyon
1915 ***Diffusionism***
1916 ***Geographism***
1917
1918
1919 E. M. Forster
1920 D. H. Lawrence
1921 ***Biographic Vitalism***
1922
1923
1924 **JOYCEAN**
1925 **MODERNISM**
1926 W. Woolf
1927 J. Joyce
1928 T. S. Eliot
1929 ***Freudian Sociologism***
1930
1931
1932 **Anti-Fascism**
1933 Auden
1934 Spender
1935 Day-Lewis **TRADITIONALISM**
1936 conservatism
1937 T. S. Eliot
1938 E. Waugh
1939
1940 **APOCALYPTIC HERMETISM**
1941 ***Holist Perspectivism***
1942 H. Treece
1943 D. Thomas
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1947 **POST-WAR CLASSICISM**
1948 C. P. Snow
1949 G. Greene
1950 ***Encyclopaedism***
1951 **New Right**
1952


Empiric
Sociologism
CIVILISM
Angry Young Man
Amis
Larkin
Osborne
Generative Formalism
BRADBURIAN
STRUCTURALISM
M. Bradbury
D. Lodge
French students revolt
New Left
MAOIST LEFTISM
D. Storey
J. McGrath
T. Eagleson
Sociologism
THATCHERITE
CONSERVATIVE
TRADITIONALISM
M. Amis
PUNK
POSTMODERNIST
CATASTROPHISM
New Age
M. Lamb
Ecologism
POSTMODERNIST
HERMETISM
MacEwan
ANARCHISM



Table 52 *A map of British cultural, literary and linguistic trends*

The Methodology of Science

Most people adhere to the cumulationist conception of cultural progress assuming that the European history of science is one undivided **spiritual tradition** in which new knowledge accumulates and grows to reach higher ad higher syntheses. Modern philosophers of science (T. S. Kuhn 1965, 1970; P. K. Feyerabend 1989; I. Lakatos 1971) refuted cumulationist views by proofs that human knowledge does not march forth in linear curves but waves in the same rhythm of rises and declines as other phenomena in nature. As there are periods of ‘shadow’, ‘grey’, ‘dark’, ‘black’ and ’brown economics’, there are perpetual returns of ‘shadow’, ‘grey’, ‘dark’, ‘black’ and ’brown science’, fully corresponding to the wealth and health of the social body. Science can prosper only in countries with bright healthy economics when accelerated by rapid industrial growth. In dark ages it periodically dies and gives way to religious scholastics marching hand in hand with black occult sciences. Occult science is a disease of scientific thought that infects the social brain in several gradual phases and distorts its texture to the extent of reaching the lethal stage.

Cultural streams in literature and methodology do not arise as inventions of geniuses lasting in an eternal tradition but form periodically repeated waves that reflect changes in social and economic values and guide human collective behaviour in the same way as our glands and hormones. Methods change together with attitudes, opinions, tastes and manners, appearing successively as incubation phases of an epidemic disease. This recipe for treating metaphysics

was proposed by one of its most remarkable rebuilders Carl Jasper, who later assisted Heidegger in founding *Existenzphilosophie* as an influential stream of modern German cultural thought. In his young days he published a study *Psychopathologie der Weltanschauungen* (1921) in which he recommended to study political ideologies as mental disorders. He noticed that cultural opinions tide and ebb and spread like epidemics of contagious diseases. They plague human thought with the same atrocity as real pestilence and cause also similar fatal catastrophic disasters.

As different cycles of economic growth shift the focus to social engineering (eunomy), aesthetic design (esthonomy), industrial technology (technonomy), consumers' masses (demonomy) and finance (plutonomy), so the progress of science shifts its focus on universal encyclopaedic knowledge (eusophy), aesthetics (esthosophy), applied technology (technosophy), sociology (demosophy) and financial magic (idolosophy). Science always concentrates on truth and objective knowledge so its cultural contribution does not consist of ideologic lies but rests in different epistemic models of deforming reality. Religion and science seem to fight as irreconcilable enemies but they both move the hand of the historical clock to go clockwise, the former by devising false illusions and the latter by disclosing true knowledge. They do exert energy in opposite directions but their forces act on opposite ends of the lever and help rotate it in the clockwise direction.

The psychopathology of mental disorders in science must naturally start from the state of their absence when the patient is in a perfect healthy state. As is made clear by examples from Classic Greece, the Renaissance or Enlightment (autarcheum), rational creative science may exist undisturbed only in state-controlled societies with a state-supported system of school education. In such bureaucratic societies the state supports 'royal academies' and can afford contributing subsidies to education and academic research. The state-controlled school system promotes secular science and impartial objective knowledge where the church-controlled school systems of dark ages subordinate these to religious faith. The first stage of every bright age brings political regimes of centralist state bureaucracy (eucracy) displaying academic systems of science called eusophy (good wisdom, rational knowledge). Eusophy is a philosophical paradigm exhibiting several standard symptoms:

- *Euphoria utopistica*: social engineering and utopian dreaming about an ideal planned, state-controlled society serving effectively the natural needs of the collective public wealth and all common people.
- *Euphoria pantheistica*: cosmic optimism combined with a fervent love for the physical and material nature enlivened by human and divine energy.

- *Euphoria encyclopaedica:* enthusiastic love of objective knowledge, rationality, science, education, literature and arts as vital instruments of humanitarian enlightment, spiritual illumination and human perfection.
- *Pamphilia humanistica*: all-embracing love for the unbroken and unspoilt human nature, belief in emancipation proclaiming equality between all nations and human races, ideals of a healthy mind in a healthy body.

Eusophia is a stage of healthy cultural conditions known in the Renaissance humanism or French encyclopaedism in the mid-18th century. Its science is characterised by humanism, historical optimism (belief in historical progress), encyclopaedism, physicalism (emphasis on cosmic physics), materialism (the primacy of the material nature), uniformism (all areas of social life observe prescriptions, regulation, standardisation and uniformity) and normativism (all phenomena should have their standard moderate measure). Humanists tended to write political utopias about ideal monarchs and states and compiled manuals instructing young princes how to rule, run their estates and practice animal husbandry. Encyclopaedists wrote compendious manuals, handbooks and encyclopaedias giving instruction in universal knowledge.

All utopists dream about constructing future ideal societies (*Aufbau*) but all economic cycles had an alternative program of a gradual erosion of utopias, their perpetual deconstruction (*Abbau*). In due course every ’positive utopia’ painting blissful idylls expires and decays into a ‘negative utopia’ that depicts the world as a nightmare. The first stage in this metamorphosis are ‘sentimental utopias’ that lose the cosmic historical perspective and plunge into everyday personal life. The humanists of the Augustan Age (Virgil, Horace, Varro) faced the opposition of the Gilded Youth and young elegiac poets (Tibullus, Propertius, Ovid) who wrote elegies about fictive beauties and poetic epistles about *ars amatoria*. Such periods pay attention to aesthetics, court revels, naval adventures and elegant rhetoric skilled in *ars poetica*. Their paradigm is **esthosophy** with these symptoms:

- *Sensualitas amatoria*: the disease of love manifested in desire for an idealised sweetheart, the courteous cult of a beautiful noble lady in the medieval *Minnesang* and Provensal *courtoisie*.
- *Sensualitas aesthetica*: focus on aesthetic pleasures, ideals of beauty, pleasure-seeking Epicureism and voluptuous sensualism.
- *Sensualitas intima*: intimism as a philosophy of everyday private life.

The second step in overcoming utopism is made by ‘zero utopias’ that indulge in scientific formalism. Technocratic antiutopias turn attention to applied sciences because the rapid industrial growth requires transition from universal science to applied technology. Their scientific philosophy may be called **technosophy** because it meets historic demands of technocracies and

technocratic engineering elites that come to the rule in the heydays of industrial revolution. Technosophy loves logic, mathematics and geometry because it has lost a sense of beauty, reality, cosmos and history. Young technocrats signal their ascent by a deep methodological scepsis, by depolitisation, weariness and fatigue from social utopias. Their „*vision du monde*" (L. Goldmann 1964) has abandoned natural idylls and frozen into geometric abstractions and cold numbers. Their mind suffers from a loss of all social and historical illusions, a loss of sensibility and sense of historical progress. It is vexed by a syndrome of stupor with several symptoms:

- *Stupor formalis*: formalist artism and an unhealthy admiration for empty forms, cold abstractions and formal signs.
- *Stupor geometricus*: the loss of historical perspectives accompanied by a descent into the world of abstract geometric figures and numbers.
- *Stupor antiutopicus*: the loss of utopian perspectives, disillusionment in utopias and their absurd deformations (Orwell's Animal Farm).
- *Stupor nonsensualis*: formal signs lose their natural meaning and become absurd puns (E. Lear's and Ch. Morgenstern's poetry of nonsense).

If eusophy pursues universal knowledge detached from applied technology and industrial production, technosophy meets their demands but remains blind to human society and common consumers. Booms of consumers' goods turn attention to ordinary needs of common people and adopt populistic views of social emancipation typical of **demosophy**. Demosophy implies a philosophical sociologism that strives for social and cultural materialism and analyses phenomena in their historical, geographic and social profiles. Its methodology definitely proved prolific in Aristotelian Peripatetics, Huguenot historiographers and modern Positivism. Its goal of impartial and objective universal knowledge suggests J. A. Comenius' ideal of *pansophia*.

- *Pansophia comparatistica*: a comparative approach to social phenomena and a tendency to analyse them on large statistic samples.
- *Pansophia sociologica*: a tendency to visualise phenomena on their social background and depict them in the setting of a large social panorama.

Demosophy brings a culminating peak of scientific prosperity but also announces the first tokens of a coming rapid decline. The crisis of economic stagflation stupefies science by a strong conservative counter-reaction and turns it into a sort of sterile religious scholastics. The bloom of scientific studies is regularly terminated by rehearsals of St Bartholomew's Night, one of fanatic campaigns conducted by the Catholic League. Science has to give way to metaphysics, a mental disorder manifested by blindness to reality, evolution, society and logic. The final result is **idolosophy** showing several symptoms:

- *Idolatria scholastica*: science collapses and degenerates into religious scholastics, it turns into a cult of saints and an exegesis of their texts.
- *Idolatria sectae* (**sectarianism**): scientific sectarianism conceiving research as persevering in an orthodox doctrine developing an esoteric wisdom founded by sacred texts of a prophet.
- *Idolatria heraldica*: ardent idolatry as a cult of idols, icons, emblems, coats-of-arms, relics, ossuaries and sacred texts.
- *Idolatria aboriginalis*: sciences adopts a primitive savage mind's optics by failing to see essential but invisible meanings (real genetic categories) and managing to see only accidental but visible signs: icons, idols, flags, relics.
- *Dyslogia lombardica*: scientific dogmatism as an utter inability to beget a meaningful thought or to understand foundations of any science, typical of all scholastics, the disease of 'ritualistic absent-headedness' manifested by the first great scholastic philosopher Petrus Lombardus or by the first scholastic Marxist philosopher Mikhail Lifshitz who wrote *florilegia* of their prophets' sentences but failed to utter a single sentence of their own.
- *Jesuititis emblematica*: the disease of jesuitism resting in a blindfolded demonisation of all heretics, infidels and apostates of faith manifested in an unsound cult of religious orthodoxy and unwavering loyalty to church.
- *Intolerantia satanica* (**exorcism**): rational science, protestant heretics and progressive social theories are demonised as devilish devices worth wiping out of the world's surface.
- *Obscurantia irrationalis*: scientific irrationalism waging pogromist campaigns against scientific objectivism under auspices of irrational cults.
- *Calumnia pogromistica* (**inquisitionism**): witch hunts, practices of hidden terror and illegal trials abused by secret lodges against all heretics
- *Calumnia coprophilica* (**calumnism**): a tendency of right-wing tabloids to throw dirt and dung on all positive and progressive social values (impregnative tabloid journalism, 'hovnomazalská euforie', graffiti terrorism)

Idolosophy is only the maturing incubation phase of deep cultural and scientific crisis that continues with **cacosophy** (bad knowledge) or mystosophy (occult, esoteric, mysterious wisdom). In dark ages they may occupy three or four 7-year cycles while in bright ages they are usually contracted into one cycle. **Cacosophy** is a convenient catchword for fates of science in the period of cultural catastrophism (apocalyptism), a trend symptomatic of culminating social and economic criminality and growing negativism in culture, art, politics and morals.

- *Paralysis regressiva* (**regressivism**): a belief in regressive (Spengler), apocalyptic (Derrida) or catastrophic future (Stoic Chrysippus, Buffon).

- *Xenophobia nauseatica*: an anti-humanist philosophy of xenophobia, physical disgust and contempt for all alien races, or for all humankind.
- *Nausea alienans*: the philosophy of nausea as a universal sentiment vexed by mean anti-humanist xenophobias, an inveterate hatred against all immigrants and foreigners seen as 'impudent aliens' and 'slimy monsters'.

The inflexion point of cacosophy is followed by a period of hermetic spiritualism manifested in astrology and occult sciences. Their designation as **mystosophy** indicates predilection for the mysterious and the esoteric.

- *Pestilentia hermetica* (**hermetism**): a radical turn from objective knowledge of outer reality to the transcendent supernatural world.
- *Toxoplasmosis semiotica*: a semiotic plague indulging in interpreting irrational signs and tokens in different ambiguous allegoric connotations.
- *Claustrophilia infernalis* (**infernalism**): the myth of a subterranean cave combined with belief in a hollow globe and a hollow underworld inhabited by a subterraneous race of mysterious over-men.

The final phase of dark ages is represented by 'sacred wars' that cause large-scale destruction and necessarily result in periods of peaceful reconstruction. Its characteristic ideology may be termed **monumentalism** as it combines religious fundamentalism with military heroism (Carlyle's hero worship).

- *Obscurantia militans* (**crusaderism**): calls for 'a bloody bath' and 'a sacred war' (Christian crusade, Islamic jihad, Greek *hagios polemos*) waged against all aliens, heretics and heathens, calls for conquering the land stolen by barbarian infidels (Bernard de Clairvaux, Ignatio de Loyola, Joseph de Maistre and Adolph Rosenberg).
- *Inflatus heroicus* (exaggerated bonapartism, caesarism and hero worship): the theory of a higher race of over-men dwelling in a subterranean cave or a higher race of 'nazists surviving in the cosmic space'; their outer appearance may take shape of astronauts, extra-terrestrials, ufonauts, slimy monsters or subterranean supermen.

Philosophy

Traditional views consider every philosopher as a wiseacre preaching a consistent doctrine of practical wisdom. His philosophical doctrine is understood as a scientific theory composed from logical propositions and postulates whose veracity may be tested easily by modern science. Its core is seen in its cognitive function and logical arguments defending his theoretical position. However, the scientific content of his philosophy is difficult to

complete into a consistent theoretical system because his logical statements play a secondary role of supplementary justification. Theorems of Plato's older contemporary Gorgias do not need opponents because they refute one another by themselves: '(1) *Nothing exists*; (2) *even if anything existed it would not be accessible to our knowledge,* (3) *even if it were accessible to our knowledge, it could not be explained*'. Anaxagoras and his *φυσιολόγοι* 'physicists' refused such statements as absurd but since they were intended for the fashionable society at philosophical disputations in Kallikles' house they were accepted by contemporaries as amusing. They were applauded for their nihilism, agnosticism and irrational irony because they precisely expressed **social attitudes** and feelings of his times, regardless of their cognitive falseness.

The primary goal of philosophy is to provide secondary rationalisation and philosophical arguments for social attitudes, changing cultural moods and aesthetic visions swaying large collective groups of people. Their reasoning is a secondary question of strategy in the **philosophical discourse** taking place in the context of religious beliefs reigning in a community and society. Every society seems to conduct an independent political, religious and philosophical discourse but they all have similar fates and turning-points. Socrates took part in the discourse proceeding at Athenian schools of philosophy from the 460s and identified himself with all of its important phases: Anaxagoras' hylozoic materialism, Protagoras' sensualism, Gorgias' formalism and nihilism as well as his disciple Plato's idealism. Historians of philosophy fail to see the meandering philosophical and social discourse as a process and muddle up its course by attempting to complete its participators' opinions into consistent independent doctrines. What really matters are not individual philosophers and their personal whimsicalities but the cultural process as a whole and its gradual phasing. Such phasing is manifested in shifting the ideological focus and permanent changes in the subjective choice of philosophical topics betraying changing social values and attitudes. Philosophy is not a sort of natural science and a section of modern physics but a sort of applied ideology that tends to disguise as natural theology or secular religion.

The **ideological approach** to philosophical thought considers philosophers as secular priests who rationalise poetic visions and reformulate them as wise sayings. Their visions are easier to describe in terms of **poetical topology** or theological cosmogony exploring the realms of the heaven, paradise, purgatory and hell. Philosophers enjoy dwelling in the physical, sensual, formal or social world or they resort to the psychical, divine and supernatural world, denying the existence of all other alternative worlds. Materialists philosophise in the paradisical meadow of a blissful pastoral idyll and recognise only the physical universe, neglecting the spiritual world. Metaphysicians and idealists meditate in a gloomy subterranean or infernal cave and do not recognise anything but

the spiritual world. Historians of philosophy will abstain from such topological considerations as inappropriate because they fail to understand their deeper ideological background. They do not realise that philosophers are heavenly architects building up the topological hierarchy of material, empirical, phenomenal, spiritual and divine worlds. Positive and negative comments on such worlds represent axiological theses that cannot be scrutinised in detail as scientific postulates and judged according to laws of modern physics. Philosophical opinions are not isolated pieces of knowledge fitting in the mosaic of modern science but organic social beliefs that cannot be exempted from their contemporary social context and historical framework. If we judge them as eternal phenomena beyond space and time we commit a vivisection that kills them and empties their natural content.

The first step to scientific philosophy requires drawing difference between **philosophical patients** and graduated **philosophical physicians**. All classic philosophers resemble poets or politicians who do practical philosophy and weave the cobweb of their own philosophical visions without being able to explain other systems. The physicians among philosophers are scientific historiographers who resign from enforcing their own philosophical attitudes but attempt at a systematic classification of all historical philosophical systems. The only scientific philosophy worth that name would be **medical psychopathology** expounding philosophical thought in terms of changing axiological systems. Its primary goal would be to outline a consistent symptomatology of philosophical diseases in dependence upon social tumours.

The elementary propositions of scientific philosophy may be formalised as **axiologic theses** or oriented relations with plus and minus marks:

Materialism = φ(- conscience, + matter)
Idealism = φ^{-1}(-matter, + conscience)
Ontism = φ(- not-being, + being)
Nihilism = φ^{-1} (- being, + not-being)

The second step concerns their **quantification** by introducing an artificial metric with four or more grades. Parmenides' ontology saying that '*everything exists*' and '*there is no void*' may illustrate **radical ontism** as opposed to opinions classifiable as 'moderate ontism'. On the other hand, Gorgias was a representative of **radical nihilism** denying any positive existence at all.

Radical ontism = (Everything exists, there is no nothingness)
Radical nihilism = (Nothing exists, all that exists is nothingness)

Similarly, George Berkeley's solipsism is an example of radical idealism and his antipode La Mettrie stands for radical materialism. Such opinions may be arranged into a 4-degree hierarchy as follows: *Ontology* = (1 – *radical nihilism*, 2 – *moderate nihilism*, 3 – *moderate ontism*, 4 - *radical ontism*).

The social machine would not be able to rotate its millstones if it did not drive them by urges of political and philosophical attitudes. Its wheels are set into motion by battles that large groups of people conduct on behalf of such noble philosophical ideals as the good, the beautiful, the useful or the divine. Most philosophical trends express **dynamic attitudes** similar to vogues in clothing. Their essential features do not include only future project but also critical responses to the recent past. They cherish vain ephemeral prejudices by loathing yesterday's fashion and adoring today's fashion because their historical mission is to push the society forth by pushing its philosophical fashion a few months forth:

Eusophy (materialism) = φ^1(- spirit, + matter)
Esthosophy (sensualism) = φ^2(- matter, + perception)
Technosophy (formalism) = φ^3(- perception, + form)
Demosophy (sociologism) = φ^4(- form, + society)
Theosophy (idealism) = φ^5(-society, + divinity)

Such formulas define philosophies as dynamic ideologies that distort the real natural world and deform its shape in a desirable way. They reduce it to a sort of decorative mummy that makes no scientific sense but serves as a reliable indicator of mental disorders peculiar to a philosopher and his times. Philosophical views are dynamic pressures that excite learned scholars in the same way as fashions in popular music and clothing excite young teenagers. Every generation fights for its own ideals of beauty, moral and wisdom without understanding their real nature, origin and association with shifts in economic needs. Philosophers cherish philosophical ideals as their inalienable professional outfit without understanding the society that employs them and does the manager's job. They weave their cobwebs without realising their essential role in assisting to carry out urgent social and economic reforms.

The progress of philosophical ideas during one cycle consists in the gradual deconstruction (*Abbau*) of utopias by dissolving contours of the real world and natural reality. This process of dissolving philosophical visions, repeated periodically every half a century, may be dubbed conveniently as 'the gradual Pythagoreisation of philosophical wisdom' or 'the Pythagorean way of all philosophical flesh'. The Milesian philosophy in Ancient Greece arose from Epimenides' religious theology and its secularisation in the age of Solon's political reforms. Thales started his career as a disciple of Egyptian occult sciences but he turned to **physical materialism** when inspired by the scientific rationalism of Solon's era. His age indulged chiefly in contemplating the physical nature and studying the material universe. In the mid-6th century Pherekydes returned back to mysticism but Thales' disciples Anaximenes and Anaximandros managed to restore materialism again. Under the reign of Peisistratos' sons materialism gradually dissolved into sensualism, Orphist

ritualism and Pythagorean formalism. After a few years Pythagoras abandoned formal geometry and changed his school into a religious sect worshipping an esoteric cult of his own person (theosophy).

The same cyclic story happened with Anaxagoras' hylozoic materialism (eusophy) a century later in Athens. Protagoras gave it a stamp of empirical sensualism (esthosophy) and Gorgias' school denied its tenets by a new rhetoric formalism and agnostic nihilism (technosophy). At this stage technosophy experienced an encounter with a counter-reaction of 'demosophy' (social materialism) defended by egalitarians among the Older Sophist (Prodikos, Antiphon). They defended Periclean democracy by glorifying social simplicity and human naturalness (*fýsis*). But the Younger Sophists betrayed the ideals of social equality and mocked at them in Orwellian untiutopias depicting primitive animal communities. They emphasised the necessity of war, violence, conventions and laws (*nomoi*) enslaving barbarian tribes. When oligarchs started to overthrow democratic governments, Socrates took young philosophers to Pythian oracles at Delphi and inspired them with new religious traditionalism (idolosophy). He blew the trumpet to announce a religious revival, a return to oracles, mysteries and a strict observation of rites. Under Plato's leadership his disciples turned to martial and judicial astrology and plunged into utter mysticism (theosophy, mystosophy).

Such changes in philosophical approaches did not appear as arbitrary individual creeds of philosophical geniuses but came as sequential phases of the standard **philosophical process** that agitates the social mind in regular periodic cycles. Its lawful character is determined by the same patterns of **social psychology** as other cultural fields. In order to pass from one state into another, society must respond to the contradictions of the present state by generating an axiological system apt to transform it into the next state. Philosophers assist in this process by translating its inner urges into the speech of philosophical ideas. Historians of philosophy should not segment its progress into individual doctrines but *épistémés* (Bachelard 1978; Foucault 1966, 1971) and changing paradigms (Kuhn 1965; Eisenstadt - Curelaru 1976; Ritzer 1980; Petrusek et al. 2000)

The classification of elementary types of philosophical systems applied to ancient Greek philosophy was foreshadowed in Table 38. Its terms are needful for establishing one unified taxonomy of trends for all social and cultural sciences but each must be compatible with traditional terms used in current philosophical literature. The following redefinitions do not give their exhausting descriptions but they are flexible enough to cover their traditional concepts as well as their dynamic mission in the cultural progress. Their defining in terms of exact science would only obscure their **ecologic**, i.e. their 'inner economic logic' that makes them efficient tools of social reforms.

physical materialism (eusophy): the priority of the physical nature and the material world, a materialisation of spiritual and mental categories.
empirical sensualism (esthosophy): the priority of empirical data, perception and personal feelings, an aesthetisation of physical reality.
logical formalism (technosophy): the world reduced to numbers and pure forms (Pythagora's numbers, Plato's triangular *spermata chrematon*), a formalisation of all philosophical categories.
social materialism (demosophy): the priority of human society and economy, a sociologisation of philosophy, studying phenomena as statistic populations.
idolatric idealism (idolosophy): the priority of material signs, idols, icons flags, standards and relic as symbols of eternal spiritual tradition.
theosophic idealism (theosophy): philosophical creationism preaching the priority of divine creative energy in the origin of natural phenomena
hermetic idealism (mystosophy): hermetic physicalism turning to astrology and natural phenomena as symbols of human fates.



Table 53 *The dial of trends on the* '*philosophical clock*'

Such terms give philosophical trends a conspicuous characteristic but fail to illustrate the fluency with which they flow easily into one another. Hermetic idealism and physical materialism seem to represent absolute opposites but, as is clear from the circular diagram on Table 53, in historical chronology they are close neighbours because hermetic mystics regularly melts through pantheism into a cosmic materialism. Materialists tend to materialise the human soul but at the cost of deifying the physical nature and enlivening matter with spirits and gods (Thales, Anaxagoras, La Mettrie). Such mutual

transitions and neighbourhood relations are revealed in a more instructive way by the topology of philosophical and religious opinions on Table 54.



Table 54 *A comparative topology of philosophic and religious worlds*

Religionistics

The definitions of philosophical trends listed in the preceding chapter presuppose that philosophy is a kind of secularised theology or moral physics. The inverted statement that theology is a kind of divine philosophy also holds good. Theology is heavy artillery on the same battlefield where philosophy is air force and everyday moral operates as infantry. In order to unite all these armies under one commander-in-chief, we should expound cultural history as religious history, and interpret modern socialism as one of many historical rehearsals of Protestant reformations.

Our knowledge as to religion is slurred very much by dogmatic considerations about everlasting churches (Christianism, Islam, Buddhism). We tend to regard every church as one undivided consistent whole without noticing that it has historically composed from many incompatible tribal cults of different descent. Every **church** represents an inorganic compound of many various contradictory traditions that originally lacked any meaningful historical links but fused into one thicket because they intertwined heterogeneous religious cultures growing in one area. Most authors indulge in gross national characteristic claiming that ancient Greek religion was

polytheistic while medieval Christianism was monotheistic, however, these observations are valid only vaguely for their dominant components.

Before we start analysing any ecclesiastic doctrine, we must decompose its amalgamated compound into pure elements of two types: original **prehistoric cults** and modern **religious movements** (reformations). The former may be reconstructed by **static religionistics** analysing churches into remnants of tribal cults, the latter are basic units of **dynamic religionistics** enquiring into parallel dynamic changes that transform religions of different origin and stamp. The first way leads to a decomposition of historical compounds into prehistoric elements, the second way studies how historical compounds of heterogeneous origin exhibit similar behaviour because they obey the same laws. Both methods abstract from long-term traditions and large cultural blocs in efforts to concentrate on finer short-term dynamic units: sects, religious movements, church reformations, spiritual revivals and individual theologies.

Dynamic religionistics claims that various national religious traditions undergo similar dynamic transformations repeating in periodic cycles and sequential series. Prophetic, apocalyptic, theosophical or chiliastic literature spreads in periodic cycles through all religious traditions because it responds faithfully to the brightening dawns and darkening dusks of our cultural dailiness. Religious scholastics becomes a dominant form of cultural ideology in all dark ages and its periodic alternation with secular eras of Protestant reformation makes religious history an ideal backbone of cultural history. All religions seem to pass through a similar sequential series of beliefs in close correspondence to standard social situations:

chthonism (eudoxy): the agrarian cult of chthonic deities (earth – soil, water - rain, fire – sun, air – heavens; the priority of the physical nature.
hylozoism (eudoxy): an ancient modernisation of chthonic cults into agents hyletic needed for agriculture.
deism (eudoxy): a modern cult of the physical nature with God as the primordial moving force of the universe.
atheism (esthodoxy): a rational secularisation of religion worshipping personal beauty and voluptuous pleasures of sensuous life.
adamitism (esthodoxy): a return to Adam's garment and the original paradisiacal state of nakedness concealing a tendency to Epicureism.
formalism (technodoxy): a metaphysical revision of religion with deities reduced to abstract teleological principles (Pythagoreism, Platonism, Aristotelian functionalism, Cartesianism, Kantism).
mendicantism (demodoxy): the popular (Palaeo-Pygmic) tradition of itinerant and mendicant preachers (Buddhism, Taoism, Sophists, Cynics, *Albigenses*, *Waldenses*, Franciscans, Lollards, Hussites, Taborites) teaching the wisdom of humble, poor and moderate life.

ritualism (idolodoxy): a strict observation of rites combined with blind idolatry worshipping the church cult of idols, icons, standards and relics.
apocalyptism (cacodoxy): sectarianism prophecying Doomsday (Last Judgement, Armageddon) and preparing confessors for collective suicides.
martyrologism (cacodoxy): a cult of martyrs who commit suicidal attacks on infidels in order to inspire collective passions of fanaticism.
hermetism (mystodoxy): hermetic sectarianism turning ecclesiastic orthodoxy into astrology and esoteric cults; all natural phenomena are interpreted as symbols of human fates.
fundamentalism (polemodoxy): religious fanaticism kindling hatreds for inciting military terrorism and waging 'sacred wars'.
messianism (eudoxy): a soteriological belief in the coming of a Saviour or Messiah who will save his chosen nation or people.
chiliasm: a doctrine prophecying that 'good king' (Christ) will return to reign for a new millennium.

Table 55 *Typology of religious systems*

When Greek polytheists cults had to support calls for a new colonisation, they waged 'sacred wars' similar to Christian crusades and Islamic jihads. The medieval knights wandered to Palestine in search of the Holy Rod, the Holy Grail and Jesus Christ's relics. Also ancient Greeks attacked foreign city states in quest of Orestes' and Theseus' relics and disguised colonisation under the pretext of false religious reasons. They had their own fanatic priests who gave blessing to conquests and urged them to kill barbarians as infidels. Their fundamentalism resembled its modern varieties in visions of dark caves and subterranean supermen. Before Epimenides (cca 600 *BC*) exorcised demons out of the minds of Athenian citizens, upset by the murder of Kylon, he slept for 57 years in a cave. About 560 *BC* his follower Pherekydes gave an allegoric interpretation of his cave *Heptamychos* (Cave with Seven Corners). Also Plato dreamt his dream about this world in a cave where all real things appeared as false copies of eternal ideas hidden in the dark. The same myth haunted Aristophanes when he was writing his comedy *Plutos* (388 *BC*). It described the world of contemporary oligarchic plutocracy as a shadowland of phantoms in a subterranean netherworld Hades controlled by money.

The irrational myth of a superman race living in a subterranean cave makes regular appearance at times of all ruling oligarchies. Plato backed up his uncle Kritias' reign of the Thirty Tyrants (404 *BC*) and his sombre mythology helped dig up the grave for Athenian democracy. Modern fundamentalism has inherited this heritage from the Rosecrucian Order and its revival in the decadent novel writing at the end of the 19th century. Bulwer-Lytton's novel *The Coming Race* (1871) described a cacotopia of a lordly supernatural

civilisation living in the middle of the Earth. Himmler launched expeditions in quest of the Holy Grail and in search of the subterranean realm Agartha. Göring propagated his pilot Bender's theories about the sun and the moon lying in a hollow space enclosed impenetrably by surrounding rocks. Hitler's private astrologer Fuhrer preached *Hohl Welt Lehre* about an empty hollow middle of the Earth and made it an official doctrine when he became 'government commissioner for mathematics, physics and astronomy' (Pauwels, Bergier 1971).

The myths of the Hollow World represent an invariant constant of mythology in all oligarchies in the same way as blissful paradisal utopias express characteristic visions in all autarchies. The traditional dogmatic view separates religious fundamentalism and secular atheism as two opposite incompatible principles but dynamic ideometry can trace their extremes as neighbouring phases in a circular rotation within one cycle. A sequence of axiologic transformation will make one population pass from religious fanaticism to Messianism, hero worship, Caesarism, Bonapartism and an atheistic cult of classics. Speaking in terms of religious topology or cosmogony, the same population will pass from **cavernalism** (the myth of a subterranean cave), **infernalism** (apocalyptic catastrophism indulging in visions of the hell) and **astralism** (hermetic astrology) to **celestialism** (brightening visions of heavens), **paradisalism** (brightening visions of the paradise), **pantheism** (cosmic optimism finding divinity in the physical nature) to **idyllism** (enjoying earthly utopias). Dante's *Divine Comedy* should not be read as a treatise on Christian eschatology but as a political utopia expressing a wide scale of fine shades in the darkening and dawning of the political scene. Such topology changes with the corresponding paradigmatic patterns in social typology and cosmic chronology. The comparative topology of cultural worlds projected on Table 54 presupposes that every world is a grade in a continuous scale of ideological mystification. Religion, secular hero worship and aesthetics are not independent cultural genres but different genres of applied social technology providing different degrees of ideologisation (see Table 47).

When we unify cultural fields into one **integral macroideology** we can see that modern science fights in a boxing-ring with the same rivals as it did at the dawn of civilisation. Its chief antipode has always been **creationism**, the religious and scientific creed of a savage, a medieval scholastic or Derrida's modern deconstructed metaphysician maintaining that natural entities are created intentionally of will as symbols by a supernatural race of Creators (gods, prophets, saints, martyrs, heroes, classics, authors, geniuses). Creationism is periodically revived by perpetual returns of hermeneutics that does not study natural phenomena (stars, planets, animal species, languages, books, poems, works of art) in the evolutionary and historical process of their

making but as isolated ‘creations’, ‘signs’ and ‘texts’ devised by demiurges to be interpreted in rites of orthodox exegesis by sects of their faithful worshippers (J. Derrida 1976; Paul de Man 1978, 1993, J. J. Altizer 1980). Real scientists confess a different religion, a creed advocated in the 19th century by Darwin’s **evolutionism** and in the 20th century by Chomsky’s **generativism** (Chomsky 1957, 1966). Both philosophies coincide in the idea of an **autogenesis**, natural phenomena grow and develop by natural evolution, they are generated naturally in a deterministic way simulated by modern **self-reproducing automata**. Whether we attribute this scientific revolution to Norman Wiener or Noam Chomsky, their principal idea is that texts, artefacts, languages and other modern commodities can be generated by artificial processes simulating natural processes in the physical nature in such a way that their phases constitute also elementary taxonomic categories.

Natural phenomena are not intentional spiritual creations to be interpreted by religious sects but entities generated naturally by periodic processes of the material universe. As there are periodic tables of elementary particles, chemical elements and chemical compounds, there exist periodic tables of a lawful evolution of stars and organic life on planets. As there is a systematic taxonomy of animals derived from the phylogenesis of their species, there exist also its meaningful continuations in the human anthropogenesis, ethnogenesis and glottogenesis. Societies, myths, poems and paintings are not isolated creations of demiurges either, there exists also a lawful sociogenesis of human cultures, religions and arts and their systematic taxonomy defined by periodicity in their development.

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